Socio-economic Problems Facing Africa: Insights from six APRM Country Review Reports

Terence Corrigan
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ABSTRACT

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) tries to identify both problems facing participating countries and solutions to these problems. However, thus far it has proven easier to examine the problems that countries face than to come up with actionable solutions, says Terence Corrigan, a researcher and seminar facilitator at the South African Institute of International Affairs. This paper seeks to identify common socio-economic development problems revealed in six African countries that have received APRM Country Review Reports, and to look at the solutions they offer.

The six countries are Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria and Benin. All have gone through difficult phases in the relatively recent past. Their issues are not identical but it is possible to find common links.

Two hidden factors hamper analysis. First is an apparent reluctance to explore political influences that can dictate success or failure, raising a ‘difficult question’: who gains and loses from development options? Second, an absence of precise information, leading to important phenomena not being taken into account. Even the definition of poverty is hotly debated, creating an impression that poverty is increasing despite economic growth.

Among the common problems are unemployment, access to land, weak educational systems, gender discrimination, and poor health care systems. Add to that, external dependency – a situation in which ‘the world’s poorest region overall’ is reliant on donors.

It is apparent, concludes the author, that extensive hurdles to development remain: encompassing a range of factors from the visible offshoots of unstable economies, to the existence of a survivalist mentality, cultural and traditional practices, absence of skills, corruption and a lack of political will.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Terence Corrigan holds a BA (Hons) in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg) and has worked as a teacher in South Africa and Taiwan. He has held research positions at the South African Institute of Race Relations and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). He is currently employed by SAIIA as a researcher and seminar facilitator on its governance and African Peer Review Mechanism project. His research interests include local government, political thought, South African and Southern African politics, aid and development assistance, labour issues, crime, and arts and culture, and he has published in all these areas.
INTRODUCTION

Central to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process — and in common with any of the previous attempts at continental reform — is the question of how broad-based development and hence alleviation of poverty can be achieved and the socio-economic conditions of Africa’s people improved. It makes a firm attempt, in line with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) initiative, to link governance with development and economic growth. To this end, the APRM emphasises ‘socio-economic development’ as one of the four broad thematic areas that must be interrogated in the course of the process. The hope is that this interrogation — carried out in separate, but linked, phases by the in-country stakeholders and by the pan-African Country Review Mission (CRM) — will either identify strengths and weaknesses in the reviewed countries’ efforts to deal with socio-economic challenges or at least shine some light on them and perhaps encourage some new thinking.

PARAMETERS

The focus of this paper is on the problems facing reviewed countries. Problems lend themselves to better and more empirical observation than ideas about solutions, and the commonalities among the problems facing different countries can more readily be identified than putative solutions. Therefore, while the achievements of the countries and the recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons will receive some attention, they will not be discussed in the same detail as the problems.

Little distinction has been made between the material in the Country Review Reports (CRRs) drawn from the Country Self-Assessment Reports (CSARs) and that produced by the CRM itself. The rationale is that if material from the CSAR was included in the report without an explicit refutation, it was accepted as having been agreed to by the CRM. The material from the reports has in places been supplemented by material drawn from elsewhere, where this was useful for explaining an issue further or indicating subsequent developments.

Dealing with six CRRs written by different teams means that there is not perfect consistency among the reports. The degrees of detail they contain vary. Some — such as the reports on Kenya and South Africa — buttress their arguments with fairly extensive supporting information. The reports on Ghana and Rwanda contain rather less detail. There is also no firm consistency regarding the issues raised in the various reports. Indeed, these reports deal with six different countries, and the issues they face are not identical. In preparing this paper, attempts were made at categorising the various issues involved; this would allow common or related problems to be analysed. Ultimately, what has been attempted in this paper is to identify the common problems facing Africa in broad strokes, and to provide some analysis and discussion in a reasonable degree of detail rather than splitting the problems into a more extensive list from the outset.

In the same vein, the question could be raised as to what makes an issue ‘common’. There is no clear answer to this, and the particular circumstances of one country will probably not exist in others. However, a problem experienced in one country might have parallels in or lessons for others. For instance, the dislocation caused by Rwanda’s 1994
genocide may not have a direct parallel in another country, but the problems may be ‘common’ to the extent that other countries have had to deal with other ‘dislocation’ issues — migration, refugees, etc.

Finally, to the extent that the recommendations of the report have been considered, they have, with a few exceptions, been sourced only within the socio-economic development section. Other recommendations germane to the material presented here may well exist in other sections, but this was outside the immediate purview of this study. An attempt has been made to identify all the solutions (in the socio-economic development section) relevant to the issue under review.

THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED

The APRM reports that have thus far been produced cover six countries: Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa. While all of these are participants in the APRM process and are members of the African Union, they also exhibit some profound differences, which can be expected to influence the problems that each of them faces. This is briefly illustrated by Table 1, which records some socio-economic indicators from the latest available Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Table 1: Socio-economic indicators, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI a</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>GDP b per capita, 2005 PPP c ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>7,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>1,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>2,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>1,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>1,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>11,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All developing countries</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>5,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa d</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least developed countries</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>9,543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP, op. cit.

a Human Development Index. The HDI combines several indicators of human welfare, including life expectancy, education and standard of living, in order to produce a composite ranking that indicates the overall condition of the country. It uses a scale with scores between 0.000 and 1. The closer to 1 the score is, the higher the level of development.

b Gross domestic product.

c Purchasing power parity.

d Excludes Algeria.
The information in Table 1 shows a considerable spread in the indicators. In terms of context, Algeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa are classed as having a medium level of human development, while Benin and Rwanda are regarded as having a low level. None of these countries has a high level. The latter status is largely the province of countries in Europe and North America, along with some in South America, Asia and the Middle East, and a handful of island states. Only one African country — Mauritius — falls into this category. That said, only one of the reviewed states — Algeria — has an average life expectancy that matches that for developing countries and for the world. Algeria’s life expectancy not only far exceeds that of the other reviewed states, but also several of the states in the high-level group. Its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is respectable at more than $7,000 PPP. South Africa has a GDP per capita that not only comfortably exceeds that of its peers, as well as the average for the world, developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa, but also that of a number of states with a high level of development; this, however, says little about income distribution in the country and has no relationship to its life expectancy, which is exceeded here even by Benin — the poorest country in the list — and by the life expectancy for the least developed countries. This is largely a function of South Africa’s severe HIV/Aids epidemic, which has caused life expectancy to tumble over the past decade.

The reviewed countries have all gone through difficult phases in the relatively recent past. Their histories have included terrorism in Algeria in the 1990s, economic decline and periods of authoritarian rule in Ghana and Benin, highly corrupt one-party rule in Kenya, apartheid in South Africa and the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda. This was coupled with generally poor governance and unsuccessful economic policies. This, then, is the background to the APRM assessments, and to the common problems facing Africa. Overcoming such legacies, setting countries on the path to prosperity and encouraging competent governance are what Nepad and the APRM are concerned with.

It should, however, be noted that despite the existence of common problems, profound differences among the reviewed countries exist. South Africa has developed an industrial and technological economy whose size and sophistication is unique in Africa. Kenya has also developed an industrial sector and benefits from revenue as a major tourism destination. It is, however, still recovering from the post-election violence in December 2007 and January 2008. Rwanda, Benin and Ghana, by contrast, are predominantly agricultural and extractive economies. Algeria is unique among the six countries for being located on the Mediterranean, with a predominantly Arab culture, and having significant oil and gas reserves, whose high prices have contributed to the high per capita income.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are referenced in various places in the reports and are viewed as a key indicator of and reference for socio-economic development. They were intended as targets to be achieved for development in the world as a whole with special emphasis on poorer countries. In tandem with what was seen as a renewed emphasis on accelerating development in Africa, they are useful accompaniments to the APRM reports, and they are referenced in these reports, providing standards against which development progress can be measured. The likelihood that countries will meet them
can be debated, however. For its part, one of the CRRs argues that that the ‘MDGs are indeed achievable, but not with a business-as-usual attitude. The authorities need to act differently and rapidly in favour of rural areas, urban slums and especially women and children living in these areas.’

The specific goals are listed in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target 1a</th>
<th>Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target 1b</td>
<td>Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 1c</td>
<td>Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 2a</td>
<td>Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 3a</td>
<td>Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 4a</td>
<td>Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 5a</td>
<td>Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 5b</td>
<td>Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 6a</td>
<td>Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 6b</td>
<td>Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 6c</td>
<td>Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 7a</td>
<td>Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 7b</td>
<td>Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 7c</td>
<td>Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and Basic sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 7d</td>
<td>Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8a</td>
<td>Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8b</td>
<td>Address the special needs of the least developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8c</td>
<td>Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8d</td>
<td>Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8e</td>
<td>In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8f</td>
<td>In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Underlining the fact that Africa is not a unified or uniform entity, the prospects of fulfilling the MDGs are seen as variable. In the case of Kenya, the CRR notes that it the country unlikely to be able to meet the goals with the exception of the provision of primary education and a fall in the rate of HIV/AIDS. Algeria is viewed as a success story in that it has done well in meeting its MDGs. Benin's economy has not grown adequately to reverse the country's development problems. The Ghanaian CRR recognises that progress has been made, but notes that the country is not likely to achieve a number of MDGs. The South African CRR notes that an implementation report on the MDGs indicates considerable achievement in working towards the goals, although meeting them would entail a 'more than doubling of effort' in the coming years. It further calls for the country fully to integrate the MDGs into its planning. The Rwandan CRR provides some (incomplete) statistical information on progress towards meeting the MDGs, which indicates that there has been a mixture of progress, stagnation and regression.

The issues tackled in the six reports can be divided into two broad groups.

**Process issues:** These include observations about the manner in which the reports were compiled and the limitations of this process, as well as overarching considerations in putting the reports together. To some extent, it is instructive that certain considerations seem to be absent.

**Content issues:** These are the issues directly addressed by the reports and, for example, relate to such issues as health and education. The choice of issues is to a significant extent guided by the APRM's Questionnaire. This is a hefty document that requires that countries provide answers to a wide range of queries on various political and socio-economic topics. Its goals are to provide some structure to the review.

The Questionnaire has the following broad 'objectives' in its socio-economic thematic area, which is the subject of this investigation (these 'objectives' are divided into 'questions', and further subdivided into 'indicators' that provide a greater level of granularity):

**Objective 1:** Promotion of self-reliance in development and capacity building for self-sustaining development

**Objective 2:** Acceleration of socio-economic development to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication

**Objective 3:** Strengthening of policy delivery mechanisms and outcomes in key social development areas, including education for all, health and combating HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases

**Objective 4:** Ensuring affordable access to water, sanitation, energy, finance (including microfinance), markets, information and communications technology (ICT), shelter and land to all citizens, especially the rural poor

**Objective 5:** Promotion of gender equality in all critical areas of concern, including education for girls at all levels
Objective 6: Encouraging broad-based participation in development by stakeholders at all levels.

PROCESS ISSUES

Process issues include those discussed below.

1 Political factors

The political dimensions of the socio-economic issues discussed receive relatively little direct analysis. The existence of a particular policy is seen as evidence of the political will to address problems, and, as a minimalist position, this is a defensible one to take. However, African governments are frequently accused of adopting policies to please donors or to comply with some governance commitment, but with limited will to see them through.15

There seems to be reluctance in the reports to investigate or comment on political drivers of policy, although these may well be key to understanding a particular policy direction, or a policy's success or failure.

Another consideration is that a considerable body of writing exists that posits that corruption and disorder function as political strategies.16 While corruption or patronage may, objectively, retard development for a country as a whole, they can work to the advantage of particular groups and leaders. A very difficult, but necessary, question that is not properly raised concerns what might be called the political economy of development: in other words, examining which groups would gain from a well-ordered and successful process and development and which would lose. Such an analysis might also demonstrate why particular choices are made or why certain development options may not have been attempted or are not likely to be.

One should be cautious in imputing motives for this failure to the review team, and it should be recorded that the political considerations behind policy are frequently not articulated by governments or are in fact different from what is claimed (one might describe these as ulterior motives). Political motivation is extremely difficult to quantify.

The reports do at times take issue — although circumspectly — with some of the political dynamics of a particular country. For example, the report on South Africa notes that 'there continues to be some denial that HIV and Aids is real, even among high-ranking public officials'.17

2 Data

A constant issue throughout the CRRs is that precise information on particular problems is lacking. This creates obvious difficulties for any research effort aiming to understand a given problem. Data gaps are not specific to any particular content, but suggest an overall situation in which important phenomena are not understood or recorded. Some examples of this are discussed below.
Child trafficking in Kenya: The Kenyan CRR notes:\(^\text{18}\) Child trafficking and the treatment of child offenders are other areas of concern. Though there are no data on the trafficking of children to help determine the magnitude of the problem in the country, it is believed that Kenya is the centre for child recruitment, transit and receiving in the East African region.

Employment and economic matters: In this respect, the contribution of women to the Kenyan economy is not well recorded or understood (‘There is little or no understanding of either the actual contribution of women to the economy or the real impact of the few initiatives on the ground in support of women\(^\text{19}\)’), although the CRR goes on to note that Kenya's statistical authorities are working on compiling such information. In the Beninese CRR, it is noted that a lack of understanding of employment retards development efforts:\(^\text{20}\)

Employment is a major concern and, unfortunately, its profile is still not well known so that effective measures aimed at finding lasting solutions could be taken, especially for the benefit of the youth and women, who are the main victims of unemployment.

Education in Algeria: The CRR notes that ‘the output of the system is low’. After describing some problems, such as dropouts, it notes that ‘[t]he CRM was unable to obtain accurate data to assess the situation in quantitative terms, but there is good reason to have concerns in this regard.’\(^\text{21}\)

Poverty: How poverty should be defined and measured and its exact magnitude are not completely agreed upon or understood. For instance, the Beninese CRR notes:\(^\text{22}\)

Meetings with stakeholders in the prefectures visited revealed that poverty is a basic concern, and that prefectures still lack complete information to understand the phenomenon and contribute to the search for viable solutions to eradicate it, or at least to mitigate it through local initiatives.

In the Rwandan CRR, similar concerns are noted:

The Ministry of Finance, however, pointed out that poverty statistics after 2000 are speculative, and that one cannot be certain that poverty indicators are indeed rising.\(^\text{23}\)

Of South Africa, the CRR says: ‘Due to inadequate data on poverty, the CRM was unable to confirm the poverty trends’.\(^\text{24}\) In South Africa, the reliability of poverty statistics — and other data — is widely debated.\(^\text{25}\)

HIV prevalence: In the Rwandan CRR, the lack of reliable statistics for HIV infection rates is noted, but it is also noted that the process of establishing a statistical authority is under way.\(^\text{26}\) A lack of ‘reliable statistics’ is also noted as a problem in the South African CRR.\(^\text{27}\)

Policy impact: The Beninese CRR notes:\(^\text{28}\)

The CSAR indicates that Benin has laws and institutions that cater for water, sanitation, energy, finance, ICTs and land, and efforts are being made in each of these sectors. However, policies and strategies are adopted whose impact on the populations cannot be easily assessed.
The recommendations in the CRRs accordingly place a great deal on emphasis on establishing reliable data. The Ghanaian CRR, for example, recommends the following: ‘Consider the urgency of gathering good data and statistics, which are important for understanding problems and tracking performance in many areas of socio-economic governance and development’ and ‘in light of the above, make a concerted effort to re-energise and reform the Ghana Statistical Services’. These remarks could describe the situation in many African countries.

**CONTENT ISSUES**

Content issues include those discussed below.

1 **Poverty and deprivation**

**Poverty profile**

Poverty is arguably the dominant problem in the countries under review to which all others relate. A striking point is that the definition of poverty is contentious. For example, the Algerian CRR notes the following:

> Algeria’s poverty profile is still not clearly defined despite abundant documentation on the subject and an impressive mechanism to this end. Poverty remains a very controversial issue, with some people even going so far as refusing to recognise its existence in Algeria. However, on the basis of discussions held in the wilayas [provinces], it appears that poverty can be seen in:

- increased criminality;
- the reappearance of begging (in particular in the West and the South);
- recourse to the informal sector to supplement income;
- ‘squatting’ in cities; and
- clandestine immigration towards the North.

While this is an example specific to Algeria, it should be noted that generally the concept of poverty is hotly debated. Other reports do not dwell on this to the same extent, although the South African CRR notes that the government and civil society have different interpretations of poverty: often the international definition of extreme poverty as someone living on less than $1 per day does not sit well with national poverty thresholds. Indeed, there have been furious debates in the media about trends in respect of poverty; for instance, the South African Institute of Race Relations published a report arguing that poverty (defined as including those living on less that $1 per day) had actually increased since the advent of democracy in that country in 1994, while the government and the ruling party denied this and argued that this was not an accurate measure of poverty in any event. The South African Programme of Action calls for a clear definition of poverty.

Of special concern is the impression that poverty appears to be increasing, despite — in certain instances — some impressive economic growth. For instance, poverty had been rising in the years prior to the APRM process in Kenya, Benin and Rwanda. This was to some degree linked to the policies that informed these countries’ efforts to deal with poverty. The Kenyan CRR, for instance, contends that ‘Kenya has no long-term vision
document for development'36 (Kenya is not an HIPC37 country and thus does not have to prepare poverty reduction strategy papers, which are used as a proxy for a development vision. However, at the time of writing, a concept paper was being prepared). Measures taken to ensure macroeconomic stability in Benin reduced the available resources for poverty alleviation.38 On the other hand, some CRRs, such as Algeria's, note that spending was increasingly directed towards welfare and poverty reduction.39

Unemployment is a significant problem and one of the key causes of poverty. This point is made in the CRRs on Ghana, Kenya and South Africa.60 This implies the imperative of encouraging job creation as a central element of economic policy. The South African CRR takes South Africa's policies to task for lacking a 'comprehensive approach to addressing unemployment in the long run',41 although it notes the emphasis that is being placed on growth in particular sectors. Algeria, by contrast, is complimented:42

The country has put in place important mechanisms for job creation and a social security system that can hardly be rivaled by countries of similar standing in Africa, and even by developed countries. The CRM met with a number of stakeholders in the capital and in the wilayas [provinces] who confirmed their appreciation of such initiatives. The objective of these mechanisms is to mitigate the effects of unemployment among, in particular, the category of first-time temporary job seekers, by contributing to improving qualifications and cushioning side-effects of national economic reforms on social welfare. The establishment of these mechanisms constitutes a case of good practice that must be recognised and highlighted.

Severe poverty is associated with inequality. In Kenya, it is noted:43

Associated with the problem of widespread poverty is the issue of high levels of inequality. Poverty is an urban, rural and provincial phenomenon. Nyanza Province had a poverty incidence of 64.6% while that of the Central Province was 31.1%. Generally, five of the eight provinces have recorded poverty incidences of over 57%. According to the CSAR, the bottom 10% of Kenyan households control less than 1% of the total income while the top 10% of households control 42%. This can be interpreted to mean that for every one Kenyan shilling (Kshs) earned by the former households, the latter earns more than Kshs56. This ranks Kenya among the top five most unequal countries in the world.

Of South Africa, where inequality is even more pronounced, the following is noted:44

The distribution of income and wealth in South Africa is among the most unequal in the world … South Africa has a long distance to traverse on the transformation front, but the vision, will and resources are there to move the country forward. Poverty is not just about the income poor; it is also about people’s lost creativity and potential to contribute to society. It is about the denial of access to opportunities and choices to lead a decent life; achieve a better standard of living; have more freedom, dignity and self respect — things that matter most for human existence.

While the other countries under review did not have income inequalities as stark as those of Kenya and South Africa, repeated comments were made about regional and gender inequalities — no doubt a factor in the countries’ poverty profiles (see below).

Table 3 shows measures of inequality for the relevant countries as determined by UNDP in its 2007/08 Human Development Report.

Various strategies for dealing with poverty are highlighted. Of interest here are
social welfare payments. In Algeria and South Africa, these mitigate the worst effects of poverty. However, the reports are sceptical about them in the long term, as they impose significant costs (which may not be sustainable) and they can foster a ‘syndrome of social dependence’. In South Africa, around a quarter of the population is on some form of welfare. There is an important political issue here: whether a government would politically be able to reduce such support. One commentator has suggested that the South African welfare system has served an important political purpose, as it has created a sense of dependency on the government and ruling party, and is therefore a means of solidifying political support. Recent news reports that food parcels from the government were being distributed in the run-up to an election in collaboration with officials of the ruling party — and to the exclusion of opposition supporters — support this contention. It is unlikely that South Africa is unique in this. It also suggests that development and poverty alleviation strategies are likely to be implemented with an eye on the political advantage that can be gained from them — at times in a manner that offends the concepts of constitutional and democratic citizenship. In future, the APRM will have to deal with countries where these concepts are appreciably less well developed than is the case with the six countries under review here. It is important that the APRM process should find a way to interrogate these processes and make recommendations that will address them.

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The CRR calls for greater understanding of the phenomenon of poverty. It encourages the government to pursue growth policies, with emphasis on ‘pro-poor growth’ that creates employment. Future planning should aim for diversification.

**Benin:** The CRR calls for ‘special measures’ to ensure ‘pro-poor growth’ with the following description: Benin should carry out ‘economic growth on a structured and expanded basis in order to reduce poverty through massive investment and job creation’. It does not offer a detailed strategy for achieving this, but calls for greater diversification of the economy to reduce dependence on the cotton sector and for mechanisms to achieve redistribution.

**Ghana:** The CRR calls for balancing sound macroeconomic policies with the need for social outcomes (such as reducing poverty), educating citizens to act accordingly (through such values as thrift and hard work) and using ‘coordinating councils’ to bring together

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**Table 3: Inequality in the six reviewed countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of income and expenditure</th>
<th>Gini coefficient&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richest 10%</td>
<td>Poorest 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> A score of zero denotes absolute equality, while a score of 100 denotes absolute inequality.
stakeholders to develop the sort of ‘shared growth’ that is envisaged.52
Kenya: Kenya should ‘accelerate the implementation’ of its poverty reduction initiatives and create the mooted youth fund to create employment for this group.53
Rwanda: The key recommendation is that Rwanda should make a ‘high-level commitment’ to the MDGs, including poverty eradication.54
South Africa: The CRR makes a rather broad suggestion that South Africa should ‘develop a long term strategic plan that exploits the nexus of growth, employment, poverty reduction, income and wealth redistribution, and systematically reduces social grants while emphasising empowerment and considering sustainability issues’.55 This is a very expansive and appealing vision, although no advice is given as to how it can be achieved.

Millennium Development Goals
The first MDG relates directly to the theme of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. Table 4 is drawn from a website that tracks progress on realising the MDGs.56

Table 4: Status of the relevant MDG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The CRRs both endorse and contradict the determinations in Table 4. In the case of Algeria, the report asserts that the country will likely meet the MDG ‘as early as 2000’57 as a result of a set of interventions, which included welfare payments and investments in a range of programmes to counter poverty and unemployment.58 Regarding Kenya, the CRR states that the country will likely not meet the goal. It continues that the goal is achievable, but not with a ‘business-as-usual’ attitude.59 Benin likewise is unlikely to meet this goal.60 Ghana’s CRR argues that the country has made ‘remarkable progress’ towards realising the MDGs, but cautions that significant challenges remain and it is likely that some will not be met. These include halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. The Ghanaian CRR calls for the country to work energetically towards fulfilling the MDGs, as they are ‘critical to Ghana’s own agenda for growth and prosperity’.61 Rwanda’s CRR indicates that poverty appears to be rising, although there is some dispute as to the veracity of the figures for 2000.62 The South African CRR cites a progress report on the goals that indicates that the country is on track to meet all the MDGs.63

Disparities
A problem that has been central to a great deal of instability in Africa has been the phenomenon whereby the benefits of government policy or the rewards of economic activity have accrued to some groups, but not to others. This may or may not be
intentional, but it can breed considerable resentment. It is also undesirable from the point of view of equal citizenship rights.

Disparities along gender lines feature very prominently and have merited their own section elsewhere in this paper. Likewise, income and wealth inequalities have been addressed in the section on poverty. Across the reports, disparities between urban and rural populations and among different regions are much in evidence. Urban centres tended to be better developed than their rural counterparts. The Ghanaian CRR draws attention to wide urban/rural and regional disparities in the distribution of dividends of socio-economic development in the country, with the three northern regions and some parts of coastal Ghana lagging far behind the rest of the country (e.g. in poverty eradication, provision of basic services, and core welfare indicators, like water, electricity, health care, roads, nutrition and education).

Another comment is that there are legitimate concerns that political loyalties are influential in determining who receives development funds. This succinctly sums up the sort of issues that all the reviewed countries face.

The Kenyan CRR notes that ‘regional and ethnic inequalities’ have arisen from ‘historic imbalances in the provision of resources’ — a process that goes back to the colonial state. Algeria’s CRR dwells at some length on that country’s ‘spatial, geographic and demographic imbalance’, which tilts towards the north. Regional disparities are recorded in Benin and Rwanda. In South Africa, rural poverty remains a significant problem, and disparities in the levels of well-being among racial groups are a notable feature.

Recommendations

**Algeria:** The Algerian CRR deals with gender disparities and notes regional disparities, but does not provide much guidance as to how the latter are to be resolved. Among the recommendations in the socio-economic development section, only one has an explicit reference to regional disparities, recommending ‘specific actions in the field of reproductive health, with particular reference to maternity without risk, especially in the areas of the South and the High Plateaux’.

**Benin:** The CRR has little specific to recommend, although it does call for promoting ‘ownership’ of the development efforts ‘at all levels’ (presumably equally in all areas).

**Ghana:** The Ghanaian CRR devotes a fair amount of space to recommendations on this issue: ‘Pay serious attention to equity issues, particularly with respect to gender and region. Ameliorating the North–South disparities seems particularly urgent.’ It warns that these disparities could be politically destabilising. It also calls for incentives for investments and development in and skilled migration to the depressed northern regions.

**Kenya:** While acknowledging the existence of disparities, little is offered as a solution, except in respect of disparities relating to gender.

**Rwanda:** The CRR calls for incentives to be provided for people to work ‘in the districts’, presumably referring to underserviced rural areas.

**South Africa:** The CRR does not make recommendations on this issue, although disparities among the races are canvassed in various forms throughout the report. The socio-economic development area contains a recommendation calling for growth that, among other things, reduces inequality.
**Land access and land holding**

Not surprisingly, given the widespread reliance of people in Africa on farming, questions of land — access to land and security in landholdings — feature prominently in the APRM CRRs (in common with other issues, land is dealt with in more than one section, being seen both as a political issue and one of development). All reports note to some degree that land is a potential source of conflict. A key problem is the overlapping systems of ownership and user rights, where traditional and modern governance systems coexist or even contradict each other. Without proper security, investment becomes difficult on many levels: with poor or discriminatory tenure rights, building a dwelling or being assured of a place to live is not always possible. Moreover, land is a principal source of collateral, and without satisfactory land rights, its value in this respect is reduced.

The Ghanaian CRR notes:

> Ghana has a peculiar and complex land tenure system that reflects the country's unique traditional political organisations such as chieftaincies, the socio-cultural differences and divergent regional traditions. Insecurity of tenure is endemic and has a bearing on both poverty reduction and economic growth.

The report calls for policy reforms to harmonise land laws. The Kenyan CRR notes that ‘the issue of land has been, and will continue to be a very contentious one in Kenya’, and also that ‘the land question has manifested itself in many ways, including fragmentation, the breakdown in land administration, disparities in land ownership and poverty’. In Kenya, attention is also drawn to the variety of land laws, ‘some of which are incompatible’ with one another. In Algeria, the CRR notes that different ownership systems for land exist. Alluding to the question of unsatisfactory data, the report notes:

> The complexity of the rural land system is such that it was difficult for the CRM to assemble documentation providing a full picture of the situation. The lack of clarity surrounding the status of land could give rise to various kinds of conflict. It is acknowledged that Algeria's poor performances in agriculture originate mainly from the constraints around the question of land.

In Benin, as in Algeria, ‘the mission could not get a global picture of the situation describing all aspects of the problem in rural areas’. The Beninese CRR goes on to say: The absence of information is the cause of disputes in the country's land tenure system. It is generally agreed today that the poor performance of Benin's agriculture (agricultural extension, introduction of new varieties, etc.) is partly due to constraints on land.

In Rwanda, related pressures of population growth, the return of displaced people, and agrarian economy and environmental degradation are discussed. Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa. The report notes:

> It is worth recalling that Rwanda has been known to face a serious predicament of rapid population growth, dependence on agriculture and subsistence farming, and land pressure as potential threats to the livelihood and survival of millions of rural dwellers in the country. Searching for alternative livelihoods would be useful.

(This advice contrasts with that given in respect of urban–rural migration and housing shortages in the other countries, which recommends trying to limit the migration to cities...
— see section on Housing, on page 25.) Given the extreme dependence of Rwandans on agriculture and the country’s troubled history, land and ethnic issues can easily become mixed and generate conflict.

In South Africa, past racial policies have created a skewed pattern of land ownership, and the CRR notes the land reform policy of the government. It calls attention to the slowness of the process and is somewhat critical of the policy.84

Attention needs to be focused on the unresolved policy contradictions arising from the dominance of land market promotion objectives over and above mass securitisation of tenure. In this regard, the authorities may need to depart from entrenched norms already known to have limited results.

The call here would seem to be for expropriation and downgrading property protection. Elsewhere, however, the report states: ‘any ill-thought attempt to grab land in South Africa can adversely affect the thriving agricultural sector.’85 This is a key policy issue in South Africa, and recently proposed legislation on expropriation has been ‘shelved’. Disputes around this piece of legislation related to the extent to which it would facilitate land reform or alternately undermine investment by threatening property protections. This concern calls to mind the following observation by World Bank officials, which deals with the experience of redistributive measures across the world:86

Although redistributive policies have the potential to benefit the poor both directly and indirectly, they will do so only if redistribution does not jeopardise investment — this may be one explanation for the observation that, in the past, redistributive policies such as land reform have often failed to help the poor.

The need for effective, coherent laws and policies is highlighted in the various reports, with, as noted in the case of South Africa, some criticism of policy. In Rwanda, it is noted that a new land law had been passed and that registration of landholdings was under way — certainly a necessary step to the coherent regulation of land.87

Recommends

**Algeria:** The Algerian CRR calls for legislation to establish a monitoring mechanism to ensure justice, transparency and equity in relation to land allocation.88

**Benin:** The CRR calls for land laws to be reviewed and for a ‘specialized institution to facilitate and ensure justice, transparency and equity in access to land in both rural and urban areas’.89

**Ghana:** The Ghanaian CRR calls for continuing the ongoing process of harmonising the country’s land laws. It makes some nebulous suggestions about reducing land disputes and enhancing access to land through the 15-year land administration policy. How these goals will be achieved is not spelt out.90

**Kenya:** The socio-economic thematic area in the Kenyan CRR remarkably contains no specific recommendations about land access. It makes a tangential remark about providing farmers with information about market conditions, and in the sections on cross-cutting issues discusses the question of land and makes some recommendations germane to this area, expressing the hope that a new policy on land will be adopted expeditiously. It notes that a process is under way in Kenya to formulate a land policy, and recommends that this be expedited. It says that it hopes ‘the government will ensure that all land is put into
productive use on a sustainable and equitable basis’. Recommendations also appear in the political governance section, calling on government ‘as a matter of urgency, to adopt and implement redistribution and reallocation policies to enforce equitable access to, and use of land’. There is also some material on easing complications regarding land registration and granting women the same access to land as men.91

**Rwanda:** The CRR offers an important, although somewhat imprecise, recommendation about facilitating land registration at district level (through training and undefined ‘capacity’ building) and continuing to conduct research on alternative livelihoods to reduce the demand for land. This latter point is crucial for the whole continent, although the recommendation inadvertently exposes the difficulty of the issue: no solution is offered, merely a call for more research, which the report says is already in progress. This highlights the fact that there are no ‘magic bullet’ solutions — or even obvious solutions — to the problems that Africa faces.

**South Africa:** Probably building on the tension inherent in the report between wanting to expedite redistribution and understanding the potential for destabilising the economy if such redistribution is not managed properly, the result is vague, shifting the responsibility to come up with substantive solutions to the country’s stakeholders, who should ‘explore innovative and creative ways of accelerating land reform’.92

## 2 Education

‘Human capital’ is now routinely listed as a precondition for economic growth and development. In this regard, a well-functioning education system is of paramount importance. Unfortunately, despite some successes in funding the education of children from poor backgrounds93 and in getting larger numbers of children to attend school, the APRM process identified some severe weaknesses in the systems of the countries under review.

The most notable problem was the unsatisfactory quality of the education provided. This was a factor addressed in many of the reports, which cover a wide range of experiences in this regard. In South Africa, the CSAR questions the ‘appropriateness’ of school materials, and the CRM notes ‘inadequate preparation’ as an explanation for high dropout rates in tertiary institutions.94 The declining quality of education is noted in Kenya and Ghana, linked to pupil–teacher ratios, ‘the quality of instruction’, favouritism in awarding bursaries and poor infrastructure.95 The Algerian and Beninese reports note that teachers are not satisfactorily trained.96 The implication of all this is that children are attending school, but are not being provided with skills for participation in the economy. The South African CRR is quite blunt about this:97

The issue of unemployment, which is a recurring theme in this Report, also has some roots in the school curriculum. The CRM confirmed that many young graduates cannot find jobs. Commendably the government has realised that the curriculum needs to be revised to allow for entrepreneurship. To this end, vocational schools are being recapitalised. The government noted the lack of resilience in many institutions that resist these types of change.

These issues are reinforced by the World Economic Forum’s *Global Competitiveness Report*, which measures the views of business executives as to the factors that promote or retard economic competitiveness. Table 5 lists the findings in respect of the education factors.
With the partial exception of Kenya, the information paints a worrying picture of the ability of the countries’ education systems to prepare children for participation in the economy. Interestingly, South Africa and Algeria overall have the lowest scores, although their levels of economic development are higher than those of the others. This may reflect a failure to produce the skills required for advanced economies — a situation that is less apparent in less developed societies. The general lack of access to the Internet is a factor in this and suggests that children are not being introduced or attuned to the technology that is now an integral part of modern economies and is important for accessing highly paid and high status work. The quality of management schools — a more prestigious and exclusive part of the education systems — is regarded as better than the rest of the system, but it is unlikely that education at this level is widely available.

Related to the above, pupils frequently drop out of school or do not progress from primary school to the higher levels. This is dealt with in various degrees of specificity, but is clearly a problem. In South Africa, there are indications that this is due to problems in paying fees (although this is not officially required). Observers of education in South Africa have noted that in addition to school fees, the costs of books and uniforms make education expensive. A similar situation is identified in Benin. In parts of Kenya, this problem has recently been identified as having been aggravated by a severe drought: many children are not receiving adequate food and water, and spend time that would otherwise be spent in school searching for water and pasture. In some instances, schools are inaccessible, as pupils have to walk long distances to reach them. A limited number of places are available in schools, particularly at the higher educational levels.
Gender considerations are brought out strongly, although progress had been made with respect to girls' education. The dominant concern is that girls are less likely to be educated than boys. The interesting exception to this is Algeria, where girls outnumber boys at the higher end of the educational spectrum.105 (See section on Gender on page 21.)

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** Algeria should concentrate on the quality of its education, particularly in terms of teacher quality, ensuring equal opportunity for all and taking measures to prevent dropouts.

**Benin:** The CRR makes three recommendations. These are important (improving the quality of instruction, improving enrolment and promoting the education of girls), but contain little by way of practical guidance as to how these goals should be realised.

**Ghana:** As previously noted, Ghana’s report has a set of general recommendations that are applicable to several of the socio-economic issues. It advises: ‘Set quantitative targets, design explicit policies and measures, and plan detailed timing to achieve the objectives in the area of socio-economic development.’ The country should consider the areas where progress has been most disappointing and make use of co-ordinating councils comprising the various stakeholders to help steer projects.106

**Kenya:** The Kenyan CRR calls on the government to arrest the deterioration of educational standards (by recruiting teachers and providing infrastructure), ensure that bursaries are provided to those who need them and provide alternative models of education to communities (such as nomads) in need of them.107

**Rwanda:** Rwanda is advised to build more schools in order to ‘increase enrolment to full capacity’.108

**South Africa:** The CRR makes 11 recommendations under the discussion of education. These are of varying degrees of specificity, but focus on improving the physical environment of schools and the quality and relevance of education. They include integrating practical skills training into primary and secondary schools; improving access to tertiary education; and establishing a monitoring unit to ensure ‘accountability between schools, the government and communities’.109

**Millennium Development Goals**

The relevant MDG concerns the provision of universal primary education by 2015; see Table 6.

**Table 6: Status of the relevant MDG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achieve universal primary education by 2015</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Algerian CRR concurs with the assessment given in Table 6 and indicates that, on available evidence, ‘universal education will be achieved within a short space of time’. The Benin report says that the country is on track to achieve a targeted 96% primary school enrolment ratio in 2006. In Ghana, the CRR says that ‘achieving universal education’ (it is not specified whether this means primary education or education throughout the school system) is one of the MDGs that would likely not be met. It later provides the following information: ‘the net primary enrolment rate increased nationally from 58% in 1999 to 69.9% in 2003, but may not have been sufficient to meet the policy target of 88.5% by 2005.’ Kenya will likely succeed in achieving this goal. The Rwandan CRR notes that the country’s progress on this issue is ‘encouraging’ (the latest net enrolment figure cited is 81.7%). In South Africa’s case, the considerable progress that has been made is acknowledged (88.8% net primary enrolment in 2003/04).

3 Gender

Gender issues are an important focus of the entire APRM process and receive repeated, detailed emphasis throughout. (In the South African case, this went as far as rewriting the country’s CSAR after its public validation to reflect, among various other things, a gender perspective.) Gender is identified as one of the cross-cutting issues in APRM, and, as such, matters germane to it are spread throughout the reports. This section attempts to tease out a few key points identified in the socio-economic development section.

The CRRs make very clear that women in the countries reviewed generally have a lower social status than men. At the most basic level, the cultures of these countries generally subordinate women to men. Culture as a cause of gender inequality is explicitly or obliquely mentioned in the reports of all six countries.

Gender inequality is manifested in various ways:

**Work:** Women tend to be concentrated in particular professions, usually the less skilled and less well remunerated ones. For example, the Ghanaian CRR quotes the country’s CSAR, which states that:

> in many respects, Ghanaian women have made important strides in the public service ....

But, in other ways, the position of women has not changed much. The bulk of women employees have remained at the lower end of appointments, specifically in clerical jobs.

A similar situation is observed in Benin. In Algeria, although women are making great strides in education (see below) and are becoming increasingly prominent in certain high-status professions, there are allegations of widespread discrimination in the private sector. Algerian women are also prominent in informal work. In South Africa, the private sector is likewise identified as an area in which women are ‘under-represented’.

**Access to resources:** Presumably partly because of traditional governance systems and cultural norms, women tend not to have access to the economic and social resources that men do. For example, the Ghanaian, Kenyan and Beninese CRRs note that women find it difficult to own land or obtain credit or capital. The Kenyan report states that they have ‘less access to social services and productive resources compared to men’.
Algeria, it is noted that health issues of specific concern to women are not given ‘sufficient consideration’.124

Legal protection: The legal systems in African countries are not coherent. Traditional systems of governance exist alongside modern (and often inefficient) constitutional systems. Within the modern constitutional system, obsolete laws may exist. These problems feature prominently with respect to gender issues. The various reports detail how women are treated differently from men with regard to inheritance, and how women may themselves be inherited by their deceased husbands’ relatives.125 In the Rwandan CRR, a law is referred to that requires a woman to live where her husband chooses to live.126 The Algerian CRR looks at this issue in detail, pointing out that the country’s Constitution, which guarantees gender equality, coexists with a Family Code (despite its revision in 2005) that contains some discriminatory provisions.127 Legal provisions surrounding family are most likely to disadvantage women. South Africa is a little different in that its report does not identify legal areas in which women are disadvantaged — reflecting achievements in changes to the country’s legislative framework, which have extended at least formal equality to women in all important areas.

Violence: Violence against women is a common feature throughout the CRRs. In Algeria, there was — at the time of writing — no law on domestic violence (although there were such provisions in the Family Code);128 in Ghana, a law on this matter had not been enacted.129 In South Africa, the report links violence against women to the poor state of the country’s social structure and notes that ‘many cases of domestic violence go unreported or are struck off the court roll even when reported, because some women refuse to testify out of fear for their safety’.130

The reports are quite positive on some gender issues. Governments are regarded as taking them seriously and having made appreciable strides in dealing with gender discrimination and disadvantage.131 Ministries and organisations dedicated to gender equality have been established, for example, in Kenya and South Africa. In Algeria and South Africa, women actually constitute a majority of those enrolled in higher education.132 In Rwanda, ‘gender mainstreaming’ is given high priority. Women hold — as of 2004 — 10 of the 19 positions of minister of state and nearly half of parliamentary seats.133 On the other hand, a great deal remains to be done in some areas and in some places. For example, the Algerian CRR balances the achievements by noting:134

Out of a total of 13 302 seats in the people’s general assemblies, 147 are occupied by women; that is, 1.09% women, compared with 98.91% men. Algeria needs to deploy huge efforts in this area if it is to achieve parity between the sexes.

In Ghana, the participation of women in political structures is ‘conspicuously’ low.135

The CRRs tend to suggest more government action to expedite gender equality, such as affirmative action programmes.136 It should be noted that although such programmes are increasingly commonplace nowadays, their records are mixed, and the economic costs — both direct and opportunity costs — can be quite substantial.137 It is also not apparent how governments with severe capacity problems would be in a position to monitor a large-scale
programme of intervention of the kind that this would seem to suggest. Such caveats or concerns are not raised in the reports.

Recommendations

Algeria: The CRR calls for policy changes (including a ‘proactive policy for the promotion of gender equality’), as well as sensitisation and practical measures such as a literacy campaign.

Benin: The CRR calls for ‘translating the Government’s political will into concrete actions by making gender equality a national priority and a prerequisite for sustainable development’, sensitising people and implementing an ‘aggressive positive discrimination policy in favour of women’. It also calls for a literacy campaign focused on women.

Ghana: The CRR calls for a law on gender violence to be passed, for cultural impediments to women’s advancement to be addressed and for affirmative action programmes. It also recommends establishing benchmarks to monitor the attainment of gender equality and setting up the ‘institutional machinery’ to monitor the move towards meeting these objectives.

Kenya: The CRR on Kenya calls for a ‘gender sensitive’ approach to monitoring development programmes, outlawing discrimination, working against cultural practices that undermine women and enacting various laws, among them laws on affirmative action and domestic violence.

Rwanda: The CRR urges the Rwandan government to consider reporting the status of women to the UN Commission for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, ‘operationalise’ the Gender Monitoring Office and build capacity in women’s councils to ensure that women’s needs are met in community projects.

South Africa: The CRR calls for protection for women from violence and the establishment of mechanisms to monitor and deal with abuse. It further promotes ‘proactive’ measures to ensure more female involvement in the private sector. The report furthermore recommends changes to the cultural relations that underlie the problems that women face. This latter point is probably very necessary, but no concrete steps are proposed and, indeed, it would be very difficult to find any firm suggestions as to how a culture might be transformed, except over a very long period (possibly several generations) — raising, in turn, the question of the practicability of the suggestion. It should also be noted that the association of culture with asocial behaviour is a sensitive and contentious point, particularly in a society like South Africa with its divided past.

Millennium Development Goals

One of the MDGs relates directly to gender equality. The status of this MDG in the various countries is reflected in Table 7 on page 24.

In contrast to the assessment in Table 7, the Algerian CRR is somewhat ambivalent. It commends the growth in female literacy and education (the chief focus on the MDG), but indicates that the proportion of women in decision-making positions is ‘insignificant’, as noted above. In Benin, the CRR notes significant disparities in the enrolment of girls and boys in school. ‘This inequality’, the report notes, ‘hampers the achievement of the MDG in the education sector’. In Ghana, the CRR notes in respect of the MDGs that progress is ‘distorted’ by ‘impediments to gender mainstreaming as a result of cultural and
other factors'. The CRR on Kenya indicates that the country is generally not doing well in respect of the MDGs (with the exception of providing universal primary education and combating HIV). The information provided suggests that the country's progress on the education component of the gender goal is fair, although the proportions of women in non-agricultural employment and representative office lag far behind men. The Rwandan CRR stresses the 'momentous' progress that the country has made on this issue, in terms both of education and women's roles in politics. South Africa appears to be doing well in this area too — educational enrolment shows near gender parity, while nearly a third of parliamentarians are women, and women occupy important positions in the cabinet, the civil service and the diplomatic corps. It should also be noted that at the time of writing, five of the nine provincial premiers are women, including one who is simultaneously the leader of the country's largest opposition party. Prior to the 2009 election, a woman also held the deputy presidency, and in the first three post-apartheid parliaments, women had occupied the speaker's office.

4 Environment

Environmental profile

Environmental concerns have become more prominent in recent years, particularly given Africa's apparent vulnerability to climate change. Such concerns are tackled in the corporate governance section, but as a broad development issue, the impact of environmental degradation is highlighted in the reports. In the Kenyan CRR, it is noted that 'declines in per capita arable land and water supply, together with the degradation of soils, forests, grasslands and water quality', are 'making life increasingly difficult for the rural poor, thus accelerating rural–urban migration'.

The Algerian CRR — drawing on an earlier report — expresses similar concern about the degradation of water sources:

It [the earlier report] stresses, in particular, the degradation of water resources caused by the obvious weakness in environmental management and the control of water pollution. It notes the existence of non-functioning water purification plants, hence uncontrolled discharges of unpurified urban polluted water, land scrubbing and drainage water containing agrochemical products (phosphate, nitrate, etc.) in the sources of water intended for consumption.
It also notes that industrialisation has resulted in environmental degradation, as planning does not take environmental protection into account, and that such degradation is costing the country some 7% of GDP. How this figure is calculated is not made clear.

Algeria and Rwanda have the additional problem of populations crammed into relatively small areas (in Algeria because most habitation is along a relatively narrow coastal strip). Kenya has a similar problem to the extent that most of that country is not arable.

Moreover, environmental degradation as a result of the exploitation of natural resources for commercial or subsistence purposes is noted with respect to firewood collection in Benin and in Rwanda and tree felling for charcoal in Kenya. Urban air pollution is a serious problem in some places on the continent: in the capital of Benin, Cotonou, rapid urbanisation and increased numbers of second-hand cars using leaded fuel are emitting an estimated 82 tonnes of carbon dioxide a day. Although environmental laws are in place and despite some successes in lowering pollution in recent years, it is unclear how effectively and comprehensively such controls can be enforced.

There is also a clear element of political economy to environmental protection, which does not receive adequate attention in the reports. This need to be teased out in greater detail. For example, Benin is faced with rising sea levels and is thus attempting to stop sand mining on its coast. The diversion of this activity inland has, however, been attacked by some people in communities where sand mining is to take place, as it potentially damages their livelihoods. Likewise, proposals in South Africa for carbon taxes to counter climate change may well have that effect, but given that South Africa’s energy is largely generated from coal, it is also likely to have a dampening effect on economic growth.

The Ghanaian CRR does not dwell on environmental issues, although it does mention environmental sustainability as a development consideration.

Recommendations
Algeria: The Algerian CRR does not make specific recommendations about the environment, although environmental concerns are dealt with in references to protecting water resources.
Benin: Benin should improve the capacity of its environmental protection agencies and communicate with businesses about care for the environment.
Ghana: Although the socio-economic section of the CRR mentions the environment in passing, it does not make substantive recommendations in this section.
Kenya: Kenya should continue to work towards the realisation of the MDGs, in particular with regard to environmental sustainability.
Rwanda: Unless one factors in a recommendation that Rwanda should implement the MDGs, there is no specific recommendation concerning the environment in this section.
South Africa: The country should ‘prioritise’ environmental protection, ‘in the light of the mining industry and high levels of rural poverty’.

Housing
In terms of housing, the problem overall concerns scarcity or non-availability of housing, with individual countries adding their particular textures to this issue. Urbanisation is a particular contributory factor. In Ghana, it is noted that rural housing is not an enticing prospect for developers, while a rapidly growing urban population is increasingly unable
to afford accommodation.\textsuperscript{161} This report also suggests that, although there has been much research into rural–urban migration, Ghanaian policy does not appear to factor this in very strongly and to have a strategy to deal with it.\textsuperscript{162} In Algeria, rapid urbanisation since independence has made formulating appropriate policies for urban development essential, although housing as such has received attention.\textsuperscript{163} In South Africa, despite extensive government funding, ‘stakeholders stressed that increased migration and urbanisation have resulted in an insatiable demand for subsidised formal housing. With low levels of delivery, the backlogs may be growing even as delivery increases.’\textsuperscript{164}

In Rwanda, ‘poverty and the previous absence of land law’ are retarding access to housing.\textsuperscript{165} The Kenyan CRR notes that persistent housing shortages have resulted in expanding informal settlements, and Kibera in Nairobi is supposedly the largest slum in Africa.\textsuperscript{166} Slow processing of building applications — which might be interpreted as a capacity issue — difficulties in getting credit and costly building materials retard housing provision in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda.\textsuperscript{167} In Algeria, the government has been extensively involved in housing provision, and the authorities ‘have shown themselves to be effective in considering the needs of the most disadvantaged.’\textsuperscript{168} The Algerian CRR notes another interesting phenomenon, that the architecture of some of the housing provided is not appropriate to the culture and lifestyle of the beneficiaries, which leads to the latter ‘rejecting’ the offerings, and that this needs to be addressed in future.\textsuperscript{169}

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The CRR on Algeria calls for a ‘permanent funding mechanism’ for social housing and vigilance in allocating housing to ensure that all people benefit from peace and economic growth.\textsuperscript{170}

**Benin:** Surprisingly, this section of the Beninese CRR does not make recommendations about housing, although it may have done so tangentially through recommendations on land (the report discusses housing within the context of urban land), recommending ‘justice, transparency and equity’ in access to land.\textsuperscript{171}

**Ghana:** This is another area in which a generic solution is proffered: ‘Set quantitative targets, design explicit policies and measures, and plan detailed timing to achieve the objectives in the area of socio-economic development.’ The country should consider the areas where progress has been most disappointing and making use of co-ordinating councils comprising the various stakeholders to help steer projects.\textsuperscript{172}

**Kenya:** The CRR calls for a ‘comprehensive strategy’ involving all stakeholders to resolve the country’s housing problems.\textsuperscript{173}

**Rwanda:** The socio-economic development section of the Rwandan CRR does not recommend action on housing per se, but does recommend resolving the land-related issues (such as registration) that have a direct bearing on housing.\textsuperscript{174}

**South Africa:** The CRR does not make recommendations on South Africa’s housing issues, but several other recommendations have some tangential relevance to them, e.g. trying to stem migration to the cities through rural development (this would reduce the demand for urban housing) and improving the capacity of local authorities to provide services (this would improve the efficiency and fairness in the allocation of available public housing).\textsuperscript{175}
Water and sanitation
Water is also a necessary element for life, and a supply of potable water is crucial for any population. For people heavily dependent on agriculture, a water supply is of the utmost importance. Common problems include inadequate infrastructure and the unsatisfactory reach of the supply system to particular constituencies. The Ghanaian CRR points out that while over 70% of urban people have access to pipe-borne water, only 16% of rural people do.¹⁷⁶ In Kenya, only some 32% of households have access to piped water.¹⁷⁷ The Kenyan CRR also notes that significant disparities exist between social groups — rich and poor — and among the various regions.¹⁷⁸ Rwanda exhibits similar disparities in regard to water, with access to ‘safe’ water available to 40% of rural people and 60% of urban people.¹⁷⁹ Benin follows the same pattern, with around two-thirds of rural people not having access to drinking safe water and ‘enormous disparities’ existing among regions. However, the Beninese government is reported to be confident that it will meet the MDG targets, as it is steadily increasing its ability to install water points.¹⁸⁰ In Algeria, similar disparities are reported, with urban areas better served than their rural counterparts, while the water supply in some places is erratic. The country is in a position to expand its water infrastructure, and is doing so with the use of desalinisation plants and dams.¹⁸¹ The Algerian CRR also draws attention to competing claims on water resources (home users vs irrigation) being a source of some dissatisfaction.¹⁸² The Ghanaian CRR, by contrast, notes that the country’s urban water utility is reportedly unable to invest any more.¹⁸³ Water access is very briefly touched on in the South African CRR, affirming that 92% of the population has access to an improved water supply. It adds that the situation is not ideal, as many people still depend on unsafe water sources (streams, stagnant pools, etc.).¹⁸⁴

The water supply situation in South Africa is, in the view of some experts, extremely serious, and will have profound implications for the country’s economy and ability to support its population in future. According to Dr Anthony Turton,¹⁸⁵ a well-known environmental scientist, South Africa has approached or exceeded the limit of what it can sustainably do with its water resources and is consequently facing a number of problems. In his words, ‘South Africa simply has no more surplus water and all future economic development (and thus social wellbeing) will be constrained by this one fundamental fact that few have as yet grasped’. A most important problem is declining water quality, which will necessitate better treatment of effluent before it reaches water bodies. In order to deal with this — and other problems — the country needs significantly to increase its engineering and scientific skills.¹⁸⁶

The CRRs on South Africa and Rwanda make the additional comment that collecting water is an activity that consumes much valuable time (in this they certainly speak for other countries).¹⁸⁷ Piped water — better still, piped water to people’s homes — would free this time up for other more productive activities.

Regarding the related matter of sanitation, the lack of proper disposal systems carries the risk of contamination and disease. In South Africa, ‘extensive lack of sanitation facilities also leads to the contamination of water sources, creating further problems for safe water provision’.¹⁸⁸ In Benin, sanitation problems are related to rapid urbanisation and an inability to cater for the increased numbers.¹⁸⁹

Sectoral studies in the domain have highlighted some problems regarding rapid urbanization. They are hazardous urbanisation, deficient town management due to the absence of community management capacities and necessary financial resources to adequately meet the
increasing need for services, and insufficient sanitation facilities for rain water, evacuation of used water and solid waste.

A holistic picture of the sanitation conditions in the reviewed countries is found in Table 8.

**Table 8: Estimates of sanitation conditions by type of sanitation facility (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Shared</th>
<th>Unimproved</th>
<th>Open defecation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the exception of Rwanda, the figures generally show improvement over time, but concurrently indicate the considerable distance still to be covered.

With the exception of Rwanda, the figures generally show improvement over time, but concurrently indicate the considerable distance still to be covered.

Poor sanitation obviously affects people’s health. It can also inflict economic costs, both in terms of treating sanitation-related diseases and damaging the tourist trade, with the latter being a concern expressed by tourist authorities in Ghana, where a lack of sanitation facilities has led to the fouling of beaches and an atmosphere that tourists consider unpleasant.191

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The relevant CRR makes two recommendations regarding water: steps should be taken to prevent conflict between domestic and agricultural users, and water resources should be protected from pollution.192

**Benin:** The CRR on Benin calls for mobilising the population to participate in programmes to implement water supply projects and improving the ability of councils to install and manage water supply systems. Sanitation should be tackled by according it more importance by ‘the development of prevention [sic] and organisation of services’.193 It is not, however, entirely clear how all of this will be achieved, although part of the plans for councils include providing suitable skills training.

**Kenya:** The Kenyan CRR has no specific recommendations on water in the socio-economic
development section, although it is ‘noted’ that the government of Kenya had made access to water a priority.194

**Ghana:** Ghana’s CRR has a set of general recommendations that are applicable to several of the socio-economic issues. It advises: ‘Set quantitative targets, design explicit policies and measures, and plan detailed timing to achieve the objectives in the area of socio-economic development.’ The country should consider examining the areas where progress has been most disappointing and making use of co-ordinating councils comprising the various stakeholders to help steer projects.195

**Kenya:** Although the CRR discusses this issue, it makes no direct and specific recommendations.

**Rwanda:** No specific recommendations are made, but the socio-economic section does recommend that impetus should be maintained to ensure that people throughout the country have access to basic amenities.196

**South Africa:** The recommendations proffered are vague and general, calling for improvement in the capacity for service delivery at local level, since municipalities are frequently to some extent dysfunctional, and encouraging payment for services.197

**Energy**

A reliable, affordable supply of electricity is an important aspect of a comfortable standard of living in the modern world, and also a prerequisite for sustainable and successful economic growth.

The CRRs indicate that this vision is still a long way off for some of the countries. In Rwanda, for instance, only 6–8% of households are connected to the electricity grid, and traditional sources of fuel are used for heating and cooking. This is a ‘significant constraint’.198 Benin has a severe problem with its electricity supply, with a relatively small proportion of the population being supplied with electricity, and outages hitting its capital city.199 In the Ghanaian report, disparities between urban areas and their rural counterparts are emphasised (75% versus 16% connected, respectively).200 In Kenya, electricity is also more readily available to urban residents than to those in rural areas, and electricity supplies are subject to interruption. Plans for rural electrification have been stalled by insufficient funding.201

Algeria would appear to be the exception, having succeeded in increasing the production of electricity from around 600 MW to 6,740 MW since independence. Plans are under way for further expansion. It should, however, be noted that Algeria is an energy producer. South Africa has gone from being a country with an energy surplus to one ‘approaching a deficit’.202 This clearly foreshadowed the ‘blackouts’ that the country experienced from 2006 to 2008, despite the reluctance of the government to acknowledge that there was an energy problem.203 Ghana also faced energy supply problems in the years following its APRM process, with drought adversely affecting the supply of hydroelectricity.204

The use of wood and other natural material for fuel has an environmental downside, which is expressed in the Kenyan CRR:

Firewood, charcoal and biogas are the major sources of energy used in many parts of Kenya. Wood fuel accounts for about 70% of the energy consumed, and electricity counts for 9%. Should this trend continue the effect on environment and therefore on sustainable development for future generations will be disastrous.205
**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The Algerian CRR does not address energy in this section; the report seems to suggest that Algeria is progressing well, so perhaps it was felt that there was no need to do so.

**Benin:** A policy of the diversification of energy sources should be followed, using such sources as biomass and solar energy and making them available to ordinary citizens.206

**Ghana:** This is another area in which a generic solution is proffered: ‘Set quantitative targets, design explicit policies and measures, and plan detailed timing to achieve the objectives in the area of socio-economic development.’ The country should consider the areas where progress has been most disappointing and make use of co-ordinating councils comprising the various stakeholders to help steer projects.207

**Kenya:** The CRR says that Kenya should ‘accelerate the energy sector reform programme to ensure an adequate supply of energy’.208

**Rwanda:** The Rwandan CRR calls for the reform of outdated laws, specifically citing those related to energy.209

**South Africa:** There is only one recommendation mentioning electricity in this section, a general one that consumers should pay for services — which is related to electricity, given South Africa’s history of non-payment for utilities.210

**Millennium Development Goals**

The environment and the issues associated with it (as covered above — housing, water provision, sanitation and energy) are covered by the seventh MDG, which deals with environmental sustainability.

**Table 9: Status of the relevant MDG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Algeria’s CRR indicates that the country has focused on development without considering the environmental costs of its programmes. It thus faces an ‘ecological crisis’ that could have negative implications for the population at large. The report notes that the Algerian government is making investments to deal with the problems. The pollution of water resources is a particular problem. However, the government’s record in respect of providing housing is substantially better.211 The CRR on Benin notes that the country’s CSAR does not adequately analyse the issue of sustainable development (a major part of which is environmental protection). The report notes that the government is taking action on this issue, but the effectiveness of these measures is not clear. The CRR doubts whether the MDG target in respect of access to drinking water will be met for 78% of the population by
2015, although the government is ‘optimistic’ about reaching the goal. In Ghana’s case, it is unclear to what extent the CRR would concur with the assessment in Table 9. There is ‘weak but improving state support for the achievement of environmental sustainability’. Water and housing provision are presented largely in terms of the scale of the problems, with particular emphasis on the disparities between rural and urban constituencies.

Kenya is experiencing problems in achieving most of the goals. The CRR records the concerns of some stakeholders about ongoing environmental degradation. Many people did not have access to proper housing and water supply services. The CRR on Rwanda does not provide much information on the goal of environmental sustainability, but does note that investments in the areas of housing and water were increasing (to 2004). Environmental protection is to be bolstered by mandatory impact assessments. The South African CRR does not reflect on these issues with specific reference to the MDGs, although the issues are discussed to some extent on their own terms, as reflected above. It should be noted that problems with respect to the country’s water supply in particular, and also the housing situation (the report notes that there is a ‘growing housing backlog’) may make the judgement reflected in Table 9 somewhat sanguine.

5 Health care

Health care is a key indicator of people’s living standard and an area of great concern to the MDGs. In Africa, HIV features prominently in health considerations and this issue is addressed in each report. South Africa, for example, is said to have one of the highest rates of infected people in the world, although the exact magnitude of the disease is not fully understood. While the CRR does draw attention to some of the social problems generated by Aids (notably the growing number of orphans), the report does not examine the developmental consequences of the pandemic — particularly as it is hitting the economically active part of the population very hard and is proving a particular challenge by denuding the labour force of skills. This has been observed elsewhere in Africa.

The Ghanaian CRR similarly mentions the country’s relatively less serious problem (around 3% of the population between the ages of 15 and 49 are thought to be infected with the HI virus) and notes that ‘some measures have been taken to address the issue of HIV/AIDS, prominent among which is the recognition of the developmental relevance of the disease and the need to combat it with a holistic approach’. In Benin, the magnitude of the disease is also relatively low, but growing and concentrated in the same age range as in Ghana. The CRR describes these increases as ‘alarming’. In Algeria, the prevalence is seen as lower, although discussion about the subject is ‘taboo’. The Kenyan CRR deals with the issue at some length, explicitly noting that ‘the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been a major constraint on Kenya’s socio-economic development process’, and Aids has been declared a national disaster. In Rwanda, prevalence is estimated at around 13.5%.

HIV infection should not obscure other health challenges, such as malaria and tuberculosis. Tuberculosis in particular is aggravated by HIV. Malaria in Rwanda is on the increase and continues ‘to be the leading cause of morbidity for children under five years of age and the general population at large’. It is likewise increasing in Kenya. Infant and perinatal mortality are identified as concerns in Algeria, Rwanda and Benin.

The health infrastructure is experiencing varying degrees of difficulty across the countries reviewed. Long distances have to be travelled to reach clinics and medicines
may not always be available in abundant supplies. Disparities in access to health care exist in Benin (urban–rural, and regional). Health insurance coverage is unsatisfactory, which is not surprising, given the poverty that afflicts most African countries.

The CRRs note that the various countries have striven to improve the health care of their populations. For example, antiretroviral medication is now being supplied to many people in these countries, while there is praise for policy. However, there is concern in some reports that the ongoing problems place the achievement of the MDGs in danger.

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The CRR recommends that reproductive health be given emphasis, as well and taking measures to reduce HIV infection rates.

**Benin:** The CRR calls for an expanded infrastructure of facilities through building more clinics, involving local stakeholders (including traditional healers) in the health care provision system and fighting HIV. There is little guidance as to how this should be done (indeed, all governments would at least claim to be fighting HIV, and it is not clear what changes are advocated). The report does include an actionable item in calling for the sampling of people’s opinions of social programmes so as to ensure improved service.

**Ghana:** As noted above, Ghana’s CRR has a set of general recommendations that are applicable to several of the socio-economic issues. It advises: ‘Set quantitative targets, design explicit policies and measures, and plan detailed timing to achieve the objectives in the area of socio-economic development.’ (This is essentially what the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy — referenced in the CRR — is about.) The country should consider the areas where progress has been most disappointing and make use of co-ordinating councils comprising the various stakeholders to help steer projects.

**Rwanda:** Rwanda should establish a uniform policy of health insurance; update its health laws; make a greater effort to sensitise the public about HIV/AIDS; and provide more resources to build centres to distribute antiretrovirals, especially in rural areas.

**South Africa:** Health is well canvassed in the recommendations: the focus is on improving the services available to underserved communities (hence the call for the building and provisioning of more clinics). The CRR also calls for action on HIV, including combating stigma, better data collection (e.g. requiring doctors to indicate HIV as a cause of death) and ensuring a satisfactory supply of drugs.

**Millennium Development Goals**

No issue is better covered by the MDGs than health. Of the eight main goals, three of them relate to health issues.

The information contained in the CRR on Algeria supports the contentions in Table 10. The report details increased vaccination, declining infant and maternal mortality, and low incidences of HIV and malaria (the report notes, however, that problems in these areas remain). It also calls attention to the necessity of the efficient functioning of the health system, which is a precondition for meeting the MDGs. The CRR on Benin suggests that progress has been made, although it is insufficient to meet the MDGs, except perhaps in respect of HIV prevention. It says:

If the present trend persists and in the absence of well targeted and enhanced measures, the Millennium Development Goals in the area of health would be hardly achieved in terms
of the reduction of infant mortality, improving maternal health and the fight against major
diseases like malaria and HIV/Aids.241

Table 10: Status of the relevant MDGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reduce child mortality</strong></td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improve maternal health</strong></td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</strong></td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The CRR on Ghana agrees that these goals will likely not be realised.242 The CRR on Kenya suggests that one of the only goals that will be achieved is reducing the incidence of HIV.243 In the case of Rwanda, the CRR tends to disagree with the assessment given in Table 10. Child and maternal health remained stable (on the basis of figures between 2001 and 2003), while HIV prevalence increased over the same period.244 The report notes, however, the lack of reliable data. South Africa's CRR cites a progress report on the MDGs, which indicates that the country will achieve them. The statistical evidence provided is, however, a little ambiguous, concurring with the analysis above. Child mortality in fact rose between 2000 and 2003/04, while HIV prevalence declined.245

6 Ownership of development

External dependency

As the world's poorest region overall, Africa is a major recipient of aid from donors. This is frequently seen as undermining the autonomy of African countries and their development efforts. The APRM reports examine this phenomenon. Weak internal capacity and the non-availability of resources are the primary spurs for reliance on donors.246 The figures given in the CRRs for donor contribution to development efforts (although the definitions and methodologies used to make these calculations differ from one another) are substantial: some 70% of development expenditure in Kenya,247 60% in Benin,248 and between 83% and 100% in Rwanda (depending on the year)249 were sourced from donors.250 Since giving aid
is a political decision, so is stopping it, and countries that rely on aid risk seeing needed funds drying up. A counter-argument, not found in the reports, but made forcefully by the Kenyan economist James Shikwati, is that aid severely distorts economic activity in the recipient societies and actually holds back economic activity.\textsuperscript{251}

Another factor that makes countries dependent — outlined in Kenya’s CRR — is reliance on world markets for primary products. Such products are vulnerable to rapid change in prices.\textsuperscript{252}

South Africa and Algeria are not as dependent on aid as the other countries. Of Algeria, the CRR states: ‘Algeria remains politically autonomous in the formulation and implementation of its policies and programmes for socio-economic development. It constitutes a good practice as far as this exercise is concerned.’\textsuperscript{253} South Africa is commended thus: ‘The CRM is impressed with South Africa’s prudent funding of the national development programme, which is almost exclusively locally funded.’\textsuperscript{254}

Central to ensuring greater country ownership of participation is ‘domestic resource mobilisation’, a large element of which is tax. The CRR on Kenya makes the following point, which is broadly applicable to all countries: ‘As a mark of a country’s autonomy, self-reliance in development is better achieved through the establishment of a broad tax base; it is therefore important for all Kenyans to understand the significance of taxation and the generation of revenue.’\textsuperscript{255}

However, the Rwandan CRR draws attention to the constricted room for manoeuvre that exists for some countries, noting that Rwanda has a very limited tax base and still suffers from the dislocation of the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{256}

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The Algerian CRR recommends continuing to strengthen national autonomy in the development process.\textsuperscript{257}

**Benin:** The CRR calls for ‘real ownership’ of the country’s development efforts ‘at all levels’, and reducing external dependency, ‘notably by investing more in social developing and strengthening the production capacity’.\textsuperscript{258}

**Ghana:** The Ghanaian CRR does not make recommendations on this issue in detail, except to the extent that it calls for more domestic resource mobilisation.\textsuperscript{259}

**Kenya:** The CRR calls on Kenya to mobilise more domestic resources, and to this end it suggests a civic education programme on paying taxes.\textsuperscript{260} This is a very good idea, but would require considerable political will, as taxes would imply that ordinary citizens would relinquish funds that they might have been able to use for discretionary spending.

**Rwanda:** The Rwandan CRR does not offer any firm recommendations on this issue, although 10 pt of tangential relevance — it calls for the improvement of the capacities of people and institutions involved in development work.

**South Africa:** As South Africa is not a significant recipient of aid, there are no recommendations for it to consider. Indeed, a ‘best practice’ is identified in the degree to which the country is funding its own development efforts.\textsuperscript{261}

**Participation**

The involvement of potential beneficiaries, ‘democratisation’ and ‘ownership’ of development processes are increasingly seen as important parts of a successful project. Participation is the subject of a question in the socio-economic section of the APRM.
Questionnaire. All of the countries reviewed appeared to be in favour of broad participation and had some means to ensure this. The extent to which this is successful is another matter.

For example, processes and institutions have been established to enable people, communities or interest groups to discuss aspects of governance or policy. In Ghana, these include the National Economic Dialogue and stakeholders’ workshops. In Kenya, they include the Constituency Development Fund and the National Economic and Social Council (the country is credited with strong political will to promote public participation). Algeria has the National Economic and Social Council, while in Benin, the Economic and Social Council is named in the country’s CRR.262

The efficacy of these mechanisms is rather less certain. In Ghana, public sector representatives acknowledge that ‘there is room for improvement’.263 In Kenya, the comments about the country’s strong political will notwithstanding, feelings existed that ‘lawmakers have yet to appreciate the importance of public participation’ and that communities do not feel that they are properly consulted on initiatives.264 Poor consultation is cited as a reason for poor project implementation, and the CRR states that Kenyans do not appreciate that participation is both a right and a duty.265 In Algeria, the quality of participation is criticised. Citizen participation and ‘democratisation of the process of socio-economic development [are] weak, if not totally absent’, and development is seen largely as the preserve of government. Algeria also suffers from the after effects of its earlier socialist governance and development model, which was heavily centralised. This continues to exercise an influence and is a brake on participation. Participation tends to be limited to ‘consultations’, which in some instances are heavily dependent on the wali (provincial governor).266

In Benin, participation is deemed by stakeholders to be ‘inadequate’. Although the CSAR evidently believes that the country’s efforts in this regard are successful (the adjective ‘massive’ is employed to describe participation), and although the CRM compliments Benin on the will demonstrated, it notes that participation is not yet at an optimal level.267

In Rwanda, attempts have been made to devolve ownership of projects to local communities. The practice of umuganda — in terms of which everybody does voluntary community work — is another expression of popular involvement.268

Underscoring that part of the initiative for public participation rests with the government, the Kenyan CRR notes: ‘For a culture of participation to persist in Kenya, politicians, officials, and experts need to accept, support or at least tolerate effective forms of participation of rural people and the disadvantaged in development, especially at the grassroots.’269 This indicates that to make participation a reality, governments must at the very least not obstruct citizens attempting to participate. The Beninese CRR has a complementary note that ‘it is becoming even clearer today that poor governance is often as a result of the fact that governments shun the much needed dialogue with the society, which quite often poses the problem of legitimacy’.270

**Recommendations**

**Benin:** The CRR calls for ‘real ownership of development efforts to be accorded to all stakeholders’.271

**Ghana:** The CRR recommends involving all stakeholders in development efforts through co-ordinating councils and resource mobilisation. It also recommends paying particular
attention to the disparities in regions and gender across Ghana.\textsuperscript{272}

**Kenya:** The CRR says that the government should help to strengthen self-help groups and that Kenya should ‘accelerate the adoption and implementation of a sustainable bottom-up planning system to encourage participatory development’.\textsuperscript{273} It elsewhere says that measures must be taken to assist ordinary people to become involved in their governance and development: this would entail drawing up guidelines regarding public participation, soliciting inputs from civil society on budgets and encouraging inputs on projects.\textsuperscript{274}

**Rwanda:** The recommendation under the relevant objective — objective 6 of the section that deals with participation — fits somewhat untidily with the overall objective. It reads: ‘The CRM recommends that the Government engages extensively in capacity building at the local level and continues to find sustainable means of funding projects at local levels’.\textsuperscript{275}

**South Africa:** Among the recommendations germane to this area are involving the legislature in the development process, building consensus with other development stakeholders and encouraging civil society to develop its own capacity to carry out development functions.\textsuperscript{276}

**Millennium Development Goals**

The final MDG relates to the issue of development partnerships and popular participation.

### Table 11: Status of the relevant MDG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop a global partnership for development</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved; on track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This goal is dealt with somewhat more obliquely than the others. The CRR on Algeria says that the government stresses global partnerships to stimulate development. It also notes that domestically, public participation is weak, although mechanisms intended to facilitate this exist.\textsuperscript{277} The CRR on Benin says simply that a global partnership is ‘instituted in various areas’. It acknowledges the political will of the Beninese government to promote popular participation, but says that more is needed.\textsuperscript{278} The Ghanaian CRR is vague on this issue, but it reports that stakeholders said that there was ‘room for improvement’ in the mechanisms for promoting participation.\textsuperscript{279} The Kenyan CRR likewise recognises the presence of political will, but indicates that communities do not feel that they are adequately brought into political processes. Interestingly, it also recommends hitching expatriate communities (diaspora) to Kenya’s development.\textsuperscript{280} The CRR on Rwanda notes that ‘all stakeholders’ participate in planning projects and calls for the government to build local capacity and to find ‘sustainable means’ to fund projects.\textsuperscript{281} South Africa is not dependent on foreign assistance and is able to fund the overwhelming majority of its development efforts from own sources (which is identified as a best practice). South Africa has made ‘tremendous’ efforts to ensure broad-based participation.\textsuperscript{282}
7 Constraints on solutions

Three recurrent themes appear in the reports that do not relate directly to the MDGs, but are important for the overall developmental success of the countries concerned. These issues are framed in terms of the problems they present and what needs to be done to ensure that they contribute to solutions rather than — as is currently the position — acting as constraints.

Entrepreneurial opportunities

In discussing socio-economic issues, a central consideration is the degree to which people are in a position to ensure their own well-being. To speak of entrepreneurial opportunities would refer to such aspects as access to finance and markets. It is a broad category, overlapping to a significant extent with the economic governance and corporate governance chapters.

Much economic activity in Africa is of an informal nature, and this was reflected in the reports. In Ghana, the size of the informal sector is identified by stakeholders as a problem, and it would be desirable to formalise it. The CRR notes that it is not ‘self-evident’ what should be done, particularly insofar as a government action is concerned (it suggests ‘education, allowing adequate freedom of contract, and efficiently enforcing laws and contracts’ — pointing towards the imperative of a sound and consistent legal and institutional framework). In Benin, the informal sector is likewise prominent, often as a survival mechanism for those afflicted by poverty.

Actual physical access to markets is limited in Ghana and Benin by poor infrastructure. The Rwandan CRR notes in brief that good infrastructure is important and names some initiatives in this regard, but does not describe the severity of the problem. (See section on Infrastructure on page 38.)

Access to finance is difficult, especially for small businesses and particularly rural ones in Ghana, as rural banks are a small part of the overall banking sector. Other sources of finance include non-governmental organisations, credit unions, etc. In Kenya, access to finance is a large retarding factor for businesses. There is also scepticism from some stakeholders as to the ability of the Kenyan government to enhance access to microfinance. Farmers in Kenya complained that the cost of inputs made their products uncompetitive. The government has taken note of these concerns and has taken some steps to address them. However, the CRR states that these actions have not been properly communicated to the general population. Algeria is making a transition from a socialist to a market economy, and its banking system is termed ‘ineffective’ and is not making a great contribution towards small and medium-sized enterprises. South Africa’s financial sector is described as ‘well-developed’, although women and young people have trouble accessing credit.

Recommendations

Algeria: The socio-economic section of this CRR does not make specific recommendations.

Benin: To find recommendations on this matter, one should consult the cross-cutting issues section. This recommends a recognition of the importance of the informal sector and that measure should be taken to ensure that it operates as a complement to the formal sector. This would include providing assistance as required to the informal sector.
Ghana: The CRR’s recommendations on this issue are expressed in a somewhat roundabout fashion, calling for the state-led developmental model to be opened up in order to encourage more involvement by the private sector. Savings and the consequent mobilisation of domestic capital should be encouraged. There should also be involvement from business in providing infrastructure and human resource development.292

Kenya: The CRR says that the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture should provide farmers with market information.293

Rwanda: An important recognition is the need to research alternative means of livelihood other than farming. This will be crucial to Rwanda’s long-term viability. The CRR also calls for the reform of outdated laws, specifically mentioning laws regarding markets.294

South Africa: No specific recommendations are made in the socio-economic development section of the CRR on South Africa.

Infrastructure

An overarching problem facing the countries reviewed — and indeed, developing countries throughout Africa and beyond — is the nature and quality of the national infrastructure. Indeed, this is a key determinant of whether a country is ‘developed’ or not and thus is a key concern also of Nepad. Infrastructure is a rather vague term, but in this context it is intended to refer to physical assets — the roads, buildings and bridges that enable the countries’ institutions, economies and systems to function effectively.

The CRRs deal with this matter in different ways, sometimes indirectly, and not in a consolidated fashion. Infrastructure is also dealt with throughout the reports, and the comments here refer primarily — although not exclusively — to the material on infrastructure found in the socio-economic sections.

The CRRs on Benin and Kenya stress the negative impact that poor infrastructure has on economic activity295 (the Rwandan report is somewhat less specific, but notes that good infrastructure is important for development296). The Kenyan CRR sets out some historical background, noting that colonial settlement policies had benefitted parts of the country at the expense of others, and that ‘this underdevelopment remains largely unaddressed in formal policies or practice’.297 This comment has at least some degree of applicability to all states — which are almost all former colonies — in Africa, and the situation was compounded by subsequent policies that prioritised service provision to key constituencies, in particular, the cities. Besides Kenya, regional infrastructural disparities are noted in the CRRs on Ghana and South Africa.298 In Ghana, rapid migration to the cities (again, a common African phenomenon) places enormous stress on urban infrastructure.299 The same is observed in Benin.300

Financing infrastructural development appears in some of the reports. Ghana’s CRR indicates that such development tends to rely on external development assistance, although some stakeholders had indicated that ‘funds should have gone to income-generating activities instead of infrastructure development projects’.301 South Africa’s growth and development policy (the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa) stresses the inadequacy of infrastructure as a brake on investment and proposed ‘massive investments’ to deal with this.302 Algeria is complimented on having made ‘spectacular progress in education in terms of numbers, infrastructure and services since independence in 1962’, and is referred to as a vast ‘construction site’. Its ability to do achieve this is, however, buoyed by the hydrocarbon sector, which is vulnerable to price movements.303
Recommendations

Infrastructure is a wide-ranging concept and recommendations under other headings (health or education, for example) may very well relate to infrastructure as it is broadly defined. References to it are also likely to be found in other sections. What follows is a selection of material relating to infrastructure, but it is not exhaustive in the broadest definition of the concept.

**Benin:** While not dressing infrastructure holistically in this section, there are recommendations with some bearing on the infrastructural backlogs. For example, one calls for Benin to mobilise people to assist in installing water points; another calls for the building of health facilities.

**Ghana:** Little is recommended about infrastructure as a discrete concept on its own, although some recommendations of relevance to infrastructure are made, such as taking (undefined) steps to stem migration to the urban areas.

**Kenya:** As with other countries, the socio-economic development section of the CRR does not address infrastructure as a discrete, coherent entity, rather alluding to it under several separate headings, e.g. encouraging the upgrading of the physical assets in the education system.

**Rwanda:** Presumably touching on infrastructure, a somewhat unclear recommendation calls on the government to ‘maintain its impetus to ensure that access to basic amenities is not restricted to the urban areas’.

**South Africa:** Infrastructure is a broad, ‘cross-cutting’ issue and, as such, recommendations geared towards particular service areas are applicable: the CRR calls for a variety of relevant actions, including rehabilitating farm schools, building clinics and promoting rural development, in part to stem the tide of rural–urban migration.

**Telecommunications**

A system of communications — of concern here are principally telephone and Internet services — is essential for a modern economy. Deficiencies in this sector are widely apparent, although not all reports deal with this sector in equal detail. On the most basic level, access to communications is unsatisfactory. In the Beninese CRR, for instance, the following is noted:

Benin seems to be lagging far behind in information and communication technologies. With the obsolete equipment of ‘Benin Telecom S.A.’, the number of telephone lines per thousand inhabitants in the biggest city is only 41.6, whereas the average cost of a phone call is among the highest in the region. The number of personal computers per thousand inhabitants is only 3.7. It is, therefore, urgent for Benin to quickly modernise its telecommunication network, and extend its optic-fibre cable network to the cities in central Benin. This would contribute to the creation of new jobs.

The Kenyan CRR makes a similar point: ‘However, major impediments to the quick penetration of ICT in the country still exist. These include inadequate infrastructure backbone and ancillary facilities such as electricity, telephones and financial services and ICT skills.’ Access to the Internet is particularly restricted, and this is acute in rural communities. This is mentioned in relation to Benin, South Africa and Kenya.

On the other hand, all the CRRs appreciate the importance of ICT, and there is
discussion — or at least mention — of the relevant planning. The role of mobile telephony is raised, if taken as a whole, somewhat ambivalently. While it is expanding access to telephone services, it is also seen by some as expensive.

**Recommendations**

**Algeria:** The socio-economic section of the CRR does not make specific recommendations on this issue.

**Benin:** The CRR makes no recommendations on telecommunications in the socio-economic development section.

**Ghana:** This is another area in which a generic solution is proffered in the CRR: ‘Set quantitative targets, design explicit policies and measures, and plan detailed timing to achieve the objectives in the area of socio-economic development.’ The country should consider the areas where progress has been most disappointing, and make use of co-ordinating councils comprising the various stakeholders to help steer projects.

**Kenya:** Kenya should ‘articulate a comprehensive strategy’ for human resources development, manage the changes that would come with e-government and ensure universal access to ICT.

**Rwanda:** The CRR on Rwanda does not make explicit recommendations beyond recommending that impetus be maintained to ensure that all people have access to ‘basic amenities’.

**South Africa:** The CRR on South Africa makes no recommendations on telecommunications in the socio-economic development section.

**Implementation**

Kenya’s CRR could be speaking for many countries in Africa with the following comment:

> A frequently encountered problem, and perceivably the greatest challenge to Kenya’s democracy, is the poor implementation of policies and programmes. Kenya is well serviced with a body of laws, programmes, commissions and agencies that could make for the best-governed democracy in Africa. However, these policies and programmes have so far been poorly implemented. There are many reasons for the poor implementation record, some of which are interlinked. These include the lack of political will to implement the policies; the donor syndrome, whereby some policies are hoisted on Kenya so as to qualify for aid; a weak resource base and capacity constraints in institutions hoisted to implement these policies; and the exclusion of critical stakeholders and institutions in some cases. Others are poor coordination of efforts by institutions involved in policy formulation and implementation, including the government, civil society organisations and the private sector; budgetary problems, including lack of transparency and accountability, and poor governance.

While policies exist — and are at times commended by the reports — the countries are frequently let down in their implementation. This problem is a cross-cutting one and features prominently in all the reports, with the exception of the CRR on Algeria, and is to a large extent a function of the general dearth of skills in the countries reviewed. This problem almost certainly has its roots deep in the troubled educational systems (as described above), but the actual loss of trained skills is highlighted, especially in the health sector, through attrition (death or retirement), through emigration, or simply
through trained personnel leaving the profession (or the public sector, which caters for most of the population). For example, ‘in the decade up to 2003, Ghana lost over 30% of its trained health personnel’. South Africa faces a medical ‘brain drain’ that aggravates the existing shortages of health professionals, particularly in the rural areas. The CRR on Rwanda notes that efforts to register land are hampered by ‘insufficient human resources and skills’. An important issue here is the extent to which countries strive to make themselves attractive to highly skilled people.

Broader, less specific ‘capacity problems’ (which are clearly largely problems of skills, although probably also of finances and other resources) are identified elsewhere. The Ghanaian CRR devotes a section of its cross-cutting issues chapter to this (noting that the government is taking this problem seriously). In the Kenyan CRR, it is noted that some projects have proven ineffective (giving the ‘inability to target the beneficiaries, insufficient involvement of stakeholders, lack of resources and poor monitoring and evaluation systems’ as examples of this) and have never gone beyond the planning stage. A combination of a shallow skills pool and young institutions in Rwanda means that ‘projects that have been identified are not being implemented and put into operation’. In Benin, the ‘poor results’ of programmes are ascribed to a lack of participation in implementing them. In Algeria, attention is called to the mismatch that occurs as the education system produces large numbers of graduates, but the labour market simultaneously is unable to find appropriate skills. This is a clear indication that students are studying in fields with low applicability to the national labour market.

Difficulties in co-ordinating various activities and general inefficiency and poor administration are other factors. Lack of proper co-ordination is noted in Benin and South Africa. In addition, other problems raised in South Africa, such as ‘institutional inefficiency’ in regard to sanitation and corruption in the social security system, certainly speak to issues facing many other African countries.

**Recommendations**

**Ghana:** The CRR suggests that the country take such actions as it can to improve the efficiency of its policies and initiatives without raising costs unduly. Among the suggestions are ‘reorganising and reallocating facilities, redistributing funds and refining processes and procedures’, part of which is monitoring implementation.

**Kenya:** The CRR, among its ‘overarching issues’, deals with ‘implementation gaps’. It calls for greater political will and the mobilisation of stakeholders, and for stakeholders to demand accountability from the government.

**Rwanda:** The CRR on Rwanda does not make explicit recommendations on this issue, although one might refer to a recommendation that training should be provided to improve the operation of various agencies.

**South Africa:** The CRR calls for skills and ‘capacity’ improvement (with a special focus on local government), as well as ‘vigourously improv[ing] [the] integration and coordination of the planning and management of socio-economic development’.

**Algeria:** The socio-economic section of the CRR does not make recommendations on this issue directly, with the exception of calling for ‘the promotion of human capital through capacity-building’ in a broader recommendation addressed to the issue of sustainable development. However, later in the report, a number of factors are cited as having an impact on reform efforts. Among these are that the CRM had observed ‘a shortage of
managerial competencies and qualified staff in government institutions and the private sector. Discussing the outmigration of skilled Algerians, the CRR says that it is necessary to understand the reasons for this phenomenon so as to be able to ‘respond adequately’.

**Benin:** In discussing water supply systems, the CRR recommends that councils in charge of relevant projects be equipped with skills in construction and management. It also recommends — using words closely mirroring the Algerian report — ‘the promotion of human capital through capacity-building’ in a broader recommendation about sustainable development.

**CONCLUSION**

Using the APRM reports as a set of guides, it is apparent that extensive hurdles remain to be overcome in the countries under review. For the most part, the visible problems — lack of health care, inadequate education, unsatisfactory infrastructure — are offshoots of unstable economies. This is particularly the case for Ghana, Benin, Rwanda and Kenya, but even significantly true of the economically stronger countries, South Africa and Algeria. In the latter cases, viable economies carry the problems inherited from political instability and ideological economic management. The result of all of this has been severe distortions in the provision of social services and the infrastructure that supports it.

The consequences of this situation have been a survivalist mentality of sorts: relying on foreign economic support, the informalisation of economic activity, the continued preferencing of particular constituencies, and the interruption or degradation of the socio-economic fabric. The ultimate outcome has been widespread poverty.

It is not, however, correct to say that the problems identified all stem from a lack of funding, although this is clearly a major part of the problem. Factors rooted in culture and tradition, particularly in respect to the role of women, have hamstrung the realisation of a great part of these societies’ potential. The problem of inadequate skills is further compounded by the inability of countries to retain their skilled personnel. The after effects of authoritarian or dysfunctional political systems linger and hinder creative participation by populations.

Some important gaps are apparent in the reports. Most obviously, solutions to all the issues and problems identified are not always offered, and when they are, they are of variable quality. There may be merit in noting clearly that solutions to particular problems are not readily evident, and further research is needed. Moreover, missing from the reports is an analysis of the political implications of development (and conversely the political factors that constrain or distort it), although these are important for understanding and crafting a development strategy.

Of particular concern are the difficulties experienced in the implementation of what might otherwise be competently conceived plans. Skills or capacity problems play a prominent role in this area, but such factors as corruption and lack of political will are clearly evident too. These need to be more carefully examined.
ENDNOTES

1 The other sections are democracy and good political governance, economic governance and management, and corporate governance.
3 Countries with an HDI of 0.800 or above are regarded as having a high level of human development; those with an HDI of 0.500–0.799 have a medium level of human development; while those below 0.500 have a low level.
5 It has been noted that the conditions that created these events were in fact identified by the relevant APRM CRR: see Turianskyi Y, ‘Common African political governance issues: Lessons from six early APRM reports’, Occasional Paper, 28. Johannesburg: SAIIA, March 2003.
7 Ibid., pp. 21–22, 210.
12 Ibid., para. 786, p. 247.
14 There are slight differences in the phrasing of the questionnaires for the various countries, but these are not of a substantive nature.
17 South African CRR, para. 815, p. 255.
18 Kenyan CRR, p. 218.
19 Ibid., p. 236.
20 Beninese CRR, para. 734, p. 244.
21 Algerian CRR, para. 918, p. 267.
22 Beninese CRR, para. 767, p. 253.
23 Rwandan CRR, para. 387, p. 119.
26 Rwandan CRR, para. 401, p. 124.
28 Beninese CRR, para. 815, p. 258.
29 Ghanaian CRR, para. 48, p. 111.
30 As the MDGs are a common currency in development thinking, they have been applied here as an organisational tool. Where possible, material has been grouped together so as to correspond to the relevant MDGs.
31 Algerian CRR, para. 889, pp. 258–59.
34 South African CRR, ‘Programme of Action’.
35 Kenyan CRR, p. 216; Beninese CRR, paras. 932–34, pp. 296–97; Rwandan CRR, para. 387, p. 119.
36 Kenyan CRR, p. 221.
37 Highly indebted poor country.
38 Beninese CRR, para. 938, p. 297.
39 Algerian CRR, para. 872, p. 256; Rwandan CRR, para. 373, p. 115.
40 Ghanaian CRR, para. 10, p. 102; Kenyan CRR, p. 208; South Africa CRR, para. 891, pp. 274–75.
41 South African CRR, para. 777, p. 244.
42 Algerian CRR, para. 893, pp. 259–60.
43 Kenyan CRR, p. 216.
44 South African CRR, paras. 889–90, p. 276.
45 Algerian CRR, para. 895, p. 262.
49 See Turianskyyi Y. op. cit.
50 Algerian CRR, para. 897, pp. 263–64.
51 Beninese CRR, para. 777, p. 258.
52 Ghanaian CRR, para. 34, p. 108.
53 Kenyan CRR, p. 220.
54 Rwandan CRR, para. 391, p. 121.
South African CRR, para. 786, p. 247.

This website is ‘an initiative of the United Nations’, and provides an overview of the progress that each country has made or is making towards realising the MDGs. Unfortunately, the methodology and information used to make these determinations are not provided. It is, nevertheless, a useful general overview of official assessments of countries’ progress.

Algerian CRR, para. 878, p. 257.


Kenyan CRR, pp. 210, 224–27.


Ghanaian CRR, paras. 40–41, p. 109; para. 48, p. 111.

Rwandan CRR, para. 389, p. 119; ‘Table 5.2: Results achieved in terms of the Millennium Development Goals indicators’, p. 121; para. 387, p. 119.


Ghanaian CRR, para. 15, pp. 104–5.


Kenyan CRR, pp. 26–27.

Algerian CRR, para. 828, p. 246.

Beninese CRR, para. 737, p. 244.

Rwandan CRR, para. 376, p. 116.

South African CRR, para. 690, p. 225.

Algerian CRR, para. 938, p. 275.

Beninese CRR, para. 759, p. 252.

Ghanaian CRR, para. 89, p. 120.

Rwandan CRR, para. 391, p. 121.

South African CRR, para. 786, p. 247.

For example, the Rwandan CRR (para. 437, p. 135) states that 91% of Rwandans depend on farming.

Ghanaian CRR, para. 10, p. 123.

Ibid., para. 11, p. 123.

Kenyan CRR, pp. 230, 231, 245.

Algerian CRR, para. 963, p. 278; para. 992, p. 286; para. 1119, p. 318.

Ibid., para. 993, p. 286.

Beninese CRR, para. 828, p. 270; para. 844, p. 274.

Rwandan CRR, para. 420, p. 129.

South African CRR, para. 905, p. 277.

Ibid., para. 858, p. 205.


Rwandan CRR, para. 421, p. 129.

Algerian CRR, para. 994, p. 287.

Beninese CRR, para. 848, p. 276.

Ghanaian CRR, para. 69, p. 116.

92 South African CRR, para. 860, p. 265.
93 See, for example, ibid., para. 789, p. 248.
94 Ibid., para. 804, p. 251.
95 Ghanaian CRR, para. 53, p. 112; Kenyan CRR, p. 222.
96 Algerian CRR, para. 904, p. 256; Beninese CRR, para. 95, p. 261.
97 South African CRR, para. 805, p. 251.
98 For example, Algerian CRR, para. 904, p. 265; Rwandan CRR, para. 406, p. 124.
103 Rwandan CRR, para. 405, p. 124; South African CRR, para. 799, p. 250.
104 Kenyan CRR, p. 219.
105 For example, Ghanaian CRR, para. 54, p. 112; Beninese CRR, paras. 781, 783, p. 259; Algerian CRR, para. 902, p. 265.
106 Ghanaian CRR, para. 69, pp. 115–16.
107 Kenyan CRR, p. 228.
108 Rwandan CRR, para. 410, p. 126.
111 Beninese CRR, ‘Table 6.1: Progress made in relation to the MDGs in Benin’, p. 254.
112 Ghanaian CRR, para. 41, p. 109.
113 Ibid., para. 50, p. 111.
114 Kenyan CRR, pp. 224–27.
115 Rwandan CRR, paras. 389–90, pp. 119–21.
117 Ghanaian CRR, para. 73, p. 107; Kenyan CRR, pp. 235, 237, Algerian CRR, para. 1009, p. 289; para. 1026, p. 295; Beninese CRR, para. 857, p. 278; para. 917, p. 294; Rwandan CRR, para. 390, p. 121; South African CRR, para. 865, p. 266.
120 Algerian CRR, paras. 1017–19, p. 293.
121 South African CRR, para. 864, p. 266.
122 Ghanaian CRR, para. 74, p. 117; Kenyan CRR, pp. 248–49; Beninese CRR, para. 843, p. 274.
123 Kenyan CRR, p. 235.
124 Algerian CRR, para. 1022, p. 294.
125 For example, Kenyan CRR, pp. 235, 248–49; Algerian CRR, para. 1021, p. 294; Beninese CRR, para. 843, p. 274.
126 Rwandan CRR, para. 424, p. 130.
127 Algerian CRR, para. 837, p. 246.
128 Ibid., para. 1028, p. 296.
129 Ghanaian CRR, para. 79, p. 118 (the report urges that the law should be enacted).
130 South African CRR, para. 867, p. 267.
131 See, for example, Ghanaian CRR, para. 7, p. 122, which acknowledges the country’s political will; and Kenyan CRR, p. 234, which mentions a series of achievements.
132 Algerian CRR, para. 1091, p. 312; South African CRR, para. 863, p. 266.
135 Ghanaian CRR, para. 7, p. 122.
136 See, for example, *ibid.*, para. 80, p. 118; Algerian CRR, para. 1030, pp. 296–97.
138 Algerian CRR, para. 1030, pp. 296–97.
139 Beninese CRR, para. 878, p. 283.
140 Ghanaian CRR, para. 80, p. 118.
141 Kenyan CRR, p. 237.
142 Rwandan CRR, para. 429, p. 132.
146 Ghanaian CRR, para. 15, p. 103.
148 Rwandan CRR, ‘Table 6.2: Results achieved in terms of the Millennium Development Goals indicators’, p. 120; para. 390, p. 121; paras. 425–29, pp. 130–32.
150 Kenyan CRR, p. 221.
151 Algerian CRR, para. 971, p. 279.
159 Kenyan CRR, p. 228.
160 South African CRR, para. 756, p. 239.
161 Ghanaian CRR, para. 57, p. 113.
163 Algerian CRR, para. 934, p. 278.
164 South African CRR, para. 842, p. 262.
165 Rwandan CRR, para. 414, p. 127.
166 Kenyan CRR, pp. 228–29.
168 Algerian CRR, para. 973, p. 281.
169 Ibid., para. 975, p. 282.
171 Beninese CRR, para. 848, p. 276.
172 Ghanaian CRR, para. 69, pp. 115–16.
173 Kenyan CRR, p. 234.
175 South African CRR, para. 860, p. 265.
176 Ghanaian CRR, para. 61, p. 114.
177 Kenyan CRR, p. 229.
178 Ibid., p. 231.
179 Rwandan CRR, para. 411, p. 127.
181 Algerian CRR, para. 968, p. 278.
182 Algerian CRR, para. 969, p. 279.
183 Ghanaian CRR, para. 61, p. 114.
184 South African CRR, para. 825, p. 258.
185 Formerly of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). He was controversially dismissed for insubordination and bringing the CSIR into disrepute, but it was widely claimed that this was in fact due to the alarming nature of the claims he was making.
189 Beninese CRR, para. 835, p. 272.
190 The table refers to the proportion of the population in each country, in each of the two years referred to, with access to each category of sanitation facilities. ‘Open defecation’ refers to the unavailability of any facilities. Totals in each row do not always add up to 100%, due to rounding.
192 Algerian CRR, para. 994, p. 286.
193 Beninese CRR, para. 848, p. 276.
194 Kenyan CRR, p. 231.
195 Ghanaian CRR, para. 69, pp. 115–16.
196 Rwandan CRR, para. 422, p. 129.
197 South African CRR, para. 860, p. 265.
198 Rwandan CRR, para. 411, p. 127.
201 Kenyan CRR, pp. 229, 231.
202 Algerian CRR, paras. 948–52, p. 276; South African CRR, para. 848, p. 263.

205 Kenyan CRR, p. 231.
206 Beninese CRR, para. 848, p. 276.
207 Ghanaian CRR, para. 69, pp. 115–16.
208 Kenyan CRR, p. 234.
209 Rwandan CRR, para. 381, p. 118.
210 South African CRR, para. 860, p. 265.
213 Ghanaian CRR, para. 12, p. 103; paras. 57–58, p. 113; para. 61, p. 114.
214 Kenyan CRR, pp. 227, 229.
215 Rwandan CRR, para. 373, p. 115; para. 384, p. 118.
216 South African CRR, para. 842, p. 262.
218 The South African CRR quotes a Joint UN Action Plan on HIV/AIDS estimate that some 5.3 million people were infected in 2005 (Ibid., para. 927, p. 281).
219 Ghanaian CRR, para. 13, p. 103.
220 Beninese CRR, para. 786, p. 260.
221 Ibid., para. 808, p. 266.
222 Algerian CRR, para. 933, p. 272.
224 Rwandan CRR, para. 393, p. 122.
225 Kenyan CRR, p. 221.
226 Rwandan CRR, para. 393, pp. 121–22.
227 Kenyan CRR, p. 227.
228 Algerian CRR, para. 831, p. 247; Rwandan CRR, para. 394, p. 122; Beninese CRR, para. 807, p. 265.
229 South African CRR, para. 810, p. 254.
230 Beninese CRR, para. 806, p. 265.
231 South African CRR, para. 810, p. 254; Rwandan CRR, para. 394, p. 122.
232 For example, Rwandan CRR, para. 393, p. 122; Kenyan CRR, p. 221.
233 Algerian CRR, para. 938, p. 275.
234 Beninese CRR, para. 814, p. 268.
235 Ghanaian CRR, para. 69, pp. 115–16.
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239 Ibid., para. 912, p. 266.
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240 Beninese CRR, ‘Table 6.1: Progress made in relation to the MDGs in Benin’, p. 255.
241 Ibid., para. 807, p. 265.
242 Ghanaian CRR, para. 41, p. 109.
243 Kenyan CRR, p. 22.
244 Rwandan CRR, ‘Table 6.2: ‘Results achieved in terms of the Millennium Development Goals indicators’’, p. 120; para. 393, p. 122.
246 Ghanaian CRR, para. 15, p. 124.
247 Kenyan CRR, p. 213.
249 Rwandan CRR, para. 371, p. 113.
250 The methodology used to make these estimates is not specified, so it may be possible for different calculations to arrive at different conclusions.
252 Kenyan CRR, p. 213.
253 Algerian CRR, para. 849, p. 251.
255 Kenyan CRR, p. 214.
256 Rwandan CRR, para. 371, p. 113.
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263 Ghanaian CRR, para. 85, p. 119.
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266 Algerian CRR, para. 1037, p. 298; para. 1041, p. 300; para. 1045, p. 301; para. 1047, p. 302.
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271 Ibid., para. 759, p. 252.
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273 Kenyan CRR, p. 215.
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304 Beninese CRR, para. 848, p. 276.
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307 Kenyan CRR, p. 228.
308 Rwandan CRR, para. 422, p. 129.
310 Beninese CRR, para. 609, p. 213.
311 Kenyan CRR, p. 233.
313 For example, Ghanaian CRR, para. 65, p. 115; Algerian CRR, para. 956, p. 278; para. 987, p. 284; Rwandan CRR, para. 413, p. 127.
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315 Beninese CRR, para. 842, p. 274.
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319 Kenyan CRR, p. 242.
320 Ghanaian CRR, para. 9, p. 102.
322 Rwandan CRR, para. 384, p. 119.
323 Ghanaian CRR, paras. 4–5, p. 122.
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328 Beninese CRR, para. 757, p. 251; South African CRR, para. 755, p. 239.
330 Ibid., para. 760, p. 240; the Kenya report also refers to ‘pervasive corruption’ (Kenyan CRR, p. 27).
331 Ghanaian CRR, para. 56, pp. 112–13.
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