THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE:
Some Thoughts on the Discipline of International Relations and on South Africa’s International Dilemma

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This Occasional Paper contains the text of Professor Kunert's Inaugural Lecture, delivered on 5 October 1983.

The Jan Smuts Chair of International Relations was established in 1957 by the Smuts Memorial Trust, and the first Smuts Professor was appointed in 1962. The parties to the Trust were the University of the Witwatersrand, the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Jan Smuts Memorial Committee. The main purpose of the Trust, in addition to the creation of the Chair, was the erection and maintenance of Jan Smuts House, on the University Campus, as a centre of International studies and a living memorial to Jan Christian Smuts as an International statesman. The building, opened in 1960, now houses the headquarters of the Institute and the Library. The Professor and Department of International Relations were formerly also housed in Jan Smuts House.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.
To past and present students of the Department, who have always shown themselves willing to distinguish between "real possibilities" and "possible realities".
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REALITY AND UTOPIA IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In my attempt to understand the reason for the existence of the gaping chasm that appears to divide the separate worlds of the visionaries on the one hand and the common sense realists on the other, I have pondered on the question of innocence, and it seems to me that what so often is taken to be either virtue or cynicism is ultimately a reflection of the duality of man's nature expressed in the opposing conditions of innocence and experience. Within each human being at all times, and for each generation, the struggle is waged between two contrasting perceptions: the ideal, which is rooted in innocence, and the real, rooted in experience. In the condition of innocence, however, we are always threatened by experience, and sense that we are perilously close to losing the childlike innocence which enables us to construct beautiful and fragile intellectual toys in our globally spacious playroom. This is the realm at which innocence comes into contact with politics; the experience emerges from the act of human association and disassociation.

We who live in this age and in this corner of the globe have for long deluded ourselves into thinking that our small world could continue in innocence in its relationship with the world beyond. The time has come for us to emerge from these childlike notions and to confront the external realm and the forces which swirl and tumble the states of the world in cultural clashes, political anarchy and ideological disorder.

Many, if not most, of the contemporary social sciences provide "non-answers to trivial questions" and anaesthetize political reality - (a conception of politics which places considerable trust in common sense) - by means of terminological and conceptual "sorcery". There is, in the social sciences, a compulsion to press forward in the search for a social sciences' equivalent of the laws of the "hard or natural" sciences, and mainly because this search is pursued in the un-charted realms of fantasy, its points of reference are located in the impenetrable social science equivalent of "pilot jargon". As Alice, the epitome of the bewildered realist in the wonderland put it: "The Hatter's remarks seemed to have no sort of meaning in it - and yet it was certainly English".

Heinrich Rickert's admonition that metaphors and concepts can "do nothing more ... than construct bridges over the stream of reality" goes to the heart of the matter, for the social science models inevitably oversimplify the phenomena they purport to explain and tend to sacrifice relevance to reality to logical elegance. If stripped of their pretenses, they often strike the participant in the debate as "streakers" dancing on an imaginary Archimedean head of the needle.

When their conferees of the sister discipline of International Relations engage each other, frequently all too frequently, in incestuous intellectual pseudo-disputations, their scientistic methodology endeavours to transform the ever more tenacious reality of states and nation-states into images of contemporary international life which approximates a mutation of history itself and not a mutation within history, in which changes of systems are not distinguished from changes within systems, in which the a-societal (Kant) or anarchical and fragmented state-system is seen as having reached take-off as "spaceship earth", a technologised artifact engineered through clock-work mechanisms of interdependent reciprocating parts.

But, despite the up-beat imagery, the delusions of many of today's social scientists are not, as they like to pretend or fervently desire in their hubris to believe, the cherished product of twentieth century enlighten-
ment, but the legacy of gnostic movements which reach back into time and recur in our age. These movements have always been the vehicles of the "great simplifiers" who carry the masterkeys to unlock the world's secrets. Their vast appeal, which sweeps ever greater multitudes into their ideological vortex, is that they promise escape from the world and the *conditio humana* and pretend to command the means of deliverance. They conjure up a vision of rebirth, redemption and return to paradise and the recapture of the Rousseauistic nature of the "noble savage". They fantasise about the chimera of a thoroughly de-politicised world, where conflict will be converted into voluntary free labour and mankind united under one sovereignty no longer confronting any enemy. These visions are normally driven by disaster experienced and/or Armageddon expected and anticipated. In these acutely existential crisis situations models are built to give man, suspended in his "state of flungness" (Heidegger's "Geworfensein"), a glimpse of the beckoning future to come. Language becomes highly metaphorical, and dangerous, to the extent of mistaking attributes of analogy for attributes of reality. To put it blasphemously, taking communion in the one Eucharistic body of inevitable, immanent, uniform, necessary, and directional change are all too frequently the "social sciences".

The Nature of the State In Theory and Reality

By postulating growth, wholeness, and oneness, to be consummated through process, their ultimate realisation is presumed. The "myth of unity" crowds out the fundamental fact that the political world is not a universum but a pluriversum, in which men live as they are in a world as it is, where peace is precariously balanced and wars all too frequent. The world is composed of "little cosmos", which with its own self-understanding and self-interpretation, of a world moulded into territorial, sovereign and independent states. For while the state concept has been repeatedly indicted by the scientistic, behaviouristic international relations theorists as conceptually ambiguous, equivocal and vacuous, in the vast external realm the reality of the state has proved to be Intractibly resilient. Indeed, not only does the state survive, but it goes from strength to strength, having multiplied three-fold over the last quarter of a century. This resilience is beginning to perplex some of the less ecstatic theorists, like Wolfram Hanrieder who, with legions of other political science behaviourists, had long ago pronounced the state dead. He now declares "... it is not a new type of international politics which is "dissolving" the traditional nation-state, but a new nation-state which is dissolving traditional international politics".

Political science terminology and methodology may be as inscrutable to the lay observer of international politics as the medical language is unfathomable to the uninitiated to the Oath of Hippocrates, but the verdict is audible and, for the political realist, encouraging. Even Thucydides would find the contemporary world, after a crash course in modern technology and geography, not all that unfamiliar. He would face a world of organised entities, clearly demarcated, jealously watching each other, jostling for influence, control and domination, employing political, economic, and military power to further their goals, and locked, on the highest level, even in bipolar conflict as were Sparte and Athen in his life time. He would find reaffirmed his contention that past and future could be judged comparatively to the extent to which historical situations are influenced by "the course of human things". Having once painstakingly, but successfully, peeled off the encrustations of political science jargon to reveal the more substantive statements, and having once mounted the barbed-wires of scientistic methodologies, Thucydides would encounter telling features of political realities captured in his "The Peloponnesian War" of almost
2500 years ago, and his near-contemporary of Hindu India, Kautilya, would clearly recognise the action-patterns of late 20th century International politics as refracted through his classic Arthasastra.

The veil of innocence, carefully woven by behaviouristic political scientists, and almost spitefully concurrently unravelled by statesmen in the daily conduct of their business, is being lifted on the state concept, though the vision of many a scientistic disciple is still blurred. While the academic detractors of the state are far from beating a hasty retreat, they are nevertheless groping through the self-generated fog trying not to lag too far behind those who have stubbornly, and often thoughtfully, insisted that knowledge of political substance in its institutional, historical, and philosophical aspects be reasserted.

Mankind began by division, and human societies, cast in the roles of states, continue to live in an international system characterised by anarchy in the strict sense of the term: they have not been subjected to an "arche", that is, an overarching world authority. The international system is not hierarchically organised according to economic exchange relations, but horizontally according to authority relations which find their fullest expression in self-help by political units, called states, as the fundamental basis of international association and disassociation.

International relations are essentially adversary relations, individualistic in origin, but ameliorated by modes of collaboration and co-operation. Attempts at "domesticating" world politics inevitably run into the unsurmountable obstacle and barrier of the sovereignty of the territorial state. State conduct remains actuated by the principle of raison d'état, precariously suspended, and held in tension, between Kratos and Ethos or, in the words of Friedrich Meinecke, between behaviour prompted by the "power-impulse" and behaviour prompted by "moral responsibility". In the last analysis, state actions are conditioned by necessitas rerum (the necessity of things) which makes politics not the abode of the Samaritan but the realm of res dura (the "hard and tough thing", Virgil). It is the highest irrationality in politics in general and in international politics in particular to act, as Weber remarked, out of the supposedly pure motives of conscience without weighing the probable consequences of such action. Politics is often a matter, not of choosing between good and evil, but of choosing between degrees of evil (Machiavelli), or, perhaps, between the "disagreeable" and the "Intolerable" (Burke). An "ethics of responsibility", or "consequences", may wring from the statesman of virtue, as concessions to necessity, violence and other evils. Often, out of fear of acquiring the reputation of being cruel or inhuman, he may fall in his assumed and assigned task of stopping "the sons of Brutus" (Machiavelli).

"Friends" and "Enemies" in Inter-state Relations

It is only when interests, ideologies, values and cultures clash that politics begins. Central to politics is people "getting" one another to do something. It is relational, has directiveness, and involves aggregates of people. The degrees of utopian constructs can be judged in proportion to their promulgators' envisaging the end of "politics" and "ideology" - notions that profoundly affect Marxism, democracy, and progressivism. Politics in its relational context, and especially as it structures the interactions between states under conditions of anarchy, is essentially shaped by the distinction between "friend" and "enemy". Political relations in the harsh, and proud, world of states are characterised by the "degree of intensity of an association of disassociation". The concepts of "friend" and "enemy", as defined by Carl Schmitt, are to be taken "in their concrete, existential meanings", and not "as metaphors or symbols". The
distinction corresponds in the political realm to the distinctions made in other, relatively independent spheres such as good and bad in morals, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics, or profitable and nonprofitable in economics. The distinction is "independent, that is to say, not derived from or traceable back to one or more of these other antitheses", though politics as the relational will be affected by them.

Modern gnostic movements are fundamentally apolitical, and are governed by the compulsion to "depoliticise" the political, by calling for the "last war" and the "last Crusade", or, alternatively, for the final cataclysmic "revolution", to usher in perpetual peace and harmony. Modern liberalism seeks to efface the distinctly political from two sides, the economic and the ethical, or, in the realm of global politics, a "new international economic order" and "human rights". In Marxism, revolutionary action is a temporary, transient concession to political reality, which is ultimately to be transformed, through the materialistic historical process, into a global administration of things and a de-politicised universal classless society, where no-one, according to the utopian script, will be "in charge", but where the "Charter of Barbarism" (Ortega y Gasset) is more likely to be brandished by the "Minister of Truth". The gulf separating the "realm of necessity", that is, of politics, from the "realm of freedom" (utopia) is bridged by revolutionary tactics, with the "Pugachev with a university education" (de Maistre) - the fantacised, radicalised intelligentsia, and self-styled avant-garde - in charge. But the enemy to be combatted will no longer be the justus hostis - the just opponent accepted as an equal - but rather the injustus hostis - the absolute foe - to be vanquished and annihilated in pursuit of a justa causa as a "criminal" of "mankind".

Utopias have no foreign policies. One of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's ideal states was that they take no account of foreign affairs. Utopias-in-the-state-of-becoming are compelled, by the sheer force of necessity, to devise foreign policies but singularly fail to formulate theories of foreign policy. Their designers may use the tools of economic analysis in a modified form so as to understand and come to grips with international relations. They employ concepts such as "systems analysis", "feedback" and "input" and "output", or, alternatively, permit their understanding of world action-patterns, as well as their research projects on brigands and mobs, to be driven by the dialectics of the Marxist "law of inertia, for ... change is natural, that is, requires no special explanation ...". Not only is the future course of history predictable, but Marxist historiography is "teleological and chiliastic as well".

History is seen as the history of class struggle, of the workings of forces of production, modes of production, and relations of production, and, transposed to the international level, of core "exploiters" and periphery "exploited". In Soviet Marxist-Leninist parlance, the relentless struggle is waged between the "camp of socialism" and the "camp of imperialism". In the more recent radical literature on international politics the thrust of argument is encapsulated in "systems of dependency", where the attempted explanatory mode is cast in terms of structurally unequal economic exchange relations, evacuated almost totally of essential diplomatic-strategic modes of actions. The "dependency" approach is as vacuous as its Leninist progenitor. The former's ability to explain international politics in the second half of the 20th century is as lame as Lenin's treatise on imperialism was in attempting to come to grips with late 19th century colonialism. As argued succinctly by Tony Smith, "... dependency theory represents an historically concrete attempt of Marxism to absorb southern nationalism (Third World) into a kind of ideological united front" against the First World.
No-one is compelled to accept the spiritual, civilisational crisis of our age as inescapable fate, no-one is forced to jump on the bandwagon on which "armed doctrines" crowd, or filter one's perception of the political world that surrounds us through the vacuity of scientistic theories. Misperception, stimulated by unexamined assumptions, only produce misconduct in the political forum and often fateful derailments in the international arena. In international relations, complex problems are rarely, if ever, solved. Partial solutions produce new problems. One buys time and muddles through, generation after generation, by makeshifts and temporizing expedients.

THE STATE SYSTEM SINCE 1945

But an alluring promise was beckoning in 1945. Conflicts could be banished when states convenanted and fashioned the compact myth of world unity. Our age started with the big bang of Hiroshima, and at least a whimper of Innocence at Dumbarton Oaks. That the United Nations Charter, projecting the image of a universal family, was the product of millennia of occidental juridical and constitutional trial-and-error ventures, was certainly for a fleeting moment, ignored. Only when old societies and ancient cultures, animated by their own norms and belief systems, re-parcelled the global space into a myriad of states and a score of new nation-states did we begin gradually to shed off the powerful, yet parochially Occidental, innocent notion of the "myth of unity". But the myth has remained impacted in the operational codes of globally expansive political forces and movements, flowing from the springs, or lying dormant in the brackwaters, of Occidental civilisation. The Idea systems, and accompanying thought-ways, of "international society" structured by law, good faith, contract, and the balancing acts, of egalitarianism, democratism, and of a universal classless society are not sustained by the mental and psycho-cultural structures of the non-Occidental orbits. As problems mounted, peoples the world over were growing back into their own skeletons, filling them out with their historically accumulated experience and resources. The world, rather than resembling One World, was suddenly mirrored in a multitude of exoskeletons enclosing different peoples' elemental and existential representations.

The United Nations and International Unity

With "zero-hour-1945", the United Nations Charter seemed to clock away at the "absolute" sovereignty of the state, and to phase in "relative" sovereignty, now entangled and enmeshed in a cobweb of individual and human rights. The lines became suddenly blurred, and the world promised to take on new contours. The idea of a "family of nations" seemed tenable as long as the General Assembly was composed of representatives whose shared historical experience gave some substance to the notion of cultural homogeneity and uniformity embedded in the stream of Occidental religious, political, and legal-constitutional value systems. But with the influx of non-Occidental peoples into the international arena, the idea of "unity", rooted and anchored in value consensus, could no longer be presumed to reflect political reality. Unable to identify with the complex substantive values, as embodied in the Charter by its Occidental legal draftsmen, non-Western peoples fastened upon terminological and procedural aspects of the Charter, which, once drained of its original substance, was filled with another syncretic, but decidedly non-Occidental, content. And palaver, not deliberations, ensued. Since conflict and strife are norm-engendering realities in most non-Western cultural orbits, the General Assembly inevitably generated into a combat theatre of the absurd, and now languishes in a state of banality. The very fact that Marxist-Leninist
"regime-movements", with their political territorial space converted into interlocking "revolutionary bases", had participated in the founding act of the United Nations, made sure that there would never be more than appearance in world unity.

Seared by war, the desire, if not passion, to banish the spectre of conflict and the scourge of military confrontation exerted a powerfully suasive influence over the minds of those statesmen who were "present at the creation" in 1945. The notion of world unity was powerfully fuelled by currents that had run for millennia through the body politic of Occidental civilisation. Pax Romana and res publica Christiana had been left as a pervasive legacy to the modern European family of nations, which, though fragmented into sovereign states, was yet bound together in a community of shared values. Common traditions as expressed in religion, contract, justice, customs, and precepts were reinforced by the mutually fashioned institutions of International law and diplomacy, to introduce a balancing act into interstate politics.

Occidental civilisation has been characterised, ever since the late Middle Ages, by increasing faith in the efficacy of reason and the scientific method as a means of understanding nature and society, and by the growing human capacity to use various techniques in dealing with physical and social problems. These formative features were threaded together into the "dramatic design" of modern Western civilisation. Its "positivism" found expression in its rationalistic, manipulative, and perfectionist conviction.

The Impact of United States Ideology

Since the United States, by 1945 the primum inter pares within the Western community, had been instrumental in structuring the United Nations and shaping the Charter, it assured that its own national ideology, or operational code, was woven into the fabric of the new society of nations. Starting from the assumption that all problems are ultimately soluble, it elongated and transposed its own national experience of economic development, social integration and constitutionalism into the world at large. Its democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values, constituting the "American Creed", were perceived as lending themselves ideally to universalisation. The national ideology became ever more moored in two versions of "positivism", that is, "common-sense popular positivism", and "technocratic-elite-group positivism". Once co-mingled, or fused, they magnified and expanded the postulates of 18th century "enlightenment" of imminent change and progress. "Common sense popular positivism", with its open, self-reliant, activistic, and optimistic streak, fostered the belief in individual initiative and group co-operation in the solution of practical problems. The second, and more sophisticated, version of "positivism" sustained the conviction of mastery over nature and society, and found its shallow expression at the beginning of this century in American "progressivism" - in the notion of man's destiny shifting from "drift" to "mastery".

This conviction "is continuously reinforced by its own pragmatic effectiveness, which encourages Utopian expectations with respect to further efforts to control and reform society and thereby strengthens the motivation to undertake them" (Th. Gelger).

When the United States was "present at the creation" it began its ascent to superpower status with misperceptions and unrealistic expectations, and the belief that its own norms and actions could in fact exercise control over the development of the Third World and its participation in world affairs.
Western redemptivism animates missionary obligations. Other-worldly redemption becomes transformed into this-worldly redemption, through the medium of faith in progress and change. Whenever ideals and institutionalised reality cleave, "creedal passions" erupt upon the scene. Torn between their ideals and reality, Americans vacillate between refusing to use the necessary power and using it with a guilty conscience. Their belief in their Creed causes them to view power ultimately as illegitimate. An almost childlike innocence is least conducive over time to perform the essential role of the Praetorian guard of the Western world.

Foreign policy translates itself into standards of domestic politics, operating according to the "rules of reason". Like their 18th century "philosophes" progenitors, Americans, especially those imbued with Wilsonianism of secularised humanism, tend to consider "the introduction of a new and peaceful era in foreign policy as dependent on a reorganisation of domestic policy. There is no need to be particularly concerned about the problems of foreign policy; they are only a partial aspect of the wider problems of placing domestic affairs on a rational basis". Since "progressivism" usually starts from the supposedly more "rationalistic" assumption that harmony exists, or may eventually be realised, power is seen as an aberration that can ultimately be eliminated from human relationships. The absence of theories of international relations constitutes in itself "the most typical ... theory of international relations" on the part of "political idealism". Since politics is rationalised as a "managerial science", political idealists have difficulty in thinking geopolitically, and their version of peace has for the most part been non-strategic. Political idealism, especially in its more unreflective guise, has only scapegoats, pre-eminently manifested in the "industrial-military complex".

THE IMPACT OF MARXISM-LENINISM ON AFRICA

Lapping away at the territorial state, and spilling over into its domestic domain, has been the tidal wave of Marxism-Leninism. The Marxist-Leninist sense of mission is eschatological, messianic, and utopian. It postulates that class struggle drives the world revolutionary process to its consummating act of redeeming mankind from social antagonisms and conflict. Its theoreticians insist that social class is the underlying structure, as well as the basic concept, in a global analysis of that structure. Since social classes, and their representations in the shape of "blocks" and "camps", are locked in inevitable struggle throughout the extended period of "imperfect peace", global politics is conceptualised as structural disequilibrium. This model has profound implications for the practical realm of political conduct. It views revolutionary advance as inevitable and, depending on the "correlation of forces", as mandatory. While it makes provision for temporary, conciliatory policies, it leaves no room for ultimate compromise. The guardians of the secular faith, engaged in "pseudo-logical speculations" and absorbed by "intra-mundane mysticism", are, in the final analysis, left only with revolutionary praxis and tactics to revitalise, in the realm of necessity, the eschatological experience. This mode of operation systematically compels its advocates to disrupt existing societies in the hope of creating disorder and chaos so that the minority of the "elect" can rise to victory. International relations pre-suppose the horizontal division of mankind into states/nation-states. Marxist thought, on the other hand, postulates vertical conflict between classes, ultimately to be resolved through the absolute unity of mankind. In terms of international politics, the Marxist-Leninist model is informed by the notion of an Imperium mundi in statu nascendi (a world-empire-in-the-state-of-making) where states, or organised entities and institutions
In general, are seen as de jure parts of it, though may temporarily and de facto be outside its expanding orbit.

Africa: Myth and Reality

When Africa was launched on the trajectory to Independence, the Ideological élites of sub-Saharan Africa created their own distinctive myth of a primordial state of nature and innocence, from which their peoples had been ejected by the intrusion of the European. They portrayed the tribal society as an earthly paradise where the "noble savage" of Rousseau roamed free to enjoy uncorrupted nature. They painted a picture of conflictless inter-human relations, animated by a socialist "attitude of mind", perhaps even shaped or moulded by socialist institutions. Africa, the abode in which stateless societies, statelets, empires, proto- and semi-states, age-groups, clans, tribes, and kinship groups dwelt, was idealised without recognition of what anthropological records suggested about traditional African political reality. The African world was, in this view, cast in terms of traditional socialism, egalitarianism, and featured an extensive network of social obligations. African Ideologists lyricalised, and continue to fantasise, about the African qua African as "naturally socialist, naturally democratic, naturally co-operative". What are for other societies postulated as goals are, "by... African natural law, postulated not only as goals, but as a natural Inheritance". By emphatically refusing to allow the Indigenous Identity to be cast as a mirror image of a European one, mired in corruption, inequality, exploitation, and enervated and grafting Individualism, African "myth-makers" fashioned a self-image which reflected only the anti-Westernism of its creators, framed in Western shibboleths. The intelligentsia's quest for identity generated in its train a near-pathological distortion of sub-Saharan Africa's ancient culture. What was expunged from the African historical record, but is so vital to our understanding of African state conduct in the contemporary era, was the indisputable fact that conflict and war were endemic to the African continent.

Modern, highly politicised Africa has defined itself against something rather than captured the ancient culture's essential meaning through self-understanding and self-interpretation. It is suspended between an idealised state of nature and vitriolic, envious resentment, bridged by political concepts and institutions that, horribile dicit, can ultimately be traced back to bedevilled Europe. The territorial, sovereign state, fundamentally alien to traditional Africa, remained as a legacy of the Congress of Berlin. Without European rule, "there might have been no African nationalism". African nationalism has been defined as an "inevitable and product of the impact of Western Imperialism and modernity upon African societies". While traditional Africa singularly lacked in continent-spanning political institutions and norms, Pan-Africanism, too, has its roots in the Occidental World and its guiding spirits in Du Bois and Garvey. African socialism, rather than being homegrown, can trace its ideological lineage to the socialist "tree of life" of its European ancestors, and Mazrui affirms that "all schools of socialism among African leaders today owe something to Marx...". The re-Europanisation of Africa, through the medium of Western "throwback" ideologies, was, if not fore-ordained, then at least to be expected. Since "so few features of traditional African society are relevant to modern expectations, institutions and techniques, the imported Western concepts and activities are likely to play a significantly larger role in the eventual new dramatic designs of African cultures than in those of Asia".

Received African ideologies, ranging from Kaunda's vapourings about African humanism to the "armed doctrines" (Burke) of Marxism-Leninism seized upon
by the Red Uncle Toms, are based on the economics and politics of resentment, and of socialism as rationalised envy. The policies they inform, and proposals they advance, are not primarily to alleviate the misery of ordinary Africans but rather to take revenge on the Occidental World. Their intent may best be captured by the mood that drives Mazrui's vision of the future; "the decline of Western civilisation might well be at hand. It is the interest of humanity that such decline should take place ...".

The appeal of totalitarian socialist ideologies lies in their singular and unrivalled anti-Westernism. They exert a special magnetic pull on the intelligentsia that powers radical regimes. It is alienated from its own culture, and norm and belief systems, and cannot fully enter the Western mental universe. As a consequence of having no place to stand, it tends to latch onto the most radical ideologies as revelation. Its tribulations parallel the course that Oswald Spengler's highly pertinent concept of "historical pseudo-morphosis" has charted. Imitation is always poisoned by jealousy and hatred and "instead of rearing itself up on its own creative power, it can only hate the distant power with a hate that grows to be monstrous".

If this synoptic view captures only part of contemporary radicalised African political reality, the implications, though troubling, if not frightening, are worth pondering. The radical élites' raison d'être may be sustainable only through the daily plebiscite of vengefully casting votes against the Western world. Their own inaptitude in tackling pressing social and political problems likely to mount, may necessitate keeping alive the monstrous imaginary enemy in the shape of Western exploitative neo-colonialism. If the ultimate battles, as Mazrui contends, will have to be fought in the "streets of Birmingham, ghettos of Detroit, harbours of Marseilles and the motels of the rest of the Western world ...", then, for the meantime, South Africa, as a manifestation of Western theological sin, will continue to serve as a lightning conductor to deflect from the West as a whole radicalised African frustrations vented vengefully against the totality of the Occidental world.

THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE

South Africa, with its "little cosmos", has gone through bouts of innocent beliefs. The Afrikaner dreamt of a "New Jerusalem" to insulate himself from the corrupt and degenerate Old World. Englishmen saw themselves as missi dominici of an Empire on which the sun would never set. The Black ethnic groups lived self-contained within their "closed" predicament. The security umbrella of the Empire promised to provide shelter from the turbulences that were gushing through the world. These innocent visions were shattered again once war engulfed the world, but the tenacity of Innocence stubbornly prevailed. Jan Smuts, the architect of "holism", made a last, desperate, and ultimately futile, attempt to recapture a sense of Innocence by envisaging the governance of mankind so that "nothing would be left to chance or the caprice of individual states or groups". Problems were to be resolved through the steering mechanism of the "trinity". An enlarged Commonwealth, drawing into its orbit the Scandinavian kingdoms and the nations of western and southern Europe, together with the United States and the Soviet Union, would form the "trinity" at the head of the United Nations. Through their concerted efforts, the "rule of law" was expected "to come to cover the whole world". By a dialectical process, the greatest and most devastating war would become "the prelude to the greatest peace".
It is the pinnacle of irony that at the moment of realising the epitome of "holism", as institutionalised in the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the dawn of disillusionment broke. As "holism" disintegrated into separateness of a multitude of rivalling and vying sovereign states in the external realm, it collapsed concurrently when separateness asserted itself in the internal arena. South Africa's sense of innocence is evaporating as it progressively pits itself against the "myth of world unity" enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. And in the process of shedding its innocent beliefs, it defines itself as a sovereign state, and this meandering course of self-definition will inevitably be accompanied by politico-strategic contentions with the Republic's conventional opponents as well as its absolute enemies. In this venture, it is repeating the historical experience of the modern European states whose physiognomy was largely determined by the continuous interplay between internal adjustments and external strategic challenges.

Once statehood and sovereignty are collapsed into economics and/or sociology, international politics is denuded of its essential and existential meaning. The imperial aggrandizement of these disciplines, cloaked in their behaviouristic, scientistic garb, have threatened to push students of international relations in to a comatose condition. But in their empire-building ventures, economics and sociology have been powerfully assisted by the appealing Carthaginian mentality of self-reputed theorists of international relations. Sovereignty and statehood denote not only the existence of differences but also emphasise the separateness of states. The modern state system is defined by "the principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another". And sovereignty, in its proper modern usage, signifies "a form of legitimation that pertains to a system of relations...". These statal units live with a permanent security dilemma.

The concepts of internal and external sovereignty express a profound ethical and moral substantive meaning. Internally, sovereignty was fashioned to neutralise, and supersede, destructive religious, ideological civil wars that threatened societies with annihilation. Externally, by legitimising systems of relations through the humanising concepts of jusus hostis and aequilatias (equality among states portrayed as magnum homines thus endowing them with moral worth), sovereignty was meant to de-criminalise inter-state relations, and to put a brake on the brutalising forces of ideologles run amock. Ideologles were to be arrested at the state boundary, not to spill over, and thus engulf, the body politic of a separate state. Sovereignty was to erect a barrier against justification of war by reference to the internal politics of another state.

This profoundly humanistic principle, clothed in the juridical language of Article 2,7 of the Charter of the United Nations, has been eroded by circumstances. It was challenged by the evil that found its de-humanising expression in National-Socialism, with its vertical war among races. It finds its most barbarous contemporary expression in Marxism-Leninism, with its vertical conflict and war among classes. In each instance, the essential and existential meaning of human politics was either liquidated, or is being liquidated, by the "great simplifiers". "Homo homini homo est" (man treating man as man) is translated into the deadly "homo homini lupus est" (man treating man as wolf).

Black Africa's re-definition of the concept of sovereignty into "racial sovereignty" completes the trinity of "daemonic human mendacity" (Voegelin). The "pigmentalisatation" of external sovereignty erases the barrier, always fragile under the best of circumstances, that separates justus hostis and injustus hostis. It threatens to plunge the clashing...
forces into a war of annihilation, for South Africa is, unilaterally indicted as a "criminal", and, thus, as the absolute foe. The re-criminalisation of inter-state relations is couched in legal phraseology. Article III, clause 6, of the OAU Charter explicitly justifies wars of aggression and armed struggle, against "white regimes", something against which the colour-blind Article 2,4 of the UNO Charter strongly inveighs. The chasm separating these constitutional documents is bridged by the concept of "racial sovereignty", and thus highlights the distance that African "pigmentational" international law has travelled from traditional international law devoid of racial connotations. By making "pigmentation" the defining criterion of external sovereignty, the concept is transformed into the revolutionising version of sub-Saharan African "continental racial" sovereignty, or, as expressed in the words of Mazrui: "sometimes the unit of exclusiveness is not strictly a continent but a race ...". Built into this concept is a highly explosive mass, which may well, once ignited, consume Africa through an uninterrupted series in international continental civil wars. Military intervention by one black state against another becomes, in line with "racial sovereignty", a domestic affair within the larger framework of an imaginary sub-Saharan black African state. The traditional concept of sovereignty was devised to perform the singularly important function of hedging against the Hobbesian condition of inter-state "anarchy", sliding into actual war and almost perpetual chaos.

Ironically, Africa's radicalised socialist ruling elites seem to exhibit a compulsively fateful attraction to exactly those European ideologies that wrought destruction on the old order, and seem at the very same time repelled by exactly those European norms and values that hold at least the potential for ameliorating intergroup and interstate conflict situations. Afro-Socialism, and even more so its bastardised version in the shape of Afro-Communism, long ago entered into a symbiotic communion with paradigmatic Fascism and core features of National-Socialism, to produce African Marxo-Fascism, which, in this volatile mixture, probably represents the most extreme manifestation of anti-Westernism yet articulated by African "socialist" elites.

Marxism, redefined as an idea-and action-system by Lenin and Stalin, converges with paradigmatic Fascism on the ideology of developmental dictatorship, monolithic single-party rule, mass mobilisation movement, expropriation of the means of production and communication, anti-capitalism and anti-Imperialism, and bureaucratic class domination. While nationalism powers and propels the Fascist developmental dictatorship, and fuses the disparate social elements into one-ness, in the Marxist-Leninist scheme of things it is employed as a vitally important instrument, with the sole objective of disrupting and revolutionising multi-ethnic societies. In National-Socialism and Fascism, it performs an essentially strategic-centripetal role; in Marxism-Leninism, it functions as a tactical-centrifugal force to speed up the disintegration of target societies.

In all instances, party, movement, and cause transcend the state, which primarily serves as a territorial base for the revolutionary avant-garde, enabling it to externalise the class/race struggle by pitting the "proletarian nations" against the "plutocracy" (Mussolini and Hitler), the "camp of socialism" against the "camp of imperialism" (Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism), and the "proletarian African continent" against the "exploitative neo-colonialism/imperialism" of the West. African-Marxo-Fascism, and the more radical versions of Pan-Africanism, most strongly resemble the Pan-Europeanism of Fascism and National-Socialism.
As Gregor contends; "Pan-Africanism harbours all the paradoxes and complexity of Fascist ethnarchic imperialism, Pan-Europeanism".

African Marxo-Fascism's affinity with Fascism and National-Socialism would suggest that the "potential for a virulent form of racism, simple oppression and military adventure ... cannot be lightly dismissed".

Totalitarian orders are sustained by conflict. The Imaginary absolute foe provides their sustenance. They are "governments of war" and destabilisation. A close relation exists between a state's domestic institutions and its foreign policy. When power is seized by means of violence and maintained by the instruments of force after its conquest, the ruling elites cannot easily conform to a pattern of trust and peaceful relationships in their dealings with foreign countries.

South Africa finally lost its innocence when it re-encountered Europe in the baseness of its destructive 20th century ideologies, which have seized the imagination of the ruling bureaucratic elites of the Republic's neighbours, and determine their operational codes. Houphouet-Boigny, immersed in the French tradition of statehood, presciently observed more than ten years ago that apartheid should constitute a secondary problem in the schedule of African priorities. South Africa's internal problem was overshadowed by the threat of Soviet Communism looming on the horizon. Military conflict between the Republic and Black Africa would provide "a new opportunity to Communism to intervene with the well-known consequences". In South Africa, with its "military and industrial power", he saw the continent's "best bulwark" against Communist aggression. Dialogue with South Africa offered the only alternative to protracted war and murderous Communist intrusion into the affairs of the Africans.

Black Africa will lose its innocence at the moment it decides to break out of the vicious circle of the "prohibition of questioning", and leap beyond the stereotype answer: South Africa, the absolute foe.

Until Africa shifts dramatically from the "closed predicament" to the "open predicament", we have to sustain our sanity by living with Bismarck's memorable injunction:

"By himself the individual can create nothing; he can only wait until he hears God's footsteps resounding through events and then spring forward to grasp the hem of his mantle - that is all".

If man can do little, it is at least his moral duty to accomplish what he can.
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