The Congo Mercenary

A History and Analysis

By

S. J. G. CLARKE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAN SMUTS HOUSE

P.O. BOX 31596, BRAAMFONTEIN, JOHANNESBURG

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Introduction

To the Western reader, the term 'mercenary' conjures up a mental picture of a bearded bandit from the hills in some remote country. The picture is coloured by social prejudices at the thought of men being hired to kill. An anomaly exists in this thinking, however, as few believe that a soldier in their own 'National' Army should be considered in the same light. The regular soldier is also paid to kill, although he may not have to. Yet, when the occasion does arise, he is considered a hero; the defender of the State. The people can identify with his uniform, whereas few have ever seen a mercenary.

There has been little use made of the mercenary, the truly professional soldier, in modern times. States have usually found revenue enough to maintain an army and often conditions are so good there that, with the added prestige, a soldier becomes one of a select elite.

If one lifts the veil of social disapproval which surrounds the mercenary, a much broader picture emerges and the purpose of this study is to assess the modern mercenary both as a military man and as a social phenomenon.

Rarely do mercenary troops step into the limelight and if they do it is still more rare for them to be acknowledged as mercenaries. Since 1960, however, the employment of mercenaries in the Congo has not only been recognised but has caused an international furor; forced the United Nations to undertake a military action which nearly caused the demise of that body; brought the cold war to equatorial Africa; and caused the charge of neocolonialism to be levelled at three of the world's developed nations.

It is for these reasons that the Congo mercenary is being studied. Criticism of him exists on all sides. Newspaper reports run into volumes, and books have been written to cater for the popular market. Various nations, too, have adopted definite attitudes towards the mercenary—both in Africa and outside it. These conflicting views and reports have led to the emergence of a confused picture not only of what the mercenary achieved militarily and what he was like as a man, but also his significance in the political sphere and his effects on international relations.
The Congo Mercenary:

Hundreds of men were hired for service in the Congo. They came from Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, South Africa and Spain. They came to seek adventure, to escape, to see Africa and to serve a cause. Above all they came for money. Whether their motives were clear to them and whether they fully understood their status is not important to this study except for one point. A mercenary could, and would, admit that he was a 'mercenary', also he might try to qualify it in terms that were readily acceptable to Western ears.

In the early days, in particular, the 'mercenary' often enjoyed too much social status and received servility from ranking government officials which implied more than his nominal position as a hireling. He appeared not to take his orders from those who paid him. He governed himself and those he commanded with the detached air of one who had superior authority and insight. These men were often not 'mercenaries' but chose to pose as such to disguise the complicity of their governments who had sent them to the Congo. It is, however, difficult to disguise a Belgian Colonel or a French Major merely by changing his regimental insignia.

The practice of 'seconding' skilled soldiers to other states and armies is long established, e.g. United States advisers to Diem's Vietnam, the British officers in Muscat who guard the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but in the Congo in 1960 a sense of shame and intrigue prevailed and the complicity of European interests was never openly admitted even when it was exposed.

In order to facilitate this study, the assumption that all white troops operating for the Katanga regime or the Central Government were mercenaries has been made, unless evidence is available to the contrary. This in no way impairs the study as a whole, but merely leaves a few ends untied.

The secession of Katanga was engineered by foreign interests and, when foreign troops had to be withdrawn, mercenaries were hired to replace them. This intervention caused a violent political reaction both in the Congo and at the U.N. While Katanga's position was underwritten by white soldiers, the neutralist and anti-imperialist states sought different solutions to (a) restore order to the Congo and (b) remove the vestiges of colonialism from the country—and Katanga. The results of this international action and the division which Katanga caused in the Congolese context are still being felt today. When Katanga was reintegrated into the Congo and the U.N. withdrew their forces, a fresh rebellion arose. This time it was the Central Government who hired mercenaries. Thus the mercen-
ary, who was a witness to all the Congo’s internal troubles for the first eight years of independence, changed his status several times within the same basic political scene.

Some questions must be asked: How did this status change and why, and how did the mercenary react to these changes? Did status affect his efficacy and value to his employer?

The Congo is, perhaps, a special case in the light of the political chaos which followed Independence, but it does share with most of its African contemporaries one distinctive feature in its internal administrative structure: the Congolese army was of typical Colonial structure, officered by non-Congolese and with little or no idea of what its responsibilities would be in a new political environment. This neglect of the “national” concept in the military machine and the paucity of trained Congolese to assume command precipitated the crisis in the army and its complete ineffectiveness in maintaining internal order. Thus the mercenary was able to fill a vacuum where there were no other standards available with which to compare his performance.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mercenary through the Centuries</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background a. The Congo</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Force Publique</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mutiny and Belgian Intervention</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the Military Situation in Katanga</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 — The Defence of Katanga</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenary Recruitment</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. action against Mercenaries</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The End of Katanga's Secession</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication for Southern Africa</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Calm</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshombe's New Leadership</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Stanleyville — The Recruitment</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reconquest — The 'Plan Vandewalle'</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Consolidation</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Final Offensives</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mercenaries — 1965</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fizi-Baraka</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Background</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The End of the Year</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mutinies of 1966 and 1967 — a contrast in behaviour</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mutiny</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Crisis</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bukavu Confrontation</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution in the Congo — Background</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Katanga</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Mulelist-C.N.L. Revolution — 1964-67</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of the 1960's</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Resolutions on the Congo adopted by the</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Security Council and General Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Maps

1. The Rebel-occupied Regions — August, 1964. .... 40
2. The Mercenary Raid on Albertville — August, 1964. 44
3. The Reconquest of Stanleyville .... .... .... 46
4. Clearing the Stanleyville Area .... .... .... 50
5. 5 Commando's Route to the North-East .... .... 55
6. The Administrative Divisions of the Congo — 1960 56-57
7. The Sweep across the North .... .... .... 60
8. The Fixi-Baraka Operation .... .... .... 63
9. The Schramme-Denard Mutiny .... .... .... 74

Centre Map: from "THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE: JANUARY 1960 — DECEMBER DECEMBER 1961" by Catherine Hoskyns, published by Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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CHAPTER 1

'A man who gives himself to be the possession of aliens leads a Yahoo life, having bartered his soul to a brute master'.

T. E. Lawrence: 'Seven Pillars of Wisdom'.

The mercenary through the centuries:

When the history of many new states comes to be rewritten, to cover a century of colonisation and perhaps a quarter century of independence, many legends will be brought into question on both sides. The benevolent glory of empire and the expected utopianism of independence are ideals that are being shattered for Europeans in the first case and for Africans and Asians in the second.

One of the threads which connects the two periods is that of war. Men and nations are competitive creatures, and the new states have turned out to be no more peaceful than the old. Nor do men fight simply for their own territory. For centuries, many have fought for adventure, ideals and money, and all such men who wage war outside their own national armies appear today to be called mercenaries.

There are various degrees within this, however, and it is necessary to make qualifications when it is realised that the men who might be termed mercenaries range from members of private armies to individualistic outcasts, criminals and exiles, from some who are paid only nominally to others who are offered high rewards by their employers. Most forms seem to exist today as they have in the past.

In the 16th century, mercenaries were considered a normal ingredient of European armies and were, at times, the only army available. This system reached such a degree of sophistication that collusion was often practised between two mercenary armies as neither wished to have losses inflicted on it. In this way, Renaissance city states were often held to ransom by mercenaries who refused to fight each other. The Swiss are probably the most famous of these mercenary soldiers of the period. They operated in permanent units and developed highly effective weapons and tactics.

Another type of mercenary in the early part of modern history was the political exile, such as the 17th century Irish soldiers who left Ireland after Cromwell's invasion, and fought on King James II's side against William of Orange. Many of these Catholic Irish joined Continental armies such as those of France

and Spain, and this kind of political exile from many European countries has continued to fight for foreign armies into the 20th century. In 1830, King Pedro of Brazil, having great difficulty in raising an army at home to fight Argentina, employed Irish and German troops, but the presence of the mercenaries caused such internal dissension in Brazil that it was necessary to terminate not only their employment, but the war as well.\(^\text{(2)}\) The French and Spanish Foreign Legions have included many political exiles.

German troops also fought for Britain on several occasions, in another class of mercenary employment involving an agreement between governments. Britain’s reputation, as the American colonies became rebellious in 1775, rested upon armed forces which were in a state of decay. Lord North’s administration, therefore, in February 1776, signed a treaty for the supply of 18,000 soldiers from Hesse and Brunswick, as well as King George III’s Hanoverian troops, to bolster the garrison in Ireland while British troops were sent to quell the Americans. Ireland would not accept them; neither would the American colonies.\(^\text{(3)}\) In this case, mercenaries proved to be not only ineffectual troops, but also of great propaganda value to the colonists, which added fuel to the rebellion.\(^\text{(4)}\)

The dynastic links between Britain and Hanover again led to the use of German mercenaries by England, in the struggle with Napoleon. In 1803 when Hanover was threatened, George IV wanted to absorb the whole Hanoverian Army into the British. Negotiations were slow, and it was not until 1805 that the ‘King’s German Legion’ was formed. This comprised not only Hanoverians but other displaced Germans. Wellington thus had mercenaries, as well as British, Portuguese and Spanish troops, under his command in the Peninsular War. Napoleon also used foreign troops, who made up nearly half of his force of 600,000 in the Russian campaign. But most of these were levied in countries that he had conquered, or furnished by Allies, and do not necessarily fall under a strict definition of mercenary.

In this century, the best example of soldiers being enrolled as a group to fight for a foreign government with the agreement of their own, has been the Gurkhas. Gurkha units have long been considered as an integral part of the British and, latterly, the Indian army. They had a distinguished history in World War II and are still considered to be among the most loyal and well-disciplined units in these Armies. Britain sent Gurkhas to Borneo to fight Indonesians. India sent Gurkhas to the Congo to form her contingent to the U.N. force. There they had to

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\(^\text{(3)}\) For a full account of the mercenaries employed in the American colonies: Mackesy, P.—The War for America, 1775-1783”—London, 1964.

fight Congolese and mercenaries. But officially they were 'British' or 'Indian' respectively, and this was one of the ways in which over the last hundred years the role of mercenaries has been disguised or played down.

In the same way, there have been mercenaries among the heroes of the colonial era. Britain, for example, built her image on the ability of her fighting men and administrators. This image was often given lustre by the exploits of the British who carried their traditions to remote places, exploits which have gone down in the annals of British history. In fact, however, many of these men, whatever their motives and their successes, must stand scrutiny as hirelings and mercenaries.

The death of General Charles Gordon at Khartoum in 1885 was felt by the people of Britain as the loss of one of their most brilliant and colourful soldiers. Gordon was committed to some extent to 'Empire' and Britain, but he was an adventurer all his life. His military reputation rested on his exploits in China, as a mercenary, in command of the 'Ever Victorious Army', a private army of the Shanghai European settlers. In 1863, Gordon put down the Taeping uprising and gained the name of 'Chinese Gordon' for the exploit. He was a devout Christian, however, and had certain misgivings about fighting for a Chinese government who had called in the settlers' army. He wrote to his mother that, as the revolt has been inspired by a Christian sect, he was not happy to fight for 'the pagan against the Christian'.

When he rejoined the British Army he found that his reputation as a soldier had preceded him and he was feted.

Gordon was later asked to become the Administrator of the Congo by King Leopold of Belgium, but declined. Instead he accepted an appointment with the Egyptian Army in the Sudan, where he made contact with a former friend and kindred spirit, Emin Pasha (Eduard Schnitzer), a former mercenary from Turkey who was Governor of the Bahr-el-Ghasel Province in the southern Sudan, for the Egyptian Government.

When Britain created the Kingdom of Transjordan after World War I, it seemed fitting that she should also provide Jordan with an army of its own. The Arab Legion was created in 1920 by a British officer who came to be known as 'Peake Pasha'. Peake formed this army from Bedouin tribesmen who owed little loyalty to any sheik or government in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1930, Peake was joined by Major John Glubb, who had resigned his commission in the British Army in Iraq. Glubb served successive rulers of Jordan until he was dismissed in

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(6) Emin Pasha had been Gordon's agent in Uganda in 1876 and was later captured by the Mahdi after Gordon had fallen at Khartoum.
(7) Lt.-Col. F. G. Peake. For a full account of his activities: Jarvis, C. S.—'Arab Command.' London, 1942.
February 1956, owing to the pressures of Arab nationalism and conflict with Israel. Glubb wielded considerable influence in Jordan and partly through him, so did Britain. A similar status was achieved in Ghana by Major-General Alexander, who admits that the main reason why he resigned from the British Army to go to Ghana in 1960 was to obtain promotion to the rank of General.\(^9\)

These soldiers, Gordon, Glubb and Alexander, have not normally been considered ‘mercenaries’ in the past. But in reality they were, even if they had their own visions of why they should fight or lead armies, such as love for Arabs in the case of Glubb. Similarly, many of the lesser individuals involved in warfare for foreign governments, in Spain and the Congo, for example, had reasons other than, or as well as, money.

The problem of the ‘ideological’ army, recruited to carry the banner of a social movement, is a case in itself. The recruitment of eight ‘International Brigades’ to assist the Republican government in Spain from 1936 to 1939\(^{10}\) is one of the best examples in recent times. Many of these men volunteered for ideological reasons, though there were those who went to Spain as soldiers of fortune. The pay they received was minimal, and the question arises as to whether they were mercenaries.

The Spanish Civil War indeed poses a real problem of definition. There were foreign troops on both sides. The Republicans recruited 40,000 volunteers, mainly liberals, socialists and Communists from Britain, Russia and many other European countries, for their brigades. The Nationalists employed the German ‘Condor Legion’, Italian forces, and the Portuguese ‘Legion de Viriato’ for most of which they had to pay heavily.\(^{11}\) But they did have a few volunteers, such as the 600 Irishmen under General O’Duffy. Almost half of the latter were ‘out of work adventurers’\(^{12}\), but about 300 were members of O’Duffy’s quasi-Fascist organisation, the Blue Shirts, who were both nationalist and Catholic, like the Falangists. Besides this ideological commitment, O’Duffy ‘expected that the exploits of his 600 men in Spain would bring him to political eminence in his own country.’\(^{13}\)

Similarly, many of the mercenaries who fought in the Congo, and the governments which backed them, wanted to ‘stem the advance of Communism’ in Africa. Taking motivation as a criterion, it is therefore difficult sometimes to draw a line between men fighting for money and men fighting for a cause. Mercenaries are reported to be involved in Vietnam, ‘a conglomeration of foreign soldiers—some British, some Australians, some

\(^{11}\) Thomas.: op cit—pp: 793-4.
\(^{12}\) Ibid.: p. 488.
\(^{13}\) Ibid.
Chinese, some Viet Cong defectors\(^{(14)}\), and they are fighting for the side which they want to win but which also pays them well. Motivation is a subjective force which it is impossible to measure.

An operational definition is therefore needed, which must take into account the various forms of employment that a foreign soldier can take up. He may be seconded by his national force to that of another country. He may be a volunteer under these circumstances. He may go to participate in a war for ideological reasons and still be paid for his services. Pay in the French Foreign Legion is very low while that of the Congo mercenaries was very high. In the British Army the pay of a Gurkha soldier is the same as that of a fellow-Nepalese in the Indian Army, but the latter has to look harder for recruits. So even the amount of money at stake is not always an informative criterion.

For the purpose of this study, therefore, a soldier may be considered a 'mercenary' if he satisfies the provisions set out below:

a) he is a foreigner in the country in which he is fighting or serving; and
b) he is paid by the government of that country, or some other body, to fight;

Some further qualifications are necessary:

c) he may, or may not, be attracted to the country for political or ideological reasons;
d) he may, or may not, be also in the pay of his own national government; and
e) military personnel who are seconded to another army, may be considered to be mercenaries if they come within provision 'b' above.

With the exception of genuine 'allied' troops, therefore, all the soldiers dealt with above fall into the category of mercenaries, a term which is not necessarily derogatory. In these various forms, the mercenary is a continual factor in war and politics, with an almost unique utility which itself takes various forms.

The mercenary is useful to the ruler or government, or rebel, who cannot raise sufficient troops in his own country, either for long service or for specific emergencies. The mercenary may be a more skilled and sophisticated fighter than the native troops. The mercenary is expected to remain loyal to the government which is paying him, and not to be swayed by local loyalties or to take sides in internal dissension. In 1932 the Spanish Government used its Foreign Legion to suppress the revolutionary mine workers of Asturias\(^{(15)}\).

With the use of mercenaries, the employer must however take into account a number of factors. The mercenary may be more

\(^{(15)}\) Thomas: op cit. p. 122.
skilled, but 15th century mercenaries and, to a lesser extent, the Hessians in America proved lethargic fighters. Nor can loyalty be relied on completely. Iron discipline was a hallmark of the French and Spanish Foreign Legions, and this was accepted, if reluctantly, by the mercenaries because of the reasons which had brought them as misfits and outcasts into the Legion in the first place. But it was not the mercenaries themselves who constituted the real power. The officers were always regular soldiers and were able to exact absolute loyalty from the men. In this way the employer government did run the risk of coups in certain circumstances. This was the case at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War when the Legion was used by General Franco in 1936. His 'Army of Africa' became the spearhead of his invasion force to overthrow the Republican government.  

A parallel can be found in French history. Following decades of exemplary service in the outposts of the Empire, the French Foreign Legion followed the officers of the French High Command in Algeria to the support of de Gaulle in 1958. When de Gaulle decided to give independence to Algeria and the officers again changed their loyalty but lost, the Legion found itself isolated and degraded. Today, the Legion is based on Corsica, where it has been reorganised, reduced in size, and is, in consequence, less dangerous. In Algeria, the Foreign Legion was in fact likely to be more of a threat to the government in Paris than the regular army because the war to keep Algeria French was less popular among the young French conscripts and they were less hostile to the rethinking that was going on in Paris.  

At times, mercenaries will even take the initiative themselves to change governments, as the Schramme-Denard group attempted to do in the Congo in 1967.  

Nevertheless, governments continue to hire mercenaries. They are politically expendable in domestic politics, troops to be sacrificed or held in reserve, depending on the 'national' or 'personal' requirements of the employer. The Congo mercenaries fit into this pattern, while also indicating how mercenaries have their own character and aims. The following study outlines the varying roles and military importance of mercenaries in a contemporary political situation.

(16) Formed in 1920 as a shock unit, the Legion soon established a reputation for toughness and had as its motto 'Long Live Death'. Thomas: op cit. p. 87.

CHAPTER 2

'We are resolved today to lead without fatal delays, but also without precipitate haste, the Congolese populations to independence in prosperity and peace'.

King Baudouin of the Belgians.
January 1st, 1959.

Background:

(a) The Congo:

The Congo has an area of 905,563 square miles and almost half of this is covered by low-lying tropical forest which is drained by the Congo River and its multitude of tributaries. This huge basin is bordered in the north by a region of forest and savannah, which eventually gives way to the desert of the Sudan and the Central African Republic, and in the east the Rift Valley system presents a border of rugged hills and four major lakes, the largest being Lake Tanganyika. Here the communications are few and the country heavily forested.

The southern, and most highly developed, region of the Congo, which stretches from the Atlantic to the hills on the shore of Lake Tanganyika, is again forest and savannah country with hill country in the east. This region is better watered than its counterpart in the north and it gives way in the south to the Angolan plateau which stretches into Katanga in the south-east.

The Congo has a population of roughly fourteen million who belong to over two hundred tribal groupings. The country is dominated by six major cities which, until 1960, formed the operating centres of Africa's most efficient civil service. The Belgian Colonial medical services and communications were well run, though they were inadequate for a country of this size. Plantations and mining concessions showed a steady rise in production and, had this position continued after Independence, the Congo would have faced a prosperous future.

In 1947 the Belgian Senate dispatched a Parliamentary Mission to study the political development of the Congolese. Their report was not optimistic and it was not until Van Bilsen's 'Vers l'indépendence du Congo et du Rwanda-Urundi' (1956), which laid out a thirty-year plan for decolonisation, that anything was really done about training Congolese for an eventual political take-over. Belgium had not taken cognizance of the emerging nationalism in other colonial territories which was causing Britain and France hastily to reassess their role as colonial

powers, and now, too late, she began to think halfheartedly of an independent Congo. Few steps were taken to train Congolese.

In 1958, the Parliamentary 'Groupe de Travail' was set up to consider the problem. Riots in Leopoldville at the beginning of January, 1959, were followed by the Royal speech quoted above and a government declaration. “Commune” elections were held in December, 1959, in the larger cities and the voices of fledgling political parties began to be heard in earnest. A ‘Round Table Conference’ was held in Brussels, beginning on the 20th January, 1960. The Belgian representatives had expected a number of divisions in the ranks of the Congolese delegates but, instead, it was the Belgians who split and gave the Congolese the tactical advantage. Within one week the Belgians had agreed to Independence for the 30th June, 1960. This left only five months for the transition period as opposed to the thirty years Van Bilsen had envisaged four years earlier.

The first step to be taken was the organisation of Provincial and Central government elections. Belgium had backed many losers in the pre-independence period and these elections were crucial for the success of the Belgian gamble. Hoping for a moderate, and, more specifically, a P.N.P. victory, the Belgian administration awaited the results of the May polling. When the results were announced on May 29th it was immediately apparent that a major upset had occurred. Patrice Lumumba and his party had captured nearly one third of the seats in the Chamber and a quarter of the Senate. No other Party approached half that number. Whilst Belgium delayed calling on Lumumba to form a government, various minorities sought to combine to assemble a majority. This effort failed and on 13th June, 1960, seventeen days before Independence Day, Lumumba was asked 'to advise the administration' whether he could form a government. Kasavubu was given the same task. Lumumba was finally sworn in as Prime Minister on 22nd June, 1960.

From the day of independence onwards the political situation is inextricably bound up with the actions of the military forces. The total collapse of civil order, the secession of Katanga and the flight of European technicians are all due, in various degrees, to the mutiny of the Force Publique.

(b) The Force Publique:

The entry of the Army into African politics has, in 1968, become almost predictable, mainly because of the weaknesses of the administrative systems inherited from colonial days. In the Congo, as in other African countries at the eve of independence, the extent to which the election campaigns would excite even the rural Congolese was not anticipated by the Belgians and the P.N.P. only gained three seats in the Senate of 84. Bolya gained his seat as an Independent.
there were no overt political aspirations within the army. In early 1960, the Belgian officers of the Force Publique could survey their 24,000 Congolese soldiers with satisfaction. They were very well disciplined and orderly. On May 14th, their Commanding Officer, Lt.-General Janssens, declared that the Congo would need a solid, reliable force for the first months of independence\(^{(3)}\) and he could point proudly to the Force Publique. There were 1,000 whites in the Force, most of whom were officers, but there were no Congolese officers at all. The Belgians expected the white officers to remain in control.

The original armed forces in the Congo had been African mercenaries, recruited in Zanzibar and in West Africa, who, under white leadership, defended explorers and the first outposts of the Belgian Colonisers. Following the proclamation of the Congo Free State, King Leopold II of Belgium began to organise a small army. The Congress of Berlin, in neutralising the area, had paid special attention to the slave trade and Leopold had international approval for the establishment of formal control. The first local soldiers were drawn from the Bangala tribe in 1886: in 1888 the first 2,000 recruits entered a camp at Boma and on the 5th August of the same year, the Force Publique came into being by decree.\(^{(4)}\) By 1897 the Force had grown to 14,000 (which included 2,000 non-Congolese) and had engaged successfully in the Arab Wars of 1892-94. The number of Europeans was very small; 120 during the Arab War, and only 350 by 1905.\(^{(5)}\) The Force was maintained at over 20,000 up to the time of Independence.

Various factors mitigated against the Force becoming a stabilising influence after the civil administration collapsed. Three violent mutinies in 1895, 1897 and 1900, had caused the Belgians to avoid tribal concentration within units, and so these were thoroughly ‘mixed’. This procedure should have built up internal solidarity and weakened traditional prejudices; instead it simply weakened the Force as a whole.

Secondly, the Force had been used to maintain internal security\(^{(6)}\) and had virtually replaced the police force. This process was accelerated during World War II and it meant that the force had inevitably been drawn into the arena of civil and political dispute.

Thirdly, no Congolese were trained as officers and the rank of N.C.O. was only attained after many years of service. Lack of education, lack of any real incentives, and lack of foresight

\(^{(3)}\) Young, op cit. p. 441.
on the part of the European cadre\(^{(7)}\) all detracted from any esprit de corps which might have developed.

Headlong independence;\(^{(8)}\) ten political parties vying for influence within a coalition government and complete neglect of the Force Publique during this transition, prepared the way for a few well-chosen words by General Janssens to the N.C.O.'s at Leopoldville on July 5th\(^{(9)}\) to provoke one of the worst mutinies in Africa's history.

**The Mutiny and Belgian Intervention:**

'The Force Publique is today the only solid institution in this country'. As a journalist wrote this for 'La Libre Belgique' on the 5th July, 1960, the first rumblings of the mutiny had begun.\(^{(10)}\)

On Monday, 4th July, the Congolese Cabinet met to set up Commissions for the reorganisation of the Army, amongst other institutions. That afternoon, acts of indiscipline at Camp Leopold II prompted General Janssens to demote an N.C.O. for incitement against the officers. The next evening, following Janssens' 'After Independence' talk, and a broadcast by Lumumba\(^{(11)}\) which heralded the reorganisation of the army, a mass meeting of troops at the camp demanded the dismissal of Janssens and the complete Africanisation of the Force. At 8 p.m., troops alerted at Camp Hardy, at Thysville, 95 miles from Leopoldville, refused to proceed to Leopoldville to put down the mutiny. Instead, they seized the armoury and confined their officers to their quarters.

Military Police managed to quieten the troops at Leopoldville but the next day, despite promises by Lumumba of universal

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\(^{(7)}\) At the Round Table Conference held in Brussels in January and February, 1960, Kasavubu had warned of the complete lack of Congolese officers in the Force Publique. He later warned that, unless it was Africanised, their loyalty could not be assured. At the M.N.C. (L) Congresses at Lubumbashi and Stanleyville, Lumumba demanded full independence, and that included an independent army.

\(^{(8)}\) The Force Publique had had a strenuous week. Theirs was the task of crowd control over the Independence celebrations. The new Congolese leaders, politicians who had a great distrust for the army—due mainly to the extreme right-wing opinions of Gen. Janssens—had to be escorted and saluted. Independence seemed to have passed them by. All their officers were still Belgian. Lumumba had just appointed the Belgian, Colonel van Houweling, to the top post in the Ministry of Defence. Riots had broken out in Coquilhatville and the Force had been ordered to open fire, drawing on itself the criticism of the politicians.

\(^{(9)}\) On the day after Independence, at 8 p.m. General Janssens called a meeting of N.C.O.'s at Headquarters. On the blackboard he wrote 'Before Independence—After Independence'. This implied no change of status for the Congolese in the Force Publique and was deeply resented.

\(^{(10)}\) Young, C. op. cit. p. 438.

\(^{(11)}\) Patrice Lumumba: b. in Kasene. The Congo's first Prime Minister, former Assistant Postmaster and brewery employee, brilliant orator and pamphleteer, he was a founder member of the Movement National Congolais (M.N.C.) the Congo's first 'national' political movement. The M.N.C. later split and Lumumba retained leadership of the main section of the Party. He was deposed in September, 1960 by General Mobutu and sought U.N. protection. He later fled but was captured and flown to Katanga. Here he was murdered, possibly by a Belgian mercenary, in the presence of Tshombe and some of his Ministers in late January or early February, 1961. He was the only popularly elected Premier in the Congo until Tshombe's government of 1965.
promotion by one rank, the troops moved into the town and demanded the dismissal of both Janssens and Lumumba. The soldiers at Thysville, had, meanwhile, started a general panic which was eventually to cause Belgian military intervention and, indirectly, the secession of Katanga.

Reports of the spreading mutiny and of outrages to Europeans caused widespread panic amongst the settlers on 8th and 9th July. Reports of killings, looting and rape from the refugees from the Bas-Congo sent hundreds of whites by ferry to Brazzaville. Negotiations were already underway between representatives of the Force Publique and the government and complete agreement was reached over Africanisation and the election of officers. All non-Congolese were to be replaced except for special advisers, who were to have no authority and were to be chosen from those Belgian officers who were generally trusted by the Congolese. Delegations were to tour the country to explain the new situation. These agreements brought calm to Leopoldville but though the mutiny in the army died down, the European exodus continued even from areas which had not been touched by the earlier disturbances.

The Force Publique had its own radio network through which distorted rumours circulated like wildfire. A further incident at Matadi following rumours of a Belgian landing from naval vessels, led to a rapid rise in the tension particularly in Kasai and Katanga.

Katanga had had a long history of separatism and resented direction from Leopoldville. Two days before Independence, a secessionist plot failed because of intervention by the Sureté. The biggest political grouping in Katanga, Conakat, shared the fears of the Force Publique of domination by the politicians in Leopoldville but their motives were very different. The soldiers deeply resented the new status accorded to Lumumba and the politicians, but could not see how they were going to benefit from independence if the white officers remained. Their position in the Congo had, however, made them conscious of a Congo nation and they would oppose any moves to destroy this unity.

The detachment of the Force Publique (1,000 men) in Elisabethville was aware of Katanga's secessionist tendencies but was still commanded by Colonel Matterne and 60 white officers, whose loyalties they doubted. As the rumours of disturbances in the

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(12) On the 9th July, 1960 Victor Lundula, a sergeant in the Force Publique was promoted to Chief of Staff to replace Lt.-General Janssens. Born in 1911 in Kasai, Lundula was greatly respected for his work during the mutiny in quelling disturbances and saving Europeans from the mutinous troops. Lundula was jailed by Kasavubu in September, 1960 but escaped to Stanleyville where he joined Antoine Gizenga's opposition government as Chief of Staff.

(13) Lumumba and Kasavubu went to the Bas-Congo; Mobutu to Equateur; Kokolo, the new Commander of Camp Leopoldville, to Elisabethville; Kasongo to Stanleyville. Conko 1960, op. cit. p. 408.

(14) Confédération d'Associations tribales du Katanga, the 'autonomy-oriented' political party led by Moise Tshombe.
Bas-Congo spread, tension between the Congolese troops and their officers rose sharply, as did tension between the troops and the Katangese.

European officers, who had not yet bowed to Lumumba's decree, were threatened at Kongolo on 8th July. White volunteers began arming in Jadotville and at other centres and while the Katangese authorities appealed for calm, many whites fled to Rhodesia. The next day, Brussels decided to send paracommandos to Kamina to assist in the evacuation of Europeans. On 9th July, Col. Henniquiau, commander of the Force Publique in Katanga, was asked to supervise the election of Congolese officers but he took no action. Col. Matterne in Elisabethville and the whites in Katanga pressed for Belgian intervention despite the protests of the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville. These appeals were answered and intervention began on Sunday, 10th July, at 6.20 a.m.\(^{15}\) with the occupation of Camp Massart.

Tshombe, recently returned from Leopoldville, which he described as 'the most complete chaos', conferred with his provincial Ministers and later appealed to the British and Rhodesian police forces for aid. Again, rumours of secession became rife. Belgian troops had been employed at Luluabourg, Jadotville and Kamina, as well as in Elisabethville. The Congolese had agreed to this as 'police action' but on 11th July, naval detachments mounted a bombardment on Matadi. This act appears to have had no provocation but it sparked off a wave of violence against Europeans throughout the Congo. The Army radio helped to spread rumours of massacres and this only incited the soldiers to worse action. The same evening, in response to the unrest, Tshombe declared Katanga independent.\(^{16}\)

**Introduction to the Military situation in Katanga:**

Lt-General Janssens had considered the Force Publique to be above politics and had tried to make it a stable, well-disciplined force, for which the presence of Belgian officers would be essential. The Africanisation decree of July 8th, however, stripped away all the officers and Janssens himself was dismissed.

In the Province of Katanga, the Belgian officers maintained their positions in the Force Publique and were backed up by the Belgian troops from Kamina base. They remained there illegally. The only Belgian troops allowed in the Congo after Independence were those who operated in terms of the Treaty of Friendship\(^{17}\), at the specific request of the Congolese Government. No such request had been made. In the period immediately following Katanga's secession, the situation was very confused, particularly with regard to troop movements. On July 15th, the Belgian


\(^{16}\) Ibid. Appendix II. No. 1.

\(^{17}\) The Treaty of Friendship was signed on 29th June, 1960 but was never ratified by the Congolese Parliament.
Defence Minister ordered Belgian troops to occupy all the important centres in Katanga and the Belgians intervened on ten occasions to establish order.\(^{(18)}\) As the Force Publique in Katanga was hostile to Tshombe, the Belgians’ first task was to neutralise them\(^{(19)}\) but these operations did not include the white officers. Many of the latter were absorbed into the Belgian Army.

Of the Force Publique, only 300-400 soldiers remained loyal to the secessionist regime\(^{(20)}\) and the new state relied solely on the presence of Belgian troops for its existence. A Belgian paratroop commander, Major Guy Weber, was given responsibility for the entire operation of pacification in Katanga and later became the special adviser to Tshombe\(^{(21)}\) under the Belgian Technical Assistance Mission (MISTEBEL). When this happened, Col. Champion took over Weber’s command of the Metropolitan forces.

Major Crevecoeur, a former officer in the Force Publique, was placed in charge of the reorganisation of the Katangese Gendarmerie and police. A complete new army had to be forged to defend Katanga and many more ex-Force Publique officers were drawn in to help.

The United Nations and Katanga:

The Belgian intervention alerted the U.N. to the full implications of the collapse of the Congo’s internal structure and Katanga’s secession.

Katanga was the keystone of the Congo’s economy. It contributed 40% of the Congo’s revenue in taxation and had been included in the independent Congo, despite its tendencies towards autonomy, because of its economic strength. Without Katanga, the Congo could not survive economically. Moreover, Conakat was receiving support from Belgium and the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and an alliance

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\(^{(20)}\) Ibid. p. 144.
\(^{(21)}\) Moise-Kapenda Tshombe, born 1919. Married with ten children. The Congo’s most colourful leader and one of Africa’s most capable but at the same time most hated politicians. Tshombe was the son of a wealthy Katanga businessman of the royal Lunda family but showed little aptitude in business himself, going bankrupt three times. In 1956 he became President of a non-political group which grew into Conakat, Katanga’s federalist party. Patronised by the Belgian administration and supported financially by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, Tshombe withdrew Katanga from the newly independent Congo on 11th July, 1960. When Katanga finally collapsed in January, 1963, despite assistance of white mercenary troops, Tshombe exiled himself to Europe where he began plotting for his return. He was recalled by President Kasavubu in June, 1964 and became Prime Minister of the Congo in July of that year. Tshombe employed mercenaries to crush the civil war and also entrenched himself politically. President Kasavubu sensed the threat and dismissed Tshombe in October, 1965. Tshombe again withdrew to Europe and to his plotting. Much later charged him with high treason in 1966 and he was found guilty in absentia. In June, 1967, Tshombe was kidnapped aboard a private plane and taken to Algeria where he remains today under close custody.
between Tshombe and Welensky was abhorrent to African nationalist philosophy. In the light of this, Kasavubu, the Congo’s President, and Lumumba, the Prime Minister, made a joint appeal to the Secretary-General for United Nations assistance on 12th July, 1960. Secretary-General Hammarskjold immediately began to investigate the possibility of a U.N. force to restore order to the Congo.

On 14th July, the Security Council empowered the Secretary-General to form a peacekeeping force for the Congo and the resolution included a clause calling on the Belgians to withdraw all their troops. On the same day, General von Horn, the Swedish commander of the U.N. force in Palestine, was appointed to command the new United Nations force in the Congo (ONUC). The first troops (Ghanaian) began to arrive the next day. The demand for Belgian withdrawal was repeated by the Security Council resolution on 22nd July and then became mandatory. The Belgian Government decided to comply with the Council’s request and by 7th August, all the Belgian troops had been withdrawn from all of the Congo except Katanga and although the U.N. force had neither the mandate to end secession itself nor to assist the central government in this regard, a Katangese army had to be formed quickly to withstand attacks from the Congolese themselves.

A force of 1,500 volunteers was quickly formed from the tribes loyal to Conakat and Crevecoeur had all the arms and supplies that he needed from Kamina at his disposal. White volunteers were armed by the army and these intervened effectively against the tribal uprisings in north Katanga. The Belgian Government had meanwhile agreed to co-operate with the U.N. forces (O.N.U.C.) and had handed over control in thirty places. Pressure for the total evacuation of Belgian troops was rising but this was not effected until 4th September. Belgium still offered Katanga large-scale technical assistance but it was the turn of events in the Congo itself that enabled the Katangese authorities to mobilise effectively.

The Lumumba government wished the U.N. force to be employed to put down secession. Instead, Major-General Alexander, who was an ex-British officer, and was Chief of Staff of Ghana’s

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(22) Joseph Kasavubu: born in 1910 in Leopoldville Province. Trained first as a priest, then as a teacher. He joined the Belgian Administration and joined the Bakongo cultural society which later became the Abako Party. In 1955, Kasavubu became Abako’s President. This was originally a separatist party but later adopted a ‘federalist’ policy. In November, 1957, he became mayor of the Dendale commune in Leopoldville. He was jailed in 1959 for his involvement in the Leopoldville riots but attended the 1960 Round Table Conference in Brussels. At Independence, Kasavubu became the Congo’s first President.


(25) This included most of the air wing of the Force Publique which had been flown to Kamina after secession and totalled approximately 14 aircraft.

Army and accompanied Ghana's contingent to the Congo, began to disarm the Force Publique in Leopoldville immediately on his arrival. The Force Publique seemed, to the first U.N. troops to arrive, to be the main cause of the disturbances and their first task appeared to be the complete reorganisation of the Force.

The Secretary-General of the U.N., Dag Hammarskjöld, decided on 6th August not to send troops to Katanga following a report from his representative in the Congo, Ralph Bunche. Hammarskjöld sent two companies of Swedish troops to Elisabethville on the 12th August, but instructed them to make no attempt to end the secession. This move led, however, to a takeover by U.N. troops of the Belgian-held towns in north Katanga.

On the 15th August, Lumumba, now completely dissatisfied, finally broke with the U.N. and began to plan an attack on Katanga. The A.N.C. (27) were sent into secessionist South Kasai but were kept out of Katanga by the efforts of the South Kasai army which in turn was given aid by Tshombe. Encountering no resistance from O.N.U.C., Sendwe's (28) troops from Kivu made a rapid advance from the north into the area where Tshombe and Conakat were despised.

The Katangese at once mounted counter-attacks. Belgian aid was speeded up, cadres were recruited in Belgium to lead the gendarmerie and Katangese were sent to Belgium for training. (29) On 18th September, Tshombe sent a special mission to Brussels to recruit 180 mercenaries, officers and N.C.O.'s to lead his gendarmerie, (30) while the O.N.U.C. began to disarm Belgian troops in the north.

(27) The Force Publique was renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise following recommendations by the Moroccan General, Keitani, who was seconded to the Congo to reorganise the Force Publique on 23rd August, 1960.

(28) South Kasai employed a small number of white mercenaries, never more than a few dozen, but most of these proved ineffective in the long run. They officered Kasai's military units but were soon rounded up by the O.N.U.C. South Kasai did not have the resources to maintain an army or fight a war for very long.

(29) Jason Sendwe: born in 1917 in Katanga. Studied medicine but became a Methodist minister and teacher. Became a radical leader at the end of the war and rose to lead the Balubakat Cartel which opposed Tshombe's Conakat. He tricked Lumumba and was appointed Commissioner of State for Katanga. In 1964 he lost influence in his Party and was later murdered by tribesmen.


(31) Ibid. p. 148.
CHAPTER 3

new countries often have to make basic decisions which are likely to determine for many years the pattern of their national life as well as their relations with the rest of the world'.

Dag Hammarskjöld.

Phase I—The Defence of Katanga:

The first white mercenary in Katanga to win international recognition was Captain W. G. Stairs, a Nova Scotian who was employed in 1891 by King Leopold II of Belgium to secure for the Congo Free State the piece of land which is today Katanga. Captain Stairs' success, at the expense of British interests in the area, was facilitated by the murder of the ruler Msiri by another adventurer named Bodson. In 1961 a mercenary was to assist in the killing of the Congo's Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, in Katanga.

In July and August, 1960, the U.N. peace-keeping mission in the Congo was preoccupied with the disarming and repatriation of Belgian troops. Belgium assisted very reluctantly and because so many of the settler community had armed to protect themselves and Katanga, and as no accurate record was available of the Belgian troops in the province, the U.N. did not immediately realise that mercenaries were being employed. The U.N. did not have the manpower resources to patrol any part of the country-side except the 'neutralised' zones set up in north Katanga, and to provide patrols along the Kasai border. Their main interest lay in the towns and major centres and at this time the O.N.U.C. consisted of only 14,000 men who had to be spread over the whole Congo.

The A.N.C. invasion from Kongolo in the north was halted on 18th September. The U.N. representatives had begun negotiating upon their arrival with the Katangese authorities and the central government to obtain a ceasefire. On 14th September, General Mobutu, who had replaced Janssens as commander of the A.N.C., assumed control of the Congo in a bloodless coup.
coup after Lumumba had obtained military aid from the U.S.S.R. Lumumba was restricted and relations between the U.N. and the Congolese administration improved. Mobutu agreed to withdraw his troops from north Katanga to facilitate U.N. control of internal order. After the A.N.C.'s departure, however, the fruits of their contact with the Baluba population added to the efforts of Lumumbists to create unrest in north Katanga. North Katanga rose in armed revolt against Elisabethville.

To quote the pro-Tshombe, Belgian journalist, Pierre Davister: "Since September, the greater part of the territories 'of the north' have fallen—without a struggle, what is more—into rebel hands." Albertville was an outpost in a sea of rebel activity. Davister continues; "the Katangan gendarmerie had to use a 'strong means' to clean out certain rebel nests." These nests consisted of Kabalo, Manono, Malemba-Nkulu, Luena, Bukama, in October 1960 and here the U.N. was the only responsible administration.

Hitherto the mercenaries who had been recruited in Europe, former officers of the Force Publique and Belgian army officers, had been deployed to stiffen and lead the small gendarmerie and the groups of white volunteers who made up the front line of Katanga's defence. The insurrection in north Katanga presented such a threat to the rest of the province that the mercenaries were now formed into separate units which were given the task of repressing the uprising.

The Katangese authorities also instituted 'police action' and 'psychological warfare' in an attempt to win back the lost regions. The Baluba uprising had swept the provincial administration from all the northern towns where sympathy did not lie with Conakat and the Balubas controlled vast areas of the countryside.

The Katangese counter-offensive began on February 11th, 1961. The action consisted of direct military aggression against the rebel-held centres and repression of the countryside. The foreign cadres (including mercenaries) numbered 400-500 of whom 210 were Belgian regulars who had worn the uniform of the Force Publique since September, 1960.

The counter-offensive was marked by four features; its complete success; the attempted take-over of Katanga's military organisation by French regular officers and mercenaries who later lost influence; the U.N. resolution of 21st February, 1961, and its effects on Katanga's army; and, finally, the introduction of

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U.N. mercenaries into Katanga.

Mukalakulu fell the day the counter-offensive opened and the railway line to Luena was opened by February 13th. The main objective of the offensive was Manono, the seat of the Gizen-gist(7) ‘Government of Lualaba’ which had been established by Prosper Ilunga, a Lumumbist, during the disturbances. This offensive had to be held back as international opinion had hardened.

On February 21st, 1961, the Security Council passed a resolution which gave the Secretary-General the power to expel ‘all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel . . . and mercenaries.’(8) This resolution brought fears both in Elisabethville and Leopoldville that all troops were to be disarmed by the U.N. In Katanga it meant that the true strength of the gendarmerie and the mercenary contingents had to be concealed from the O.N.U.C.

In order to clear the north of Katanga of rebels, a task force under Major Matthys regrouped and armed itself for a quick attack on Manono.(9) Ilunga, the head of state in Lualaba, who had only the jeunesse irregulars to defend the town, found himself deserted by the A.N.C. This meant that the Katangese took the town before the U.N. could intervene.

The capture of Manono on 30th March marked the beginning of the action to eliminate Baluba resistance. Whole areas had to be screened for their support of the old Congolese political movements, and it was here that the mercenaries were used to greatest effect. In small, mobile units travelling by truck and jeep, with air reconnaissance provided, when necessary, by light planes piloted by Belgians, the troops put large areas to the torch.(10) Intimidation, searching and executions were the tactics employed. Thousands of Baluba refugees fled to Elisabethville for U.N. protection.(11)

The pacification had a double urgency. Firstly, on April 2nd, following the capture of Manono, Indian Gurkhas were flown into Kamina to reinforce the O.N.U.C. This added weight to the U.N. resolution of 21st February, 1960.

At the end of April, a new Belgian Government, a socialist-led coalition headed by Spaak and Lefevre, came to power and their attitude was not sympathetic to an independent Katanga.

(7) Antoine Gizenga: Lumumba’s Deputy Premier, b. 1925. He was the first President of the P.S.A. but joined Abako in 1959. He supported Lumumba against Kasavubu and fled to Stanleyville when Lumumba was arrested. In February, 1961, he was recognised by Afro-Asian States as the legitimate leader of the Congo and established a government in Stanleyville. His regime was crushed in 1962 and he was jailed on an island on the Congo River. Released by Tshombe in 1964 he was arrested again shortly afterwards. Upon his final release by Mobutu, he fled the country and is now in Moscow.

(8) For the text of this, and other UN resolutions on mercenaries—see Appendix.

(9) This regrouping was done in the area between Mitwaba and Piana with the latter as H/Q—Hoskins, op. cit. p. 354.


Belgian support was to be withdrawn, Tshombe had little hope of maintaining his position and sought to consolidate before he had to fend for himself. In effect, although his military successes did achieve their purpose in Katanga, they also forced Kasavubu to sign an agreement with the U.N. which authorised the deportation of all non-Congolese in the Katangese forces.\(^{(13)}\) From the point of view of the U.N. Secretary-General, this accord was still bound by the provisions of the Security Council Resolution of 21st February, 1961, and did not empower the O.N.U.C. to use force. The fighting which broke out in September, 1960, was justified by the U.N.'s representative in Katanga, Conor O'Brien, as being within the mandate. Full powers to use force were not given to the Secretary-General, however, until the Security Council resolution of 24th November, 1961.\(^{(13)}\) Thus the O.N.U.C. had little power to implement the February resolution although it did carry out 'Operation Rumpunch' in August and, in the interim, Tshombe explored many avenues to establish his gendarmerie as an effective force.

**Mercenary Recruitment:**

The two missions to Belgium and France to recruit mercenaries were well received in right-wing military circles.\(^{(14)}\) The semi-official representations made by Thyssens were given added weight when Katanga's Minister of Defence, Joseph Yav, journeyed to Belgium and France in December with similar intent.

Two different categories of mercenary were recruited: (a) French-speaking soldiers who had had experience of guerrilla warfare were needed to command Katanga's military effort against the A.N.C. and the insurgents and (b) soldiers to stiffen the gendarmerie in battle or to form separate units.

The recruitment of the former category encountered political difficulties. The Belgians in Katanga were not satisfied with the support which the Belgian Government was giving their secessionist State\(^{(15)}\) and wished to counterbalance the effects of the Belgian monopoly in Katanga's army. There were also people who disliked the way Tshombe was handling secession and wished to replace him. At the beginning of January, 1961, Roger Trinquier,\(^{(16)}\) an experienced French officer, was given the task of recruiting 100 mercenaries and was himself to take command

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\(^{(14)}\) See above Chapter 2.

\(^{(15)}\) In August 1960, Belgium had agreed to withdraw her forces from Katanga and, since that day, had shown more willingness to comply with UN action and sentiments over Katanga. In fact, Belgium was trying to play a double game, but this did not reassure the 'ultras' in Katanga. On 22nd February, 1961, the Belgian representative to the UN addressed a verbal note to the Secretary-General, which stated that recruitment of mercenaries would be stopped in Belgium. UN Document, Security Council S/4752, Annex II.

\(^{(16)}\) For Trinquier's role in the Algerian War of Independence and his methods of dealing with rebellious populations, see Behr, Edward—'The Algerian Problem'—Penguin, 1961. Chapter 12.
of the whole military effort in Katanga. This request coincided with an A.N.C. (Stanleyville) advance into North Katanga and on 24th January, Trinquier resigned from the French army and flew to Katanga to study the situation. On his return he opened a recruiting office at 29, Rue Cambon in Paris. (17)

The French Minister of Defence aided Trinquier’s efforts by allowing him a ‘discharge’ from the army (18) but Belgium, and the Belgian officers in Katanga with the Military Mission (Mistebel), saw this as a political threat and reacted swiftly. Col. Matthys launched his counter-offensive on 11th February and its success re-established confidence in the Belgian administration of the army. On the 28th February, Trinquier flew to Salisbury on his way to Katanga but before he left Southern Rhodesia he was dismissed by Tshombe. The French Ministry of Defence, however, did not stop its efforts to infiltrate the Katangese gendarmerie. (19)

In addition to the counter-offensive, Mistebel increased its efforts to bring Belgian mercenaries to the Congo. ‘Mission Marissal’, named after an officer of that name, opened an office in Brussels on 27th February and another Belgian officer, Col. Vandewalle, was sent to Katanga as ‘consul’ to keep an eye on proceedings there. (20) Despite the declaration of Belgium to the U.N., Marissal was able to continue recruitment until August, 1961, and 250 Belgians were recruited for Katanga (21) by his office.

At the beginning of 1961, recruiting offices were established in Johannesburg and Bulawayo and over 200 English-speaking mercenaries were recruited. These mercenaries were not integrated into gendarmerie units as were the French-speaking soldiers, but formed a separate unit called ‘Compagnie Internationale’, commanded by Captain Browne, an Englishman. (22) This company was divided into five sections and operated on its own or with gendarmerie units.

The mercenaries’ presence in Katanga developed into a game of cat and mouse with the O.N.U.C. The Katangese gendarmes and their white officers and the special units were able to carry out their task of ‘pacification’ with little interruption from the O.N.U.C. in the country, as the U.N. faced a severe manpower shortage. (23) As soon as the Katangese took a town, however, the O.N.U.C. would move in and all the whites had either to

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(17) This office was closed soon afterwards by the French police but many mercenaries were enlisted.
(18) Gerard-Libois, J.: op. cit., p. 188.
(19) One French officer, Col. Paulques, became commander of the training camp near Jadotville.
(20) Vandewalle: see also below Chapter 5.
(22) For evidence submitted by captured mercenaries, including Captain Browne:
remove their uniforms or take to the bush. In the major centres, the mercenaries, backed by the whites, assumed an arrogance which was a reflection of their real value to the Katangese regime. Their appearance resembled that of a brigand\(^{(24)}\) and they were fêted as heroes in the bars of Elisabethville. Tales of their successes in the bush and their apparent invincibility in battle coupled with their disreputable bearing soon gained them the description 'les affreux', a name which engendered revulsion or endearment depending upon which side of the Katangese fence the user sat.

Dayal, the U.N. officer in charge in the Congo, reported on 12th February, that there were 400 mercenaries employed in Katanga.\(^{(25)}\) These were engaged in the counter-offensive but the Katangese authorities were aware of the mounting pressure at the U.N. and wished to play down the strength of the gendarmerie.

**U.N. Action against mercenaries:**

Manono fell on 30th March, 1961, after a drawn out battle against very small odds.\(^{(26)}\) Three days later, Indian Gurkhas arrived at Kamina, and this marked the high water level of Tshombe's military success. The tone of the U.N. approach had changed, although it took five months to implement any positive policy. On the 7th April, two raids on Kabalo were successfully dealt with by O.N.U.C. A barge containing mercenaries was sunk by Ethiopian troops and thirty mercenaries were captured as they landed at the airport.\(^{(27)}\)

The mercenaries were arrested and later expelled by the U.N. The incident marked the first step by O.N.U.C. to implement paragraphs A(1) and A(2) of the February resolution.\(^{(28)}\)

From the end of April to the middle of August, the position of Katanga weakened under a number of pressures. Belgian backing was noticeably reduced and, in June, Major Weber and Michel Renaud, head of Katanga's Sûreté, were withdrawn. In July, Spaak agreed to allow the U.N. to draw up a list of political 'undesirables' in Katanga who would have to leave. The U.N. sent a representative to Elisabethville to assess the number of foreigners in the Katangese forces. He reported, on June 30th, that there were 512 advisers and military personnel who would fall within the U.N.'s category for repatriation.\(^{(29)}\)

In August the Belgian Government closed the 'Mission Marissal'

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\(^{(26)}\) The UN Detachment at Manono (Nigerians) made no attempt to resist the Katangese attack, although they were empowered to do so in terms of paragraph 1 of the February resolution.
\(^{(27)}\) This unit of the 'Compagnie Internationale' was led by Captain Browne. He was expelled from the Congo by the UN but returned at least four times, and was expelled on each occasion.
\(^{(29)}\) See Appendix for text.
Katanga received a political set-back, after the optimism which followed the Tananarive Conference in March, when Tshombe was arrested by Congolese at Coquilhatville. Talks between Tshombe and Mobutu in July resulted in a joint agreement which did not result in any definite advantage for Katanga. Mobutu repudiated the agreement on July 26th. Adoula as assumed the premiership on the 2nd August and immediately began to co-operate with the U.N. This action culminated in Ordinance 70, of 24th August, whereby Congolese Government policy was brought in line with the February resolution and the U.N./Kasavubu agreement of April. The U.N. force was asked to expel all foreign mercenaries who were described as 'undesirable aliens'.

At 0400 hours on 28th August, the O.N.U.C. began to arrest all foreign mercenaries and military personnel serving in the Katangese gendarmerie. The O.N.U.C. had garrisons at all the major centres except Kabongo, Kolwesi and Kapanga and they expected to arrest the majority of the 460 foreigners of whom they had details. The O.N.U.C. had 5,000 men in Katanga, of whom 2,500 were in Elisabethville. Operation 'Rumpunch' was a bloodless success as complete surprise was achieved. Sixty foreign officials were arrested in Elisabethville and, altogether, O.N.U.C. rounded up 338. 'Rumpunch' created a stir in Brussels and London and by midday the Belgian Consul in Elisabethville was making representations to O'Brien to stop the arrests as they were 'humiliating', and asking if the foreigners could not leave Katanga voluntarily. The Consul, Créner, took responsibility for their compliance. O'Brien agreed to this but the next day Créner said he could only take responsibility for the 'regular' Belgian soldiers and not for the others. The O.N.U.C. had stopped the arrests the previous day and now it was too late to resume them. All non-Katangese had been warned and at least 104 foreigners had not been captured, the majority of whom were thought to be mercenaries.

The remaining mercenaries had now to go into hiding, as the U.N. was planning further action in co-operation with the Congolese Government. Operation 'Morthor' began on 13th August.
September but this time the mercenaries and Katangese gendar- 
mes were not caught unawares. They resisted the O.N.U.C.'s 
efforts to arrest them and a full-scale military operation had to 
be mounted to overcome the resistance. The battle raged until 
a cease-fire was signed on the 20th. The white volunteers, 
mercenaries and the Katangese gendarmes fought determinedly 
in Elisabethville(37) and at Jadotville gendarmes with white offi-
cers surrounded Irish troops and laid siege. Avikat Fougas then 
strafed the U.N. positions. U.N. transport, troop concentra-
tions, transport and communication centres were all attacked by 
Avikat aircraft which had absolute air superiority.(38)

After the failure of 'Morthor', and a change of direction of the 
Congo operation at the U.N. following the death of Dag Ham-
marskjöld on 7th September, Afro-Asian pressure resulted in a 
stronger resolution being passed by the Security Council on 24th 
November.(39) This resolution empowered the Secretary-General 
to use force, 'if necessary' to expel all mercenaries and foreign 
elements from Katanga's army.

This resolution accentuated the failure of Katanga to gain 
concessions from the U.N. personnel in Katanga and, at the be-
inning of December, tension began to mount again. On 2nd 
December, the Katangese erected three roadblocks in Elisabeth-
ville and, although the O.N.U.C. troops held their fire, the 
gendarmes adopted a belligerent stand and fired on the O.N.U.C. 
positions repeatedly. On 5th December, the second phase of 
'Morthor' began and, with determined action, the U.N. defeated 
the Katangese in Elisabethville. At least six mercenaries were 
killed in the fighting, as were 25 men of the O.N.U.C. Mercen-
aries and white volunteers had led the gendarmerie units and 
this gave the Secretary-General the excuse he needed to order 
the completion of the operation. Most of the mercenaries were 
able to evade capture by the U.N. and many took up civilian 
employment in an attempt to hide their identity.(40) On 21st 
December, Tshombe signed the 'Kitona Declaration' which ack-
wnowledged his recognition of the Central Government and U 
Thant, the new U.N. Secretary-General, called upon the O.N.U.C. 
to cease fire. The next day the Katangese Cabinet repudiated 
the whole document.

On 31st December, the A.N.C. took Kongolo and it became 
vital for Katanga to maintain its army. France became the 
main source of mercenaries and on January 8th, 1962, 35 mer-
cenaries journeyed to Katanga via Brazzaville and Ndola.(41) On 
24th January, Tshombe made a public declaration that the mer-

(37) See Smith Hempstone—'Katanga Report'—London, 1962, for an eye-witness 
account of the fighting in Elisabethville.
(38) When A. N. C. troops were marching on Katanga at the end of September, 
Fougas bombed their column, causing them to retire in disorder.
(39) S/5002. See Appendix.
(41) Ibid. p. 256.
cenceary problem must be ended ‘once and for all’ and that Col. Faulques had been deported under escort. The U.N. believed that the mercenaries had been withdrawn to centres where the U.N. had no garrisons.

It soon became obvious to the U.N. that mercenaries were still being used. The Katangese retook Kongolo on 17th February with foreign help. The joint U.N./Katangese commissions which were set up in February to expel mercenaries\(^{42}\) had only limited success initially and then failed altogether.

The U.N. force continued to search for mercenaries and expel those they caught but recruitment continued. The 1962 Katanga budget for ‘contract personnel’ and ‘foreign advisers’ totalled Fr. (Katangese) 1,977.8 million\(^{43}\) and the report submitted to U Thant by Robert Gardiner, a Ghanaian U.N. official, in October estimated that there were again between 300 and 500 mercenaries in Katanga. This figure represents an increase in the total of August, 1961.\(^{44}\) This build-up in strength, although countered to some extent by the advance of the A.N.C. which followed the breakdown in the Tshombe/Adoula talks of March/April and May/June, 1962, created tension between the O.N.U.C. and the Katangese. Numerous incidents were reported on both sides.\(^{45}\)

**The end of Katanga’s Secession:**

The failure of the June talks convinced U Thant that drastic action was necessary by the U.N. to end secession. In August he formulated a plan for the re-integration of the Katangese administration and gendarmerie. The plan\(^{46}\), dated 10th August, 1962, was to be implemented in four progressive stages by Katanga, and the O.N.U.C. was given complete freedom to round up the remaining mercenaries. Protracted negotiations ensued. Draft constitutions were drawn up and submitted to Adoula and Tshombe. The U.N. representatives acted as intermediaries for the warring factions, but no compromise was reached. As it appeared that the U.N. would begin to implement its ‘course of action’, at the beginning of December, tension mounted and on the 19th, Tshombe declared that a ‘scorched earth policy’ would greet any O.N.U.C. moves to end secession. Roadblocks were again set up by the gendarmerie.

U Thant determined to implement ‘Operation Grandslam’ in terms of the November resolution to assert the U.N.’s right to freedom of movement in Katanga.\(^{47}\) The O.N.U.C. began to dismantle Katangese roadblocks on the 28th December. On

\(^{42\text{Ibid, p. 256. 9 mercenaries were expelled on the 9th February.}}\)

\(^{43\text{Ibid. p. 344.}}\)

\(^{44\text{UN Document, Security Council S/4940, Add. 1. Here there is a list of names which was submitted to the UN by Tshombe.}}\)

\(^{45\text{Gerard-Libois, J.: op. cit. pp. 239-240 and 265.}}\)

\(^{46\text{UN Document, Security Council S/5053, Add. 13, Annex I.}}\)

\(^{47\text{UN Document, Security Council S/5053.}}\)
14th January, Tshombe signed a declaration ending secession. The U.N. force was equipped to beat the Katangese decisively. Between 28th and 30th December, Swedish jets destroyed the Katangese air force on the ground. The O.N.U.C. had advanced into all the major centres except Kolwesi by the 3rd January and the Katangese and mercenaries had melted away before it. The mercenaries no longer appeared to want to fight, as the cause was lost. Remnants regrouped at Kolwesi where Tshombe joined them on the 12th. Here the final bargaining attempt was made. Tshombe threatened to blow up the Delcommune Dam but, typically, the mercenaries offered 'protection' to the dam in exchange for Fr. 200 million from Union Minière\(^{(48)}\). They were the only ones who could have destroyed the dam but they left Kolwesi by rail on the 15th leaving it intact.

Towards the end, relations between the mercenaries and Katanga deteriorated. The mercenaries did not resist the O.N.U.C. advance and this brought about the collapse of the gendarmerie. The destruction of Avikat and the numerical strength of the O.N.U.C. appears to have convinced the mercenaries that they could not win, and as a result, they fled.

The mercenaries had therefore failed as a military force in Katanga. They had been undisciplined and brutal and had remained only so long as they were in a position of ascendancy. They had been well armed and had even been given 'tanks', which were converted bulldozers\(^{(49)}\), in an effort to gain superiority over the O.N.U.C. It was relentless pressure which wore them down and made them afraid for their own lives\(^{(50)}\).

Of those who left by train for Angola in January, some signed on to assist the Portuguese fight their rebellion, while others simply went home. At least one, Denard\(^{(51)}\), went to Yemen to fight for the Royalists. Jean Schramme and five other Belgians remained on a farm in Angola with over 1,000 ex-gendarmes to await further orders from Tshombe.

Implication for Southern Africa:

Katanga's secession had opened new paths in international relations and the foreign efforts to maintain its autonomy had introduced black Africa to the powerful influence of three states which had hitherto remained on the fringes of the power balance of the continent; Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa. Each had its own motives for supporting Tshombe but each was aiding a common cause.

The Congo's independence brought the borders of decolonisa-

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\(^{(50)}\) Ibid. p. 152. Thirty-two mercenaries were killed in Katanga between 1960 and 1963. This estimate appears to be fairly accurate, but the only figures available are those in the UN reports on military action in which it engaged.
\(^{(51)}\) See below Chapter 8.
tion to Angola. In 1961, the first guerrilla attacks were made on Portuguese settlements and on tribal centres. The rebels were based in the new Democratic Republic of the Congo and Portugal felt a threat to her colonial security. Angola's border with the Congo is long and could not be patrolled intensively. Tshombe, meanwhile, sought allies to maintain Katanga's independence and the Benguela Railway through Angola became his main supply route for arms. While Portugal sought to consolidate her military and administrative position in Angola the vital rail link to Katanga remained open. No rebels were able to use Katanga for a base for attacks against Angola and the ties which Tshombe made in this period were to outlast the existence of an independent Katanga and he was later able to use Angola as a potential base for his eventual return to power. The Portuguese did not, however, give Tshombe material aid as he had sufficient reserves of his own to buy on the world market.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was under a white leadership which was more insecure than the Portuguese "provincial" administration. Welensky was not free to deal with the nationalism of Northern Rhodesia in his own way because Britain maintained the power to decide on the treatment of the Federation's indigenous populations. The full implications of African independence for the remaining colonial regimes came as a shock to Welensky and Tshombe's position in Katanga became vital to the internal political stability of Northern Rhodesia. Welensky was quick to realise this and, although he could offer little material aid, the Federal Government did nothing to stop mercenaries from being recruited in Salisbury and Bulawayo. The direct influence of European power had been abruptly removed and so the Federation had to secure a buffer state on its own. Unlike Portugal, the Federation did not have a seat at the U.N. and therefore did not have to answer criticisms of her actions publicly. Britain was able to use the Federation's position and influence to help safeguard its investment in the Union Minière without becoming directly involved itself. Despite these factors, the Federation was unable to give much real support to Tshombe as Katanga's main need was a quick route to the sea. Katanga was, however, able to secure two of its three borders against outflanking movements.

South Africa played a minor role in the Katanga affair but its interest in this stage of the Congo's history marked the beginning of an experiment which was to reach its climax in 1965. Three distinct issues developed. South Africa, an economic giant in comparison with the other states in Southern Africa, was in a position to assist its weaker neighbours and it was in South Africa's interest to maintain Angola and the Federation against the possibility of a political breakdown similar to that
of the Congo. By supporting Tshombe, South Africa would be able to protect its own buffer states. The second issue was one which had international implications. The policy of apartheid had already come under attack at the UN from India and Pakistan and other newly independent states. By allowing its citizens to fight in Katanga, South Africa was able to test international reaction and, at the same time, its own capacity at the southern end of the continent to fill the vacuum which had resulted from the withdrawal of the European powers. Thirdly, the Congo was extremely important to, and had great influence on, the internal situation in South Africa. The issues of majority rule in Africa were highlighted by Harold Macmillan's speech to the South African Parliament in 1960 and Dr. Verwoerd was able to quote the Congo as an example of the fate of rapidly decolonized territories which might also become the fate of South Africa.

As 'separate development' and Bantustans were relatively new concepts in South Africa at the time, it was expedient for Verwoerd to identify with a "black" leader such as Tshombe as an example of the 'correct' path towards modern status by Africans. The threat of "Communism" and the role of the U.N. were the ideological reasons given for discreet South African intervention. By 1965, not only were South African mercenaries proving the military potential of South Africa to the rest of the continent, but the strategic implications of defence in Africa were being closely studied in Pretoria. It was said that South African security officers were in liaison with the Congolese authorities.52

A superficial appraisal of the achievements of the mercenaries in Katanga had shown that even badly led white troops were capable of defeating untrained, lightly or badly armed tribesmen and inexperienced African armies, but that the mercenaries in Katanga lacked sufficient cohesion to withstand conventional military attack by a well-trained and more disciplined force such as the O.N.U.C. When the mercenaries withdrew from Katanga the secession bid collapsed but the absence of an efficient army meant that internal chaos could quite possibly return to the Congo. With better planning, a mercenary force might in future establish its control.

The mercenaries of Katanga had served a more significant purpose internationally than in Katanga itself. They had shown the lack of solidarity in the Pan-Africanist movement and had emphasised the power of South Africa to all African states and they had exposed the opposition which established white communities, such as those in the Rhodesias and the Portuguese provinces, constituted to the fulfilment of the ideal of a totally decolonised Africa.

52 This information was supplied by one such officer who gave it to a journalist in Leopoldville in 1965.
CHAPTER 4

'My fingers become metal. I can cut down 200 men with one swipe of my hand.'

Martin R. Kasongo, Minister of Justice (CNL-EST)

The Calm:

The mercenaries had let Tshombe down badly in Katanga. They had proved ruthless against the Baluba in north Katanga and the A.N.C. units which confronted them from the borders, but in the final advance of the O.N.U.C. they had melted away. It appeared that a chapter of history had closed.

The Adoula government was given the chance to solve two major problems but was unable to resolve either. The problems were the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo and the stabilisation of the Congolese economy with the aid of the Katangese copper revenue. To achieve this, Adoula had to remove the legacy that Tshombe had left; to destroy Tshombe's charisma and reassure the European companies. He also had to extend his own political influence over the Congo. His dismissal in 1964 bore witness to his failure.

The full pacification of Katanga was not achieved in 1963. The mines returned to normal production but the whites remained uneasy. Tshombe had left for Europe in June, 1963(1) but a nucleus of ex-gendarmes and mercenaries remained in Angola. Pressure on the Portuguese government failed to stop its complicity in this matter and Tshombe's forces were not ejected. Thus these forces posed a constant threat to the Central Government. Mobutu took the threat seriously enough to station six of his best battalions in Katanga.

Of the estimated 15,000 Katangese gendarmes who had maintained the secession, only 2,000 joined the A.N.C.; 1,000 and a hard core of mercenaries remained in two camps in Angola, whilst the rest took to the bush with their arms.(2) These gendarmes still maintained some contact with Tshombe(3) although most of them turned to banditry or took up employment in the mining towns.(4) As rumours began to flow back from Angola that the gendarmes there were in training for a reconquest bid, the U.N. was obliged to keep a large proportion of its forces

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(1) Rand Daily Mail, 26/3/1964:
(2) Congo 1964—op. cit. p. 150.
(3) In the third week of June, 1963, the A.N.C. arrested a paymaster who was going the rounds of the villages, paying the gendarmes their "retainers".
in Katanga.\(^{(5)}\) In August, 1963, ex-gendarmes occupied the village of Kasenga,\(^{(6)}\) south of Lake Moero, and completely disrupted the fishing industry there for several months.

In October, Jean Schramme, who had maintained the gendarmes in their camps at Vila Luso and Teixera de Sousa, was reported to have visited Tshombe in Madrid. From this time onwards the rumours of reconquest mounted. Wautier, another mercenary from Katanga, was commissioned to recruit mercenaries in Europe, and a third, Joseph Deom, was given a similar task. On the 25th December, the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid was asked to provide visas for twenty men to proceed to Angola.

The organisation being built up in Angola was known as the 'Forces Katangaises Libres' (F.K.L.)\(^{(7)}\) It consisted of the gendarmes and mercenaries who had fled in 1963 and a section of 'Avikat', the Katangese air force, with Major Puren in command. These camps proved a focus for Katangese loyalty and more ex-gendarmes began to filter across the border for training. A full command structure began to emerge.\(^{(8)}\) In May, 1964, Tshombe's private secretary reported that the force had been joined by three deserters from the Tunisian detachment of the O.N.U.C. Tshombe, meanwhile, denied all knowledge of the F.K.L. It is not clear what international support Tshombe was receiving while in exile. On 24th March, 1964, the Star reported that France no longer favoured Tshombe as it had in 1960-61, and was giving him no assistance. But the Portuguese government gave tacit approval to Tshombe's efforts by closing their eyes to the F.K.L. base in Angola. Tshombe was said to have owned the farms on which it stood and arms shipments were reported to have come through Luanda. All this contributed to the insecurity of the central government.

The second major threat to the Adoula administration was the first stirrings of a rebel movement in Kwilu Province in 1963. Pierre Mulele, a dissatisfied ex-Minister of the Lumumba Government, had gone into exile with about one hundred other Lumumbists early in 1963.\(^{(9)}\) He went on a tour of China and Eastern Europe to try to win support for a 'revolution Muleliste' in the Congo.

His approaches seemed to gain some support in China, and he set up an external headquarters in Brazzaville. Early disturbances in Kwilu Province were traced to Mulele and on October 25th, 1963, the provincial government of Kwilu offered

\(^{(5)}\) In 1963, Newsweek reported (9/9/63) that 2,500 mobile U.N. troops were needed to put down the bandits alone. The cost of this would be $10,000,000. In March there were over 5,000 U.N. troops in Katanga.

\(^{(6)}\) Congo 1964--op. cit., p. 150.

\(^{(7)}\) Ibid. --p. 152.

\(^{(8)}\) Ibid. A full description of the sections of command is given in a document captured by the A.N.C. Denard and Puren are mentioned, as is Schramme.

a reward of Fr. 500,000 for his capture 'dead or alive'. The rebellion in Kwilu began with incendiary and explosive attacks on New Year's Day, 1964 and conditions deteriorated rapidly. On 11th January, army contingents were called in to assist the police and, on 18th January, President Kasavubu declared a 'State of Exception' in Kwilu which suspended the operation of the civil administration in favour of the military. A.N.C. detachments waited at strategic points in Kasai. Initially the A.N.C. was able to contain these outbreaks but eventually the rebels consolidated in a triangular area bounded by Kitwit, Gungu and Idiofo. In May, 1964, the C.N.L. opened a second front in the eastern Congo with the capture of Uvira, and the A.N.C. and civil administration generally went to pieces.

Between May and July the C.N.L. was able to consolidate sufficiently to rout the A.N.C. wherever it desired. Witchcraft had a decimating effect on the A.N.C. troops and Tshombe's return in July to head a new central government, was not early enough to avert the loss of over half the Congo to C.N.L. control.

The A.N.C. had been retrained after Independence in 1960, but owing to the national chaos that followed, little or nothing was done subsequently. On the 26th February, 1963, Adoula wrote to the Secretary-General of the U.N. to ask if the U.N. would finance the retraining of the Congolese forces. Adoula specified the countries in which he desired the Congolese to receive this instruction, but the Secretary-General suggested others which were not satisfactory to the A.N.C.

Bilateral agreements with Belgium, Israel, Italy and the U.S. followed. Pilots for the air force were sent to Italy and Belgium; officer trainees went to Belgium and paratroopers to Israel. The U.S. was invited to give material aid. Under-Secretary of State Averell Harriman was sent to the Congo at the end of March, 1964, to study the effect on the Congo of the withdrawal of the O.N.U.C. in June. The optimistic note of the press interview he gave on his return was belied by the immediate aid sent to Adoula in the form of Cuban-piloted T-28 aircraft and 100 advisers and technicians. These agreements and the military missions, such as that which the U.S. had sent to the Congo in July, 1962, under Colonel M. Green, and another from Belgium,

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(12) Comité Nationale de Libération, Formed in September 1963 in Leopoldville.
(13) "Simbas", as the rebels called themselves, were anointed with "Mulele Water" (Mai Mulele) which was supposed to turn bullets into water. Badly trained A.N.C. units, when confronted by Simbas screaming "Mai Mulele" went to pieces when, even when hit, the rebel soldiers did not slow their attack. Drugs were the main reason for their seeming immunity and the mercenaries, who understood better what they were up against, were not affected.
(14) See Congo 1963 and Congo 1964, pp. 3-78.
(15) Canada, Italy, Israel, Norway, U.S., Belgium—all "N.A.T.O." countries except Israel—but all "Western" in the international political context.
resulted in 200 officers and twenty thousand men of the A.N.C. receiving some retraining before the O.N.U.C. left the Congo.

The U.N. operation in the Congo had cost £140 million and 236 men from twenty-five countries who had died under the U.N. flag to preserve the cohesion and order of the new Congolese state. Since the end of Katanga's secession the force had been steadily reduced until on June 30th, 1964, only a contingent of 400 Nigerian police remained, though the Nigerian troops who had returned the previous year stated that the apparent stability could never last. (17) As the date for the O.N.U.C.'s departure drew nearer, speculation arose as to whether Adoula would request its continued presence. No request was forthcoming, but in June requests were made to Nigeria and Tunisia to 'station units in troubled regions' (18) though not to conduct military operations. In May, General Lundula had asked for U.N. assistance for Kivu, and the U.N. representative in Bukavu reported that the A.N.C. had collapsed. (19) But Adoula took no steps to ensure continued assistance and the U.N. forces departed from the Congo on 30th June, 1964.

In Madrid, Tshombe awaited his recall.

(18) Ibid.—p. 98.
MAP NO. 1 — THE REBEL-OCCUPIED REGIONS — AUGUST, 1964
CHAPTER 5

'Give me three months and I will give you a new Congo'
Moïse Tshombe

Tshombe's new leadership:

The rumblings from Katanga and Angola, and the complete loss of control by the Government in the war with the C.N.L. forced Kasavubu to terminate Adoula's premiership on 30th June, 1964. Tshombe had returned to the Congo on the 28th and on 9th July, Kasavubu asked him to form a government. On the following day, after he was sworn in, he uttered the words quoted above. His optimism seemed rather extravagant.

The immediate task was to regain the lost territory and Tshombe used two methods simultaneously: reconquest and reconciliation.

Jean Schramme and Jerry Puren had both led mercenaries and gendarmes in Katanga during its secession. Both followed Tshombe to Leopoldville and Tshombe called on them to organise a fighting force along their own lines. Schramme's influence lay with the Katangese whom he had sustained in Angola. The 15,000 ex-gendarmes were to be brought back into uniform. Puren, who had brought five pilots with him from the remains of 'Avikat', immediately recalled Major Mike Hoare from South Africa to organise a mercenary force. (1)

On the surface at least, Tshombe also made attempts to bring the rebels to the negotiating table. On 15th July, he released Gizenga who declared that he would work towards reconciliation. This was met by a statement from C.N.L. representatives in Peking that 'the road to freedom from the imperialist yoke is long'. (2) That day, the 15th, the C.N.L. forces took Kasongo in Maniema province and one of its leaders, the Lumumbist Soumialot, declared that Tshombe's government was 'illegal'. (3) It would appear that Soumialot's assessment of Tshombe from Peking was more influential than that of the C.N.L.'s Bimbwa, who met Tshombe in Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, on 27th July. Bimbwa was immediately discredited by Soumialot and this seemed to be the last genuine effort that Tshombe made to meet the C.N.L. He tried to raise regional support by visiting Stanleyville on 31st July but this city fell to the C.N.L.

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(3) The C.N.L. advance in Maniema convinced other Congolese leaders that the time for negotiations had passed. Munongo, Nenduka and Mobutu had always wanted a military victory and urged the strengthening of the A.N.C. with aid and manpower from outside.
on the 5th August. The rebels then held two-thirds of the Congo and decisive action was needed.

Major Hoare had dispatched two of his colleagues to Johannesburg and Salisbury to recruit mercenaries for a new, all-white unit which was to be under his command: 5 Commando. Advertisements calling for 'fit young men' appeared in the leading newspapers. Their salaries were to be £150 per month for a soldier, plus £5 per day extra if fighting and an additional £2 per day spent in an 'Insecurity Zone'. (4) The first thirty-eight South Africans arrived at Kamina on 22nd August to begin training. (5) In South Africa, Commandant-General Hiemstra was reported by the Guardian as saying that a plane-load of 'medical supplies' had been sent to the Congo. Four days later, Major Hoare and 22 mercenaries paddled up Lake Tanganyika to attack Albertville from the east. This marked the beginning of a mercenary build-up in the Congo. South African recruits were flown from Johannesburg without any immigration formalities such as visas or the need for passports.

**TO STANLEYVILLE**

*The Recruitment:*

The A.N.C. began to advance against the rebels with some purpose after Tshombe's accession. The offensive began in the south, and Kabongo and Baudouinville fell on the 8th August. Tshombe, and Adoula before him, had taken steps to enquire into the possibility of obtaining troops from O.A.U. member states but no serious offers were made. When Tshombe specifically asked Nigeria, Liberia, the Malagasy Republic, Senegal and Ethiopia on 20th August he was turned down. (6) Tshombe had repeatedly stated that a 'Foreign Legion' would not be formed and that he would rely on American material assistance and manpower from African States. He was, however, preparing to form his 'Foreign Legion' and these plans were allowed to go ahead.

Mercenaries were also needed urgently to officer the ex-gendarmerie units which were being formed. The Katangese had returned from Angola on 11th July with seven mercenaries and were soon to give trouble. Their loyalties lay with the old State of Katanga and many refused to fight outside that province. In this they were abetted by the old guard mercenaries who kept their Katangese epaulettes for battledress-wear. (7) The Katangese also demanded back-pay for the period they had spent in the bush and showed little inclination to fight. French-speak-

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(4) Johannesburg Star—27/11/64.
(6) West Africa, 22/8/64.
ing officers were needed and a Belgian, Wautier, had, in 1963, been given the task of recruiting mercenaries for the Angola camp. Belgian regular officers took over many commands.

Who were these mercenaries Tshombe had been recruiting for Angola for over six months before his return to power? There were many Belgians and Frenchmen, those who had remained to the end in 1963, and who had maintained their links with Puren, Wautier, Hoare and Schramme—'les Affreux'. They knew the country and the people; their task now was to forget the Katanga comic-opera war and face up to the new responsibility.

The Rhodesians and South Africans recruited for 5 Commando are well described by Major Hoare as he first saw them upon their arrival at Kamina:

'The general standard was alarmingly low. There was too high a proportion of alcoholics, drunks, booze artists, bums and layabouts, who were finding it difficult to find a job anywhere else and thought this a heaven-sent opportunity to make some easy money. In addition, I discovered ... that there were a fair sprinkling of dagga (marijuana) smokers and dope addicts.'

And throughout the existence of 5 Commando, 'homosexuals'.

Few had seen regular military service but most of the South Africans had done their National Service. The few veterans of regular soldiering, though mainly from the non-commissioned ranks, were given officer status and it was to this group that Hoare turned to establish discipline and spirit.

There were trouble makers too. These men of doubtful background, all thrown together in a situation where it appeared that they alone held the key to a nation's future, soon made their presence felt. Major Hoare was forced to quell a minor mutiny before his first sortie to Albertville; one mercenary found that he had no stomach for soldiering after he had donned his uniform for the first time; and the first arrivals at Leopoldville proceeded to beat up the bars and hotels. They complained about the absence of pay and the conditions at Kamina base but later became extremely effective from a military point of view, if somewhat flamboyant.

**THE RECONQUEST**

The 'Plan Vandewalle':

As the first mercenaries arrived at Kamina, two A.N.C. columns were advancing on Albertville. Hoare snatched the

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(8) Hoare—op. cit. p. 66.
(9) Ibid p. 48.
(11) A mercenary officer, ex-Coldstream Guards, was killed on the way to Stanleyville while conducting a counter-attack from his deckchair in the middle of the road.
MAP NO. 2 — THE MERCENARY RAID ON ALBERTVILLE
AUGUST, 1964
22 new soldiers who were prepared to come with him and sped with them to Lake Tanganyika. These men had received no training and hardly realised that they were under arms. This undue haste to commit the mercenaries to battle bears out to some extent the rumour that a military victory over a centre such as Albertville was worth enough to Tshombe for him to offer a reward to the victors.\(^{12}\)

The mercenaries’ first taste of battle came when they were attacked while resting south of Albertville. They drove off with ease a small force of rebels who attacked them, but when they reached their destination that night they were welcomed with machine-gun fire, which forced them to withdraw. They attacked again three nights later but were again forced to withdraw after an inconclusive skirmish. Two mercenaries died in this raid and this did little to dispel widespread scepticism over the value of mercenaries. A ‘Radio et Télévision Belgique’ report intimated that the mercenaries had come to kill ‘blacks’ in the Congo as this was prohibited at home.\(^{13}\) On the 26th September, 1964, the *Guardian* interviewed a mercenary in London who said that life had been a ‘bit dull during the past few months’. Whatever their motives, the mercenaries found that the Congo needed trained, disciplined and determined soldiering if the civil war was to be won.

The overall planning of the reconquest was the responsibility of the Belgian Military Mission to the Congo under Colonel F. Vandewalle, and a plan was devised to recapture Stanleyville and to ease the pressure on Leopoldville from the north. This was the ‘Plan Vandewalle’.

A mechanised column, Mechanised Brigade No. 5, was to be formed at Kabalo in northern Katanga to clear the road to Stanleyville and to retake that city. At the same time three other columns were to be flown to strategic areas of the Congo and to clear rebel-held territory along the main communication routes. Their ultimate goal was also Stanleyville.

5 Commando had been split into seven smaller Commandos of 40 to 50 men each. 5/1, under Lt. Wilson was flown to Coquilhatville in the north-west, and then further north to Gamena where a column consisting of the mercenaries and a Company of the A.N.C. was to clear the road east to Bumba. This column, under Major Genisse, reached Bumba at the end of October. 5/2 (Captain Mueller) also flew to Coquilhatville to join a column under Major Lemercier. 5/4 (Lt. Forsbrey) flew to the northern border of the Congo at Yakoma, to relieve beleaguered A.N.C. units. The rebels were driven off Yakoma but not before they had kidnapped Dr. Paul Carlson, who was later to be killed in Stanleyville. 5/4 then flew to

\(^{12}\) *Daily Telegraph*, 31/8/64.

Bikili to join 5/2. 5/3 (Lt. Maiden) flew eastwards to Bukavu which was besieged and there cleared the road south to Uvira and north to Mambasa. They were assisted in this by one company of the A.N.C. and were under the command of Colonel Decoster. 5/3 (Col. Decoster) established the A.N.C., under Col. Mulamba, securely in Bakavu, and cleared the road to Lake Tanganyika. They then moved north and took Butembo on 28th October. At this time 5/1 was withdrawn from Bumba to Kongolo, 5/4 was poised for Opala and 5/2 was to proceed to Paulis in the north-east (it had been flown to Bumba). Stanleyville was encircled from the north.

Lima I, the first unit of 5 Mechanised Brigade was forming up at Kongolo. This column consisted of 300 mercenaries and Belgian regulars, 300 A.N.C., specialist companies of engineers and a tribal unit raised locally from the Balemba. The mercenaries of 6 Commando were to do the bulk of the bridge-building. Lima II, the reinforcement for Lima I, consisted of an armoured unit, ten mercenaries and 350 Baluba tribesmen. They were to be flown to join the main column at Punia when this was taken. These columns had been supplied with equipment from the United States and commanded more than 150 trucks, armoured cars and jeeps. The whole column was supplied and screened by the Congolese air force with aircraft piloted by Belgians and C.I.A. Cubans. These Cubans can be considered as representatives of a highly specialised form of mercenary soldiering—pilots and intelligence agents.

The tactics used by the Stanleyville column were on a grander scale than those used by the columns which were advancing from the north but were otherwise very similar. The whole mode of the advance was surprise coupled with overwhelming firepower. The rebel units holding towns had little intelligence system and were only loosely controlled by the High Command.
of the A.P.L.\(^{18}\)

The column was made up as follows:

(a) The Mercenary Spearhead plus armour.

The objectives of this force were to force roadblocks and to do as much of the actual fighting as possible. When an obstacle such as a river was reached, the mercenaries patrolled in a screen whilst the engineers carried out their task. Often the rebels would allow this section to pass before ambushing the main force.

(b) The Congolese Troops:

These served the garrisons for the towns captured and were left in charge, either under white officers or with a small detachment of mercenaries. Even the smaller units in the north-east found they had sufficient men for this task though Lima I finally took three weeks to subdue Stanleyville because of the concentration of rebels in the area. In the mobile units, the A.N.C. elements were in charge of the mortars and the heavy machine guns.

The first priority for all columns was the airstrips along the route which were often boobytrapped. Supplies were brought in by air until the railways became operational. The obvious drawback of this type of warfare was that the resources of the column were too small to pacify the countryside BETWEEN the towns. This meant that until patrols could be undertaken from the towns, and the country cleared, communications between centres were both precarious and dangerous. The A.P.L. units were able to regroup and attack towns after the column had passed.\(^{19}\) The bush along the road was thick and, towards Stanleyville, heavily forested with tall trees. Pursuit was impossible, as was a conclusive victory. At times, when the attack was severe, the whole column would halt while the mercenaries attempted to encircle an ambush and destroy the attackers.

The A.N.C. had to provide new troops to reinforce the garrisons. To do this they recruited local tribesmen and further mercenaries. Full advantage was also taken of the Katangese who represented a fresh, vigorous addition to the A.N.C. They were well-officered and did not resent the presence of white officers as their military traditions pointed to a common cause with them. The Katangese never forgot their loyalty to their

\(^{18}\) The Armée Populaire de Libération, commanded by Col. Pakassa, was formed on 14/4/64 by E. Bocheley-Davidson but did not make up an integrated force. "Jeunesse" Companies, irregular units of tribesmen and A.N.C. deserters held towns with a mixture of intimidation, witchcraft and charisma. These proved no match for the A.N.C. as reconstituted by Tshombe until the final major battle for Fizi in 1964. Pakassa had disgraced the A.N.C. in 1962 by allowing his men to kill, and eat, thirteen Italian airmen of the U.N. Force at Kindu.

\(^{19}\) Manono had to be retaken, Paulis was not held after the Belgian paratroopers had left and had to be retaken by Column Genisse. Column Genisse took Niangara but this fell again and had to be retaken by House in 1965.
province and awaited the time when an independent Katanga would emerge again.

This war was one of Drive against Ambush.

The journey of the Stanleyville column began on 1st November, 1964, from Kabalo in north Katanga. The first major prize was Kindu and, in order to take it by surprise, the columns travelled along the railway line rather than follow the road and the rebel communications, via Kasongo. The first leg took them seven days. The main objective was to rescue the white hostages who were to be killed by order of General N. Olenga of the A.P.L. who was in Kindu at the time. Over 200 hostages and a further 48 priests from Kalima were freed. The mercenaries were used for all expeditions which took troops off the main line of advance. The speed and efficiency of this type of work bred a fine spirit of co-operation in the white units, for this was the sort of work that they preferred. It was less dangerous too. At Kindu, the mercenaries bore the brunt of the defence of the beach-head across the Lualaba River at Elila and this duty brought the highest casualties.

At 04.00 hrs. on the 24th November, Belgian paratroopers dropped on Stanleyville and by 0520 had reached the town. They were too late to save 22 hostages, including Dr. Carlson, but they did rescue over 3,000.

At 11.00 hours local time (two hours ahead of G.M.T.) Lima I and II arrived and began at once to pacify the city. The next day, Belgian paratroopers dropped on Paulis.

The Stanleyville operation caused a wave of international protest against the action of Belgium and the United States. On 10th December in New York, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers passed a resolution by a vote of 20 to 0 (10 abstentions) calling on the U.N. Security Council to condemn the military intervention and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign mercenaries. On 30th December, the Security Council adopted a resolution which embodied these requests.

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(20) Hoare—op. cit. p. 96.
(21) G.M.T.
(23) For the text—See Appendix.
MAP NO. 4 — CLEARING THE STANLEYVILLE AREA
CHAPTER 6

"...if you can imagine a Jew in a fight for power in Israel recruiting ex-Nazis to help him you can imagine our feelings."

Julius Nyerere.

The Consolidation

The fight for Stanleyville took three weeks but the mercenaries of 5 Commando, who were not French-speaking were not to play a major part. They were given one section of the town to clear in conjunction with the A.N.C. but the greater part of the Commando was employed in clearing the left bank of the river, rescuing hostages, and doing what open fighting had to be done. Their contracts were coming to an end and the Government wished to keep the mercenaries fully employed until that time. Point was given to this by the fact that the mercenaries of 5 Commando were proving unmanageable in Stanleyville and had begun to loot. Another white Commando, 6 Commando, had been formed in August with mercenaries originally recruited in France, Belgium and Italy for 5 Commando. These were initially under the command of a regular Belgian officer, Col. Lamouline. The Commando was to work in close co-operation with the A.N.C. and in particular with Katangese units. They bore a large responsibility for pacifying Stanleyville and were able to work in close liaison with the Belgian High Command.

After Stanleyville had been subdued many mercenaries from 6 Commando were sent out to stiffen A.N.C. garrisons and, because of this fragmentation, the unit never earned a reputation as an efficient fighting force equal to that of the 5 Commando. Their discipline and loyalty to the Congolese Government was also to prove to be not of the highest order.

5 Commando mounted three successful operations during December, 1964. The first of these was to reopen the Congo River downstream as far west as Isangi and to rescue hostages there. The second was to relieve 5/4 which had not moved from Opala, south-west of Stanleyville, for more than a month and had failed to cross the Lomani River to advance to Stanleyville. This was the first set-back since the abortive Albertville episode in August. It was a wasteful enterprise as no advantage was gained over the rebels. The final act of reconquest by 5 Commando in 1964 was throwing a loose chain around a large area to the north-east of Stanleyville. This was achieved by the 23rd December and a number of hostages were freed. As was later proved, this area to the south of Paulis and

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(1) Hoare—op. cit. p. 137.
(2) See below Chapter 8.
including the towns of Banalia, Panga, Bafwangbe and Bafwas-
sende was to be a major source of rebel activity for the whole
of the next year. The Column of the West, under Col. Maliere,
had advanced across the northern Congo as far as Paulis and
fresh units of 5 Commando replaced the garrison there and took
Wamba on 31st December. When this stage was reached the
A.N.C. and its special forces were extended to their maximum
and needed a period to consolidate and re-equip. Local oper-
ations were undertaken but the only major undertakings were the
attempts to recapture Basoko and to open the Congo River, and
an abortive raid on Niangara in the north-east in which 6
Commando suffered heavily. The object of this raid was to
close the Sudan border to the rebels but frontal attacks were
the wrong tactics.

The High Command later decided to attack along the eastern
border from Bunia.(3) New mercenaries were needed to replace
those in 5 Commando who had ended their contracts and who
did not stay on, and so a new recruiting office was opened in Cape
Town by Captain I. Gordon.(4) New recruits were not easy to
come by(5) and the Commando needed 300 to bring it up to
full strength. New troubles were also creating disorder in the
ranks of the mercenaries which took two months to iron out.
On the 13th February, 5 Commando went on strike.(6) The
strikers were joined by South African pilots of 21st Squadron.(7)
The main grievance was that they had not been paid and thirty
mercenaries left in disgust, reducing the complement to 115 men.
This unit had fought very hard. Units of the Commando had
cleared the east as far as Bunia, the Tshuapa River and the
north-eastern Congo, as far as Paulis, where a strong point had
been established, but all the towns en route had been retaken
by the A.P.L. Three small commandos had cleared the route
to Stanleyville and done all the actual fighting of the campaign.

In January, 1965, when there was time to take stock, it ap-
peared to the officers that all the equipment that the U.S. was
pouring in to aid Tshombe’s Government was going to the
A.N.C., who did not do the fighting. 5 Commando was short
of jeeps, scout cars, petrol and rations.(9) Some Katangese units
found themselves in a similar position and sided with the
mercenaries. A contributory factor was that the Niangara raid
had not succeeded. Also the Commando was kept stationary
at Paulis. Major Hoare had returned to Leopoldville in Decem-
ber and here he and 5 Commando had been publicly snubbed
by Tshombe.<(10) Following this incident, Hoare had returned to

(3) See below Chapter 7.
(8) Armée Populaire de Libération—The military wing of the C.N.L.
(9) Congo 1965—op. cit. p. 50 and Daily Telegraph, 18/1/65.
(10) He had mentioned the great victories of the A.N.C. but had made no reference
to 5 Commando.
Durban and rumours were rife that he had resigned.\(^{(11)}\) His return to the Congo and his promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel did much to smooth over the troubles.

The employment of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries had caused vicious attacks on the Tshombe Government, especially by African states. They saw the employment of mercenaries as a threat to the pride of the new states, and as a renewal of neocolonialist tendencies in the Congo, which had still not freed itself of Belgian influence. The U.A.R.\(^{(12)}\), Algeria, the Sudan and Uganda decided to give direct aid to the C.N.L. which they saw as the rightful heir to Patrice Lumumba and this led to pressure on Tshombe by the U.S. which foresaw a second Vietnam situation developing in the Congo. General Mobutu also saw the English-speaking mercenaries, Tshombe's 'Pretorian Guard', as a threat to his own position and had tried to counter this by establishing 6 Commando.\(^{(13)}\) Mobutu had the Stanleyville periodical \textit{L'Action} banned in February for daring to mention 'mercenaries' instead of the A.N.C. This was a sensitive issue on both sides.

The rebels were also experiencing troubles in their own camp. Hostility between the two wings of the C.N.L.\(^{(14)}\) seemed to be aggravated rather than submerged by the defeats. In January, Agence France Presse reported that the C.N.L. (Gbenye) were causing trouble in Tanzania\(^{(15)}\) where they were based. Soumia-lot's troops had not been paid and he was shot and wounded by a dissatisfied supporter. The Gbenyists and the Gizengists\(^{(16)}\) had been decisively beaten by the A.N.C. in November and both were smarting from this wound and blaming the other for their misfortunes. Both factions were to be effectively crushed, at least inside the Congo, in the ensuing months of 1965. The Mulelist rebellion in Kwilu had been cut off from outside support and supplies were petering out. Mulele had a price of Fr. 1 million\(^{(17)}\) on his head.

The aid given to the rebellion by other states was not enough to sustain it against the attacks by the mercenaries and the political power of Tshombe within the Congo but it was, nevertheless, considerable. The mercenaries defeated in the Niangara raid reported that the resistance was well-disciplined and deployment well planned.\(^{(18)}\) In January, the \textit{Rhodesia Herald} reported that over 3,000 rebels were in training in the U.A.R. and that

\(^{(13)}\) Congo 1964—\textit{op. cit.} p. 366.
\(^{(15)}\) Agence France Presse. 29/1/65.
\(^{(16)}\) Rival factions of the original MNC (Lumumba) which attempted to present a common front to the outside world with the evacuation of Stanleyville. Thereafter distinct areas of influence emerged within the Congo and this divided approach was disastrous to their military effort against the Tshombe regime.
a 21-day course in guerrilla fighting was being given. Aleksandr Shelipin, a former Security Chief of the U.S.S.R. was reputed to be assisting with this programme in Cairo. In Algeria, the Latin American guerrilla warfare expert, Major 'Che' Guevara, was said to be training rebels, as was the Chinese General Kin-Mai in Burundi, and other Chinese in two rebel camps in Congo-Brazzaville. The Niangara episode and the later attack on Fizi bore out these reports as the whole nature of rebel opposition changed radically to one of steady resistance. Training, leadership and supplies improved to the extent that frontal attacks by the A.N.C. could be met with equal force.

But after the mercenary operations along the northern borders, outside support diminished considerably. The new Algerian Government of Col. Boumedienne, which came to power on 19th June, 1965, cut back on active support. The Sudanese Government discovered that arms destined for the Congo were finding their way to the Sudan's own rebels and the Government was glad of the excuse to stop military aid in August.

In January, 1965, the remaining concentrations of rebels were in:
(a) Central Kivu—Baraka/Fizi area;
(b) small concentrations around Kindu;
(c) the triangle bounded by Paulis in the north, Bafwassende and Panga;
(d) the whole border region north of Bunia and stretching to Bondo in the west of Ulele province;
(e) the Kikwit, Gundu, Idiofa triangle, Kwilu;
(f) stretches of the Congo River and areas north of Stanleyville;
Plantations in many of these areas had taken to employing mercenaries of their own for defence against the rebels.

The A.N.C. and 6 Commando were capable of containing the rebels in all sectors, but were not strong enough to mount a major offensive. Internal political tensions were beginning to rise as a three-way power struggle was developing between Kasavubu, Mobutu and Tshombe. In order to minimise the effects of this on the military situation, 5 Commando had to mount two major offensives to eliminate the rebels before the end of the year. These were:
(a) a sweep north from Bunia to close the Ugandan and Sudanese borders and to confine the rebels within a sealed pocket; and
(b) the capture of eastern Maniema province and those sectors of north Katanga which were still held by the rebels, based on Fizi.

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(19) Rhodesia Herald, 19/1/65.
(20) Sunday Chronicle, 3/1/65.
(21) Star, 7/8/64.
(22) Congo 1964—op. cit. p. 446.
(23) Agence France Presse—21/8/65.
(24) Rhodesia Herald, 15/6/65.
MAP NO. 5 - 5 COMMANDO'S ROUTE TO THE NORTH-EAST
CHAPTER 7

‘What are a thousand foreign volunteers in an army of 31,500 soldiers?’

General Joseph Mobutu.

The Final Offensives:

Col. Hoare began the attack on the north-eastern borders on 15th March. His force comprised two so-called “battalions”, one of 300 mercenaries of 5 Commando and the other of 600 Katangese which included 10 Commando, a Katangese unit commanded by Major Tavernier of the mercenaries. Nearly two hundred of these were new recruits who had been trained at Kamina base, but with a hard core of veterans to officer them.

The rebels in the area south of Paulis were supplied through Uganda and, between the departure of Column Marlier and the build-up prior to the reconquest of the frontier region, the A.P.L. had built up considerable strength in the area. The Port of Mahagi had been abandoned by the A.N.C. and this was the first objective of Hoare’s Column.

The whole advance, from Bunia and Niangara and the complete closure of the borders took less than three weeks, and the first three hundred miles as far as Faradje and Watsa took only 13 days.(1) 5 Commando did this unassisted but they should have been reinforced by 6 Commando which was stationed at Paulis. This help did not materialise and, as mercenaries and Katangese were left at each town to revive the administration, the force became very scattered. When the column reached Niangara, patrols were sent to sweep the border area and there was an instance when a column under Commandant J. Peters crossed the Sudanese border. They pursued the rebels for eight miles and finally burnt their camp to the ground. So-called ‘mercenaries’ from Uganda, which were units of Uganda’s regular army, had crossed the border to assist the rebels in their attack on Mahagi in February. Thirty Ugandans in green uniforms were reported to have participated in the action. Their leader was said to be a Major Lolgoya.(2) At Dramba, on 29th March, in addition to a complete field hospital entirely equipped with Russian stores, 5 Commando found ‘rooms full of ammunition, lately the property of the “Uganda National Army, Box 20, Entebbe”’.(3)

While this operation was reaching its successful conclusion,

(2) Agence France Presse. 20/2/65.
(3) Hoare—op. cit. p. 201 and The Star, 30/3’66 for a full description of arms.
the task of containing the rebel pocket in South Kivu and estimating its strength was begun. One whole contingent of mercenaries maintained the Congolese 'Navy' on the lakes and a constant watch was kept for gun running from Kigoma in Tanzania. At the beginning of March there was fierce fighting in the Kasanga region(4) and although the A.N.C. held posts at Lulimba, Kangolo and Uvira, the military presence was precarious. Between four hundred to six hundred mercenaries were deployed with the A.N.C. in the Bukavu-Uvira area which was attacked repeatedly by rebels, as were the power installations at Bendera in north Katanga. The mercenaries used in these operations were men of 6 Commando who stiffened the mercenaries specially recruited to defend the S.U.C.R.A.F.(5) installations in South Kivu. One contingent of the latter were to win wide recognition for their defence of Uvira—the Codoki(6) Commando.

The rebels mounted attacks to the north (Uvira and Ruzizi Valley) and south (Bendera) for two months and held the A.N.C. on the defensive. The attacks were well-disciplined and the arms used were of modern design. The operations on the lake, which were stepped up after 4th May with the arrival of six armed motor launches from America, were, however, sapping rebel energy and by the end of May they were confined to the Uvira, Fizi, Kasanga triangle.(7) Their forces were estimated by the A.N.C. to comprise six 'battalions' of 350—400 men, each of which operated independently.

The mercenaries and A.N.C. units, while not gaining any decisive victories, contrived to keep the main lines of communication open and it was decided to continue with the sweep across the northern frontier.

This operation was to be a joint action by 6 and 5 Commandos and when the Sudan border was stabilised by the middle of May the two Commandos prepared to drive westwards. 6 Commando was plagued with troubles which stemmed mainly from the irregularity of pay and the mixed nationalities which made up the Commando. Major Denard had arrived from Europe to take over command at the beginning of March(8) but the Commando at Paulis was in such disarray that it was in no position to move. The rebel concentration south of Paulis also presented a problem to communications with Stanleyville.

Operation 'Violettes Imperiales' began on 29th May from Niangara, which had become the advanced headquarters of 5 Commando. The object of the sweep was to rescue the remaining hostages in the north, open the roads to normal traffic, and

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(5) The sugar refining company.
(6) Commandos du Kivu.
(8) Congo 1965—op. cit. p. 49.
to surround the rebels in this region. On the first day, 5 Commando covered 160 miles to Bambesa. The column travelled at high speed and took rebel units by surprise at every town. Two missionaries were rescued at Bili on the last day of May but the column arrived too late at Bondo the following day. Thirty hostages were taken from the town by the retreating rebels.\(^{(9)}\)

On the same day, 6 Commando left Paulis for Buta. This Commando had not been very active and had spent much of its time in training replacements and mounting small patrols. The men were not used to the type of warfare developed by Col. Hoare and their column moved hesitantly. They soon ran into trouble at Poto where they met fairly strong resistance and their column was halted for over a day. 5 Commando arrived at Likati on 2nd June to find nine whites dead or dying. On 3rd June they reached Buta to find that 6 Commando were still half a day’s drive away. 5 Commando had covered more than twice the distance and experienced less than half the losses of 6 Commando. The value of Hoare’s tactics and the spirit which his training methods developed were by now apparent and the efficiency of his closely-knit unit was never equalled in the Congo.

5 Commando left a small contingent under Lt. Maiden in Buta and proceeded to Stanleyville. 6 Commando and this unit had the responsibility of clearing the bush with patrols and maintaining the communication links, the chief of these being the railroad from Paulis to Aketi. But Bondo was retaken by rebels once all the mercenaries had passed. The rebels still controlled the countryside and employed roadblocks on the roads. The glory was over and the hard work began. Col. Hoare, meanwhile, had arrived in Leopoldville, where General Mobutu and Tshombe persuaded him to undertake one final operation—the capture of Fizi.

**The Mercenaries—1965**

July 1965 marked the end of the second contractual period of the mercenaries of 5 Commando. In their year of duty 32 South Africans and Rhodesians had died\(^{(10)}\) and twice that number had been wounded.

The Commando had achieved a reputation as a first-rate fighting force and had adapted itself to any conditions that were offered. Its members were ruthless in combat and took few prisoners. Their object was to win their battles and earn their pay but there were few questions asked about their methods. Even when not fighting, the mercenaries proved impossible to tame. The recruits terrorised Leopoldville\(^{(11)}\) and they considered the

\(^{(9)}\) Hoare—op. cit. p. 231.
\(^{(10)}\) Die Vaderland, 18/5/65.
\(^{(11)}\) The Star, 18/3/65.
Congo fair game for any exploit. One mercenary boasts that he killed an unpopular officer and was acclaimed by his fellows. In December 1964, Radio South Africa broadcast that the war around Stanleyville was so hideous that some of the South African mercenaries have opted out of the armed forces. They were appalled at the number of children who were trained as rebels. A London newspaper reporting this commented: 'It is doubtful whether the mere fact that children gave information to the rebels horrified certain South African mercenaries so as to make them desert; the horror must have come... from what was done by the mercenary-led army to children suspected of carrying information to the enemy...'

When the mercenaries were off duty, the bars and clubs proved the main attraction. Outside the main bases of Kamina, Stanleyville and Bukavu, the men had to make their own entertainment and lack of excitement drove them to seek ways to better their lot, especially in remote regions. The mercenaries were often judge, doctor and, sometimes, schoolmaster in the villages they protected and this unlimited power often went to their heads.

In August, news reached Johannesburg that photographs had been printed in British newspapers exposing atrocities committed by mercenaries.

The French-speaking mercenaries were recruited mainly in Belgium from Liege, Namur and Charleroi. This action was illegal under Belgian law but the Congolese Embassy in Brussels appears to have carried on with impunity. Later Spanish mercenaries were recruited in large numbers. Two or three flights a week left Paris or Zaventem for the Congo. At the beginning of March the complement of 6 Commando stood at 287 men but this number was increased steadily. The war had to be maintained.

**Fizi-Baraka**

'The Fizi-Baraka pocket of rebel resistance covered an area twice the size of Wales. It stretched from Uvira at the top of Lake Tanganyika, south along the coast for one hundred and fifty miles to Kabimba, which was thirty miles north of Albertville, and inland to Kasanga on the Lualaba.'

The attack on Fizi was made by three main forces. One

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(12) 5 Commando was accused of looting gold from the mines in the Watsa region (The Star, 2/3/65). Men escorting Commandant Peters were involved in a shooting incident in Paulis where a Congolese officer was killed (Hoare—p. 223-224). The currency exchange market proved so attractive that all mercenaries were searched for illicit money on arrival at Leopoldville. (The Star, 18/1/65). A Captain Hodges managed to take $65,000 out of the Congo (Sunday Times, 14/3/65).

(13) Observer, 6/12/64.

(14) Observer, 6/12/64.

(15) Observer, 6/12/64.

(16) Rand Daily Mail, 30/8/65.


(18) Hoare op. cit. p. 239.
MAP NO. 8 — THE FIZI-BARAKA OPERATION
section of mercenaries attacked Baraka from the lake, another, led by Major Wicks, from the south-west via Bendera and Lulimba; the A.N.C. attacked from the west — under the direction of Lt.-Col. Hardenne, a regular officer in the Belgian army—and this force linked up with Wicks’ unit; the third struck southwards from Uvira and comprised ‘Force Cobra’, a unit of the A.N.C., and mercenaries of the ‘Codoki’ Commando. The attack began on 27th September.

The mercenaries landed at Baraka and were pinned down for 10 days awaiting reinforcements. They took another week to clear Baraka completely. On the 10th October, 5 Commando took Fizi and the rebels withdrew to the hills. On the 13th, the A.N.C. and 5 Commando joined up at Lulimba.

The resistance which met the mercenaries was completely different from any encountered before. A standing battle had not been fought since the Niangara raid(19) earlier in the year, but the probes made by mercenaries and the A.N.C. were met with continued attacks in the Fizi area. The strength of the rebels was not underestimated, and more than 3,000 men of the A.N.C. and 350 mercenaries were used in this operation.

The rebels held out initially with the tenacity that could be expected from regular army units and it was found after the capture of Fizi that Cuban advisers had been leading them at the time. Hoare reports that, towards the end of the battle of Baraka, the rebels suddenly reverted to their former habit of mass attacks.(20) This indicated to him that the Cubans had withdrawn and that the rebels were on their own. 5 Commando suffered 11 casualties at Baraka which was exceptionally high, but, once this town fell, the remainder of the attack went more quickly and at lower cost. The capture of the towns did not mean however, that the battle for the Fizi area was over. The rebels still continued to attack in the Ruzizi valley and Fizi. Lake Tanganyika had been closed, at least temporarily, as a source of supply by the capture of the ports of Baraka, Kasisia, Yungu and Kayumbwe, and Tanzania was becoming less inclined to risk incidents caused by gun-running from Kigoma. Units of 5 Commando were stationed in this area until the unit was disbanded in April, 1967.

The Political Background

Meanwhile, efforts to reconcile the Congolese Government and the C.N.L. had been made by the O.A.U.. An ad hoc committee had been set up under the chairmanship of President Kenyatta of Kenya, but, although the Congolese Government did co-

(19) Here units of 6 Commando, under Major Mueller, were severely mauled by determined rebel forces between Bafwassende and Paulis. Casualties were so heavy that the whole Niangara offensive had to be called off. Of the 32 mercenaries in one unit, only 12 arrived at Paulis unscarred.

(20) Hoare—op. cit. p. 264.
operate to some extent\(^{(21)}\), the proceedings ultimately reached an impasse.

In the Congo itself, an old source of tension re-emerged. Tshombe had established a firm power base in the Conaco Party which was founded on 13th February, 1965, by 49 small groups. This made him a natural contender for the Presidential elections which were to be held in 1966. While the military operations were going on, co-operation was maintained between Kasavubu and Tshombe. But, as the end of the last major armed struggle appeared in sight in August, their rivalry came out into the open.

Kasavubu had said in July: 'the mercenaries will only be expelled when the O.A.U. States stop aiding the rebels',\(^{(22)}\) and begin to aid the Congo Government. This gave Tshombe the authority to continue recruiting. On 12th October, Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe as Premier, despite his majority in the newly convened Parliament. On the 22nd October, opening the O.A.U. meeting at Accra, Kasavubu said his Government was seeking a 'definitive' solution to the 'mercenary problem'.\(^{(23)}\)

This statement caused unrest amongst the mercenaries who saw their departure as imminent. Their presence was still vital and General Mobutu needed their confidence and determination to remain. On the 28th October, Mobutu made a statement to the press; he said that President Kasavubu's declaration involved only those mercenaries who had not been engaged by the Congo-lese Government; all those not so employed would have to leave. This involved Puren, who had taken the first steps to recruit mercenaries in 1964, and had been employed directly by Tshombe. Mobutu also refuted rumours that Katangese gendarmes had refused to fight after Tshombe's dismissal. 'These soldiers do not fight for one man but for the Congo',\(^{(24)}\) he said.

On 25th November, after Kasavubu's Prime Minister designate, Evariste Kimba, had failed to obtain a vote of confidence in Parliament, Lt. General Mobutu took over the Presidency in a bloodless coup d'état. President Mobutu named Colonel L. Mulamba as Prime Minister, but retained the Defence portfolio for himself. On 2nd December, President Mobutu declared: 'Never shall I negotiate with those criminals Soumialot, Gbenye and the other leaders of the rebellion'.\(^{(25)}\)

On 9th December, at the end of his contract, Col. Mike Hoare retired from the Congo. 5 Commando was placed under the command of Major J. Peters, who had been reinstated before the Fizi operation.\(^{(26)}\)

\(^{(22)}\) Agence France Presse—16/7/65.
\(^{(24)}\) Congo 1965—op. cit. p. 404.
\(^{(26)}\) Maj. Peters had left the Congo from Paulis in April and men of his command who were escorting him shot and killed a Congolese officer. Peters' role in this affair is not known but he had been asked by Hoare not to return to the Congo.
The end of the year

The Mobutu coup and the Fizi action ended the six years of world interest in the Congo. The rebellion was officially closed, as far as the Central Government was concerned, and as all the major actions were over, the remaining operations of the military lost their news value. The Mulamba Government was a coalition, and, because every province was represented, the political emphasis shifted away from the parties. The first steps of the new regime were directed towards stamping out corruption and re-establishing the economy and so technicians, mercenaries and white minorities moved out of the spotlight. Action against the rebellion did not slacken, however.

In November, 1965, the rebels were still very active in the following areas:
(a) the Fizi—Uvira region, extending almost to Bukavu in the north;
(b) the area around the railway line in Ulele province, from Akele to Paulis;
(c) large areas around Stanleyville, and
(d) a small area held by Mulelists around Gungu and Idiofa.

The Fizi region posed the main opposition and 5 Commando continued to patrol the area. The rebels were well armed with automatic weapons, mortars and anti-tank weapons and they were able to receive some aid from Tanzania. In the Ruzizi valley the rebels attacked repeatedly and blew up the major bridges at Kamaniola and Luvungi on the 22nd and 29th November. The Uvira-Kiliba road (to Bukavu) was cut and convoys were the only safe means of travel. The rebels held the strategic advantage in the mountainous wooded country. In this sector, the rebel zones were known but could not be eliminated as the resources were not available.

The rebels used three boats capable of transporting 200 men each, and in addition, had three very fast motor launches which were armed with machine guns. Mercenaries were employed on the lake to command Congolese boats. On 22nd November a joint land-sea operation sank four rebel boats on the Lake off Kabimba.

In the north the position was the reverse. The rebels spread over a wide area and employed ambushes to great advantage. The borders between Uganda and the Congo were reopened on the 1st November, 1965 and arms began to trickle in again. In Stanleyville, rebels, disguised as Katangese soldiers terrorised the A.N.C. for a short period. Whereas the attacks mounted in the Fizi sector employed over 1,000 rebels, those in the north were made by small groups.

(28) Inbel, 24/12/65—Congo 1965—op. cit. p. 57.
On the 24th November the Catholic agency ‘Dia’, reported that the whole region south of Kasongo had been occupied by rebels from Sola. The rebel base was at Namoya and was the hub of a fortress area. Concerted efforts by 5 Commando, the Codoki Commando and units operating on the lake reduced the force of the rebellion in this region by the end of December. At the end of the year it was reported that the rebels had lost heart and were deserting in large numbers, but the rebellion in the Fizi area was to maintain its intensity for most of 1966, and has still not been completely crushed.

During 1965, the A.N.C. cost the Congolese Government Fr. 10,265 Million, and, of this figure, Fr. 4,000 million were spent on foreign advisers and mercenaries. The Congolese troops were paid Fr. 2,153 million. The A.N.C. reached a maximum figure of 30,700 men but the mercenaries never exceeded 1,000. Of this number, the French-speaking 6 Commando accounted for a maximum of 550, which was 250 below the figure required by the Government. At the end of 1965, Spanish mercenaries were introduced and recruitment from Spain was boosted during the ensuing year. Mobutu, and Kasavubu before him, had never accepted the role played by South African and Rhodesian mercenaries and so 1966 saw the replacement of many of the men recruited by Tshombe. Neither Col. Hoare nor Major Wicks renewed their contracts with the Mulamba Government. But Mobutu was not able to dispense with the services of 5 Commando as a unit. This Commando had been disciplined along British army lines by Col. Hoare and was the only really strong force in the Congo. In order to minimise its status, however, Mobutu continued to relegate the Commando to obscurity.

(30) 6 Commando was divided into small units, each of which worked with a Congolese battalion. In November 6 Commando garrisoned 26 posts. The Codoki Commando was based on Bukavu.
CHAPTER 8

'There have been adventurers and bandits amongst the foreigners, but these have been expelled or dealt with. You should see the order that they are in now . . . when the Congo no longer needs them they will leave with the honours due to them.'

Joseph Mobutu.

The Mutinies of 1966 and 1967—a contrast in behaviour

1966 presented a respite during which President Mobutu and his military Government sought to put the Congo's house in order. The back of the rebellion had been broken and Antoine Gizenga, chief of the M.N.C.—(L)(1), had been absorbed into the Government as a senator for Kwilu. Tshombe had left the Congo in December for 'health reasons'.

The A.N.C. continued its activities in the troubled zones. The rebels had learned from the Fizi affair that the Central Government was capable of defeating them, whatever strength they offered. They thus employed worrying tactics—ambushes and raids—which kept up their morale and never allowed the A.N.C. to relax. In March, over 1,000 rebels attacked a plantation, but were ousted by mercenaries and the A.N.C. This was the last large attack. Mercenaries continued to be recruited(2) to stiffen the A.N.C. and to protect plantations and installations. The number of French-speaking, or, rather, non-South African, Rhodesian or English-speaking mercenaries, increased to nearly three times its 1965 maximum, but 5 Commando continued to be responsible for the Fizi area. The mercenaries' tactics were to intimidate a region completely. Patrols were still confined mainly to the roads, and villages were searched and burned in an effort to extract information from the terrified population. The A.N.C. offered protection to the villagers in hastily built camps near the major centres where they could be watched and concentrated. Little advantage was taken of this offer despite the threat of continued interference by the A.P.L.

Rumours of foreign cadres being employed by the rebels began to circulate and rewards were offered for the capture of these cadres. These were as high as $15,000 for a Cuban and Fr. 1 million for a Chinese.

By May, the situation had quietened down and it was thought that the A.N.C. and the rebels had grown tired of the war and

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(1) Movement Nationale Congolaise—Lumumba, the party which formed the first Congolese Government in 1960 and, in 1965, was one of the many movements which claimed to be the rightful heir to Lumumba's position.

(2) Star—24/1/66—48 left Johannesburg for the Congo.
were not engaging each other. If this is true, then it must be remembered that the A.N.C. was mercenary-led and that most of the glamour of serving in the Congo had gone. Some of the mercenaries had been in there for two years and had settled down into a routine existence. There was, therefore, little point in upsetting a pleasant situation.

At this stage there were over 1,500 mercenaries in service. These consisted of more than 1,000 Belgians and Germans, 200 Spanish and the three hundred South Africans of 5 Commando. In addition there were nearly 400 Belgian technicians and 400 officers and N.C.O.'s seconded to the Congolese army, under the military assistance programme. This programme was headed by two Belgian Colonels, Desperange and Halewyin.

5 Commando did not seem to fit the general pattern of mercenary soldiering, but one can presume that the area in which it was stationed determined to some extent the role it had to play. In May, 5 Commando, flanked by two A.N.C. Commandos, each with a mercenary unit attached to it, began yet another swoop through the Uvira-Bukavu area. Ten mercenaries were killed in this action and this severe toll convinced the High Command that the rebels were still receiving outside leadership and training.

By contrast, 6 Commando was scattered all over the north and east of the country. There were 100 Spanish mercenaries patrolling the Central African Republic border whilst the French and Belgians were based around Stanleyville in the areas where there were few roads and the rebels had degenerated to banditry. The C.I.A.-recruited Cuban pilots of the Congolese air force were still supporting and supplying the army despite the trickle of trained Congolese pilots who began to return from European countries.

When Mobutu had taken up the reins of power in November, 1965, he had made a great show of his determination to stamp out all the corrupt and inefficient practices of his predecessors. His regime, however, was as fraught with difficulties as was Tshombe's, whatever his intentions may have been. The A.N.C. was implicated in the drum-head trial of Evariste Kimba at the end of May and the fact that there was dissent in a caste which wielded the ultimate power, a group who had shown unfailing loyalty to the President even when he had chosen to reduce the

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3) *The Star*, 19/5/66. There had been only 600 mercenaries at the end of 1965, which shows the marked increase (Star, 14/10/65). This increase was disguised by a marked drop in publicity which the mercenaries were accorded. If one takes these two factors together, it would appear that the rebellion was far from over.


5) Evariste Kimba and three other ministers were tried in Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) on 30th May, 1966 for high treason and were found guilty on the following day. Kimba pleaded that he was merely carrying out the wishes of certain army officers and at least ten officers vanished shortly after Kimba's execution. Kimba, incidentally, died with the secret of the missing £7 million, which had vanished from the Katangese treasury at the end of secession.
power of Prime Minister Mulamba, indicated that conditions were not all that they seemed. Much was done to placate outside interest, but at home even the A.N.C. were not receiving any additional benefits from Mobutu's 'enlightened' rule.

The Katangese of the A.N.C. did not benefit from the same treatment as the 'Congolese' units as they were often discriminated against. Mobutu still considered the exiled Tshombe a threat and these troops could quite conceivably be the vehicle on which he could return to power. As a consequence, the Katangese and, therefore, their mercenary leadership, bore the brunt of the military operations and were not favoured with facilities, such as regular pay, which were the lot of the 'Congolese' troops.

Discontent in the army itself only added to the lowering of morale in those mercenary units who had little military responsibility of any magnitude. Irksome duties for some and lack of action for others caused indiscipline. In June, a mercenary was charged with blasting his way into a bank with a bazooka and stealing £100,000. In June, President Mobutu began verbal attacks on Belgium, and whites, especially in Katanga, became uneasy.

5 Commando was maintained at its peak level. Regular influxes of mercenaries from South Africa replaced 'wastage' and those whose contracts had expired. More than 100 arrived in June. This Commando had covered 100 miles since May and had virtually cleared the Lake Tanganyka area of rebel activity. Their tactics were to drive a small convoy of mercenaries along contested roads and invite attack. A reserve column of mercenaries and A.N.C. was within range to relieve them once the rebels had exposed themselves. The Commando's strategic position was to have great significance in July.

The Mutiny

On 21st July, the Katangese units of the A.N.C. at Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) mutinied against the Congolese Government. Various reasons are given for this action but basically, it was because of neglect. They had not been paid for three months, while the Congolese troops had been paid, and they had been stationed far from their home province.

1,000 Katangese had mutinied and they had been assisted by at least 100 Spanish, French and Belgian mercenaries. They had quickly taken over the city and had forced the A.N.C.

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(8) The Johannesburg recruiting office was being run by Lt. Sheriff.
(9) The chief reason given by the A.N.C. was that it was an attempted coup to return Tshombe to power. Others maintained that it was nationalistic and that they were distressed at the nationalisation moves of Mobutu towards the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga complex in Katanga. The 'Tshombe plot' was not new and the Katangese had always feared that they might be disarmed.

Observer, 2/8/66.
onto the left bank. They took over the airport, post office and radio station and dug in to wait for other Katangese troops to join them from the north-east. Under orders from their commanding officer, Colonel Tshipola, they killed the Congolese High Command in Kisangani—Colonel Tshatstin and ten officers. Also killed was the mercenary commandant Wautier.(10)

For some time it was not clear whether the entire mercenary force in the north had mutinied as well and, more important, whether mercenary units stationed elsewhere in the Congo would follow suit. Mobutu, fearing another coup in Katanga, rushed troops to Lumbumbashi (formerly Elisabethville) from Kasai and mobilised his reserves around Kinshasa, including the 'model battalions' trained by the Belgians for duty in the north.

As it transpired, the Belgian mercenaries, 6 Commando under Major Denard remained loyal to the Government but it took some time to gather them in from their far-flung garrisons. As the Katangese and mercenaries began to withdraw from their posts, the 'Simbas' began to emerge from the bush and terrorise the northern districts.(11)

Katanga had been placed under Martial Law but when Colonel John Peters, commanding officer of 5 Commando, had refused a £15,000 bribe to join the revolt, tensions in the south lessened somewhat.

The A.N.C. was in general disorder. The 'model battalions' had failed dismally to re-occupy Kisangani, as their Belgian officers and instructors refused to enter operational zones. The report that mercenaries were leading the revolt caused widespread panic along the road to Katanga from Kisangani and the garrison at Kindu fled in panic when it was rumoured that the mutineers were going to march to Katanga.

No sooner had the mutiny consolidated itself in Kisangani, than the 'Tshombe plot' began to renew itself.(12) Thirty mercenaries were arrested near Chandolas, in France. Recruiting was done by a Paris firm called 'American World Travels' and a Colonel de Bonnay was planning a parachute drop of 100 mercenaries of Tshombe's private army on Albertville.(13) Rates of pay offered to these mercenaries were to be £140 per month in France, £350 in action. A life insurance policy of £30,000 was to have been taken out for each man and an £800 bonus was to be paid after 10 months duty.

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(10) See above, Chapter 4. Wautier was killed by a mutinous mercenary when he refused to join the uprising. Congo 1966. Brussels 1967. p. 350.

(11) On 21st October, 1966, rebels were reported to have seized the gold mine at Watsa and stolen a large quantity of refined gold. Star, 22/10/66.

(12) The Kisangani mutiny may, in fact, have been linked with Tshombe but its roots were more fundamental. The A.N.C. High Command were always suspicious of the Katangese units, which were the most efficient in the A.N.C. because of their role following independence in 1960. Tshombe was actively engaged in subversive activity while in exile, and it was good politics to link the mutiny with him.

The Kisangani area was vital to the Central Government in their fight against the C.N.L. and other rebel organisations.\(^{(14)}\) Mulamba and Munongo\(^{(15)}\) (Governor of Katanga) had tried to negotiate a peace, but, when their efforts failed, they regrouped the A.N.C. to crush the mutiny. Denard's mercenaries attacked strongly in the second week of September and on the 21st, 50 paratroopers (mercenaries under Major Dulac) dropped into the Kisangani airport.

The Katangese began to withdraw from Kisangani on 23rd September and suffered heavy losses. Almost half their number surrendered at Boaka and the remainder began the 1,000 mile march to Katanga.

On the 26th, the A.N.C. regained full control of Kisangani. 6 Commando was given the responsibility of holding the city on 1st October. C.I.A.—piloted planes strafed the Katangese battalion as it moved slowly towards Punia, which it reached on 4th October.

The road to Kindu was being held by a unit of 5 Commando and a battalion of A.N.C. under Commdt. Jean Schramme. There were fifteen mercenaries in all and these were not thought sufficient to stop the mutineers. However, the Katangese column surrendered to 5 Commando and Colonel Tshipola was captured at Kusese on the 15th October. The mutiny was over.

The mercenaries had offered the Katangese a fair trial and had made promises of safe conduct. None of these were honoured by Mobutu. On March 13th, 1967, Tshipola, Moande (the Katangese second in command) and Tshombe (in absentia) were tried by mob decision in a Kinshasa stadium. All three were sentenced to death. There is a parallel here with the action of General Gordon at the siege of Suchow. The column which was stopped by the mercenaries of 5 and 6 Commandos at the Ulinda River appeared to vanish after confirmation had been received of its surrender. It might appear that the mercenaries had enough insight into the Congo Government's idea of a 'fair trial', and had allowed the soldiers to melt away into the bush in the same fashion as they had done in 1963. An interesting aside to the mutiny was that Mobutu's offer of a cease-fire was well received by at least 1,000 'Simbas' who voluntarily gave themselves up to the A.N.C. at Baraka.

The mutiny of some mercenaries of 6 Commando at Kisangani had convinced Mobutu that they were capable of turning against

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\(^{(14)}\) Gizenga had fled the Congo in February and had gone to Cairo in an attempt to reconcile the rival rebel groups. He was regarded by Nasser as the official representative of the C.N.L. and Soumlalot fell from favour and his offices were closed.

\(^{(15)}\) Godefroid Munongo: b. 1925. Grandson of Misri, the last African ruler of Katanga. Trained as a priest and founder member of Conakat. Became Tshombe's Minister of Interior during Katanga's secession and Tshombe's chief adviser. He is alleged to have witnessed, and even to have committed, Lumumba's murder. Became Tshombe's Interior Minister in 1964 in the National Government and Governor of Katanga in 1965. At the end of 1966, he was arrested on Mobutu's orders.
him en masse in the future, and he therefore resolved to get rid of them without delay. Tshombe's 'private army' was given fresh publicity when Col. Peters revealed details of its size and objects to the South African press.\(^{(16)}\) In December, a former mercenary (French) called Delamichel\(^{(17)}\) appeared in Johannesburg, in uniform, to recruit thirty South Africans to supplement the '600' which he had already. Mobutu made an official complaint to the Security Council in October\(^{(18)}\) that the Portuguese Government was harbouring mercenaries in Angola. The Portuguese representative countered that complaint with the statement that it was 'baseless' and that the Congo was trying to cover up the fact that the Angolan Government-in-exile was based in the Congo. The resolution, which was passed unanimously on the 14th October, urged Portugal not to allow mercenaries to use Angola. Mobutu used the whole incident to whip up another attack on Belgium.

*The second crisis*

By the beginning of 1967, the rebellion had quietened down considerably. The exiled rebel Governments had found a cooling of sentiment in their host countries as, internationally at least, Mobutu's autocratic role swung more into line with O.A.U. opinion and the next O.A.U. meeting was scheduled to be held in Kinshasa from the 11th to the 14th September.

Mobutu had to avoid the embarrassment of acting as host to African Heads of State while relying on the protection of South African 'racists' in 5 Commando. Colonel J. Peters resigned from the A.N.C. on 26th March after the trial of Moise Tshombe and, rather than find a replacement for Peters, Mobutu disbanded the Commando in April. The last plane load arrived in Johannesburg on 24th April.\(^{(19)}\)

6 Commando was also being reduced and was down to 500 men at the beginning of 1967. The mercenaries had little to do, as few, if any, of the rebels presented any form of resistance beyond simple banditry. It was also planned to phase out 6 Commando by the date of the O.A.U. meeting but this was not to be done as smoothly as it had been for 5 Commando.

The thought of leaving the Congo did not appeal to the mercenaries. Some of them had been there for a long time\(^{(20)}\) and had no wish to disrupt their lives. The only remaining pocket of resistance lay in the north-east and this was not posing a threat to their lives.

\(^{(16)}\) Agence France Presse, 30/10/65.
\(^{(17)}\) Sunday Express, Johannesburg, 13/12/66.
\(^{(19)}\) Rhodesia Herald, 28/4/66.
\(^{(20)}\) Major Puren, who had been a mercenary for one side or another, had maintained his precarious position in the Congo since 1960.


73
MAP NO. 9 — THE SCHRAMME-DENARD MUTINY
One of the biggest factors causing the mercenaries' unrest was that Tshombe had been kidnapped on 30th June, 1967 and taken to Algeria. Colonel Denard, Commander of 6 Commando, had visited him in Madrid earlier in the month and there was a strong element of pro-Tshombe sentiment amongst the mercenaries. Many of them, Denard and Puren among them, might well have provided the nucleus of any force which could be gathered to assist his return to power. Another factor which gave rise to frustration was that Mobutu had lately nationalised the Union Minière and the fate of 2,400 Belgians employed by the company still lay in the balance. There had been incidents of sabotage in Katanga in June and five Belgians had been arrested. They were said to be working for the return of Tshombe.\(^{(21)}\) It was reported that the mercenaries had not been paid for three months\(^{(22)}\) and this was the final cause of their mutiny.

It is likely that the primary cause for the rebellion was that an attempt to restore Tshombe had been planned for some time. Tshombe's kidnapping had disturbed the political timetable but the mercenaries were determined not to allow him to be handed over to the Congo and probably executed. The mercenaries appear to have been split into three factions in June, 1967:

(a) The French and South Africans\(^{(23)}\) who were loyal servants of Tshombe, provided the money still arrived and who had engineered his return. This number included Col. Denard, the Commander of 6 Commando.

(b) The Spanish, Italian and British mercenaries who worked for money and merely wanted to continue to earn the good salaries that the Congo Government offered despite the presumably better salaries offered them to join the revolt, and

(c) some Belgians, led by Jean Schramme, who definitely believed that the Congo could be a better place under a Belgian-orientated Government and who despaired of the direction taken by Mobutu. It can reasonably be assumed that had Colonel Denard\(^{(24)}\) remained in charge of the military, circumstances would have been very different.

The mutiny began at 6 a.m. on the 5th July; the mercenaries and Katangese soldiers of 10 Commando drove into the military camps at Kisangani and opened fire on anything that moved. Similar mutinies occurred at Kindu and Bukavu. In Kisangani, the mercenaries had a quick success and drove the A.N.C. over

\(^{(21)}\) Observer, 9/7-67.

\(^{(22)}\) Three months appears to be a journalistic generalisation for a time limit of undetermined length. The Katangese in 1966 were also reported to be due three months pay at the outbreak of their mutiny. If three months is indeed the tolerance threshold of African troops and mercenaries, the Mobutu Government should have realised it before 1967.

\(^{(23)}\) Rhodesia Herald, 13/11/65.

\(^{(24)}\) Colonel Denard had been ordered to disband 10 Commando (KatanRese) on the 3rd July, but had not acted upon this. He feared a repetition of the massacre of Katangese in 1966. He obviously had other plans for Colonel Monga’s men.
the Congo River to the south bank. Here the A.N.C. regrouped and started to counter attack. The mercenaries reported that they met no resistance in Kisangani but at least one armoured car and three trucks were destroyed by mortar fire and the town was badly damaged.

When the mutiny began there were only 50 mercenaries in Kisangani, 30 in Kindu and between 30 and 50 at Bukavu. The Kindu uprising was abortive as the A.N.C. drove the mercenaries out of the town with heavy losses. The survivors made their way to Kisangani to join the mutineers there.

On the 7th July, a plane carrying 29 wounded mercenaries and Katangese flew out of the Congo to Rhodesia (Kariba). Aboard was Cononeel Denard who was badly wounded, and Major Schramme assumed command of the mutineers.

Schramme was in Bukavu, where the mutiny had been a success. Due to a misunderstanding which was no doubt a result of Denard's incapacitation, he pulled out his entire force on 7th July and journeyed to Kisangani. He should have left half of his men to hold the town. As it was, the A.N.C. entered the town and proceeded to maltreat those members of the white population who had not fled in panic to Rwanda when the mercenaries withdrew.\(^{(25)}\)

Schramme waited in Kisangani long enough to allow other mercenaries who were stationed in the north to join up with his force. On the 10th\(^{(26)}\), Mobutu called on the mercenaries to surrender but this request went unheard. The mercenaries wanted to burn all their boats and, if they were to lose, to be defeated in a blaze of glory. They did not however have any real belief that the A.N.C. could defeat them. On the 11th May they refused to allow a Red Cross plane to land at Kisangani. The official version for the reason of the flight was to evacuate hostages being held there, but on-the-spot observers say it was a plane, painted with the Red Cross insignia, from the C.I.A.—operated 'Congo Frigo' a meat packing firm which is run as a front for their activities. This appears to have been the correct tactic for, had there been Red Cross personnel aboard and had the plane been refused permission to take off again because of the presence of C.I.A. spies, the mercenaries would have lost any of the sympathy which remained for them in the world at large.

The Bukavu Confrontation

On the 12th the mercenaries were ready to depart. They travelled from Kisangani to Punia in 27 stolen trucks and took with them some of the Kisangani airport ground crew as ‘hos-

\(^{(25)}\) Information given to author by eye witness.
\(^{(26)}\) On 10th August the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on the mercenaries. It called for all states to ban the recruitment of mercenaries and to stop giving aid and transit rights to mercenaries.
tages'. Punia, Bukavu and other towns had landing strips which the mercenaries intended to use and they needed qualified men for the job. It is understood that these 'hostages' were fleeing the now anticipated reprisals against whites by the A.N.C. and that they also wanted to reap any rewards which the hitherto invincible mercenaries might bring their way. On the 13th, a DC-3 landed at Hendrique de Carvalho in Angola carrying 10 wounded and 18 unwounded mercenaries. By the 17th, the mercenaries were reported to be dug in at Punia and rumours abounded that a second mercenary army was being formed in Angola to attack from the south. Some mercenaries from the old 5 Commando were reported in Paris. Whether there is any substance in these reports or not, is not known, but a number of ex-mercenaries chose to get some personal publicity from the mutiny.

Schramme finally decided to march back to Bukavu, which he retook on the 9th August. He installed a 'Government of Public Safety' under Colonel Monga and decided to hold out and await developments. There may have been a plan for a second 'front' to be opened in Katanga from Angola but, although rumours of mercenary activity spread, Katanga appeared quiet, if uneasy. There were 5,000 A.N.C. troops in Lumbumbashi. Denard was reported to be in Katanga with 16 mercenaries (one report said 300) and some Katangese gendarmes but there is little evidence as to the size, role or intention of this force. Both Zambia and Rwanda closed their borders with the Congo and alerted their armies.

In Bukavu, the mercenaries established themselves in a series of strong points along a ring of hills outside the town. They listened to the A.N.C. radio transmissions and were able to repulse attacks easily. Whenever they needed ammunition they would attack the A.N.C. and capture what they required. Congolese aircraft strafed the mercenaries and it was reported that Italian, Cuban and Congolese pilots were used. These planes did little damage although they did manage to kill four people in Rwanda by mistake.

Negotiations for the repatriation of the mercenaries and asylum for the Katangese in Zambia were started by both the 

(27) Rand Daily Mail, 17/7/67.
(28) Star, 24/7/67.
(31) On 29th July the Congo signed a military assistance agreement with Ethiopia who sent four jet fighters to the Congo. Ghana is reported to have offered 20 pilots.
The mercenaries now numbered 129 (excluding the wife and child of a Belgian mercenary). There had been 200 in 6 Commando and at least 40 had been evacuated, wounded or unwounded, to Angola or Rhodesia. Schramme reported from Bukavu that 10 of his men had been killed but this figure appears low considering the Kindu incident. If this figure is correct, then 21 must have fled to Rwanda, Burundi or Zambia in the course of the action.

On the 10th August, the day of the Security Council resolution on the Congo, Schramme gave Mobutu 10 days to come to terms with the mercenaries and threatened that if no satisfactory agreement was reached by then, the mercenaries would take over the whole Congo. Ultimata were made by both sides while negotiations continued between Schramme, Mobutu, the Governments of Rwanda and Zambia, and the O.A.U.

The Katangese, who would undoubtedly come off worst, wanted to invade Katanga when Rwanda refused entry to the force on 23rd August. The Katangese were not happy being with the mercenaries as they were often snubbed and disregarded.

Schramme, a shy, mild man, is a bewildered idealist who had waited for a revolution to restore the Congo to stability. He laughs at the description 'Black Jack' which has been invented by journalists to give colour to the mutiny, but there is a touch of Colonel Hoare about him, as he was able to stop Rhodesian mercenaries from looting in Bukavu. He did not support Tshombe's return strongly which angered some of the mercenaries but he owed them money ($400 each, reportedly) and is believed to have an account worth over $1 million in Switzerland. This kept the mercenaries loyal. Schramme came to the Congo when he was 14 and owned a plantation in the Punia region. His parents are in Belgium, and were not killed by the Lumumbists, as some reports claim. He would have liked to make his fortune in the Congo but has now ruined his chances of ever being allowed to remain.

On the 13th November, the mercenaries crossed the border to Rwanda and were disarmed. Though Mobutu sought to have them extradited for trial, international pressure on Rwanda finally led to them being repatriated through Geneva by the International Red Cross in April, 1968. A condition of their release was a pledge not to return to Africa, though within a few days four mercenaries arrived in Johannesburg, some of them keen to resume their careers. A chapter of the Congo's history may have been closed, but, as Tshombe is still alive, the mercenary may yet come back into his own.

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(32) In Kisangani, the Red Cross made 10 flights carrying wounded A.N.C. troops to Kinshasa and Lumbumbashi but few 'hostages' needed treatment.
(34) Newscheck, 26/4/68.
'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'.

Mao Tse-tung.

Revolution and Insurrection in the Congo

Background

Armed insurrection has plagued many of the world's nations since World War II and it is of interest to this study to determine whether the Congo's two major internal conflicts, which involved the use of mercenary troops, fit into any general pattern of post-war revolution and whether the means used to end them were effective. Two related systems of classification can be applied; the first is to identify, as far as possible, the causes of the revolution and the second is to determine how far it had progressed before effective measures were taken to put it down.

a) Katanga

Tshombe's secession was the direct result of Belgian mismanagement of the Congo's independence. The establishment of the Tshombe régime, while aggravating tribal rivalries, was based on the political ambitions of the Conakat leaders and the desire of Union Minière du Haut-Katanga to maintain its economic hegemony. The war that followed was primarily one between the rival armies. The people of northern Katanga, who bore the brunt of the Katangese 'pacification' measures, were innocent bystanders who could expect brutal treatment from both factions despite their political allegiance to Sendwe. The 'State of Luulala' and South Kasai's secession can be seen as the bizarre results of this tribal friction and of the opportunism of the leaders who emerged. Katanga's secession contained these elements but was a far graver threat to the unity of the Congo. From the point of view of the Central Government, Katanga's military organisation demanded retaliation on a full-scale war footing. Katanga was capable of committing a whole army to defend its borders and this would mean that the rebellion in Katanga had reached 'Stage Four' in the classification presented by McCuen.(1) The fact that the population were not necessarily


| Stage I: | The organisation of the initial revolutionary group and the preparation for the revolt. |
| Stage II: | Terrorist activity, aimed at consolidating base areas. |
| Stage III: | Guerrilla warfare with large areas under revolutionary control. |
| Stage IV: | Mobile warfare with frontal attacks on the Government. The rebels receive outside political and material support. |
committed to Tshombe and Conakat is not relevant, as parallels can be drawn from the Russian revolution and the Malayan uprising, where the leaders had little concern for the political leanings of the people.

The special internal conditions of the Congo in 1960 allowed for the rapid assumption of military and political autonomy by Katanga. The Belgian Military Mission, 'Mistebel'\(^{(2)}\), the provision of military personnel (after September, 1960, in the form of mercenaries) and arms supplies, by Sabena airlift\(^{(3)}\) and through Angola, were capable of sustaining the régime against any force the Central Government could muster. McCuen\(^{(4)}\) points out that when this stage is reached, the Government has virtually lost the war and must call in outside military assistance. The U.N. force (the O.N.U.C.) was decisive in ending the secession but not until the mandate of the O.N.U.C. was extended by the resolution of November, 1961.\(^{(5)}\)

The Central Government was far too weak to counter the strength of Katanga on its own. The A.N.C. was demoralised. Owing to its inexperience of war, and deprived of its Belgian leaders, the A.N.C. suffered many defeats at the hands of Katanga's new army. The officers had great difficulty establishing their loyalty to the Central Government, partly due to the rival claims of Leopoldville and Stanleyville to be the legitimate power. The assumption of power by Mobutu did not completely resolve this issue. On the other hand, the limitations of the first mercenaries and the mercenary-led gendarmerie of Katanga were exposed as soon as the U.N. began to apply the resolution of February 22nd, 1961.\(^{(6)}\)

After July 11th, 1960, the gendarmerie, a newly-recruited force with no traditions, buoyed by the 'patriotic' exhortations of Radio Katanga and the propaganda of the régime, never lost heart in their cause. They were in fact fighting for Katanga against an alien army. They accepted their white officers, first Belgian regulars and later mercenaries, as legitimate leaders who shared in their endeavour.\(^{(7)}\) They accepted that the Baluba and other northern tribes presented a threat to their existence, and, equally, they enjoyed their status as soldiers.

The mercenaries, however, held a different view of the internal military situation. They saw the O.N.U.C. as a growing threat to Katanga which could tip the scales against them. After the August operations in Elisabethville and other centres it appeared that their time in the Congo would be limited and that they

\(^{(2)}\) See above Chapter 3.
\(^{(3)}\) Gerard-Libois, J.; op. cit. p. 130.
\(^{(4)}\) McCuen—op. cit. p. 258 et. seq.
\(^{(5)}\) UN Document S/5002. See Appendix.
\(^{(6)}\) See Appendix.
\(^{(7)}\) Many Belgians, such as Jean Schramme, did join the Katangese fight for autonomy with idealistic reasons. After 'Operation Rumpunch', the 'mercenary' element increased as most of the new recruits were French, South African or Rhodesian.
must make the most of it. Their ruthlessness in the rural villages was the reflection of a supremacy complex which is often found in white communities in Africa. They were completely insensitive to the plight of the thousands of people they killed or displaced.

By the same token, it must be remembered that they never knew who their enemy was or where he might strike next. As a result, the tactics of 'pacification' or 'police action' were brutal in the extreme. Often villages were burned and their populations dispersed or killed merely because of the village's strategic position or because it had been 'contaminated' by A.N.C. occupation. Needless to say, the mercenaries stuck to their task and assumed the personality of 'les affreux'. This raises the question of what sort of man would undertake work of this nature and be prepared to receive the praise and adoration of a community such as the whites in Katanga as the spur to greater effort.

The mercenaries in Katanga did not sign up to become part of a special army as such. The situation on the borders was grave and so they had to go into action with little or no training. They were given weapons, transport and were able to mark out their own modus vivendi. The authority exercised by the Belgian officers, who assumed 'mercenary' status, did not really extend to control their behaviour or establish real discipline and the only thing asked of them was that the military objectives be attained.

The mercenary is essentially an individual. He hires himself out on his terms and does not 'join' anything or any movement. In Katanga this factor was pronounced, especially in the non-Belgian mercenary. The bonds between these individuals were not strong as the majority acted independently to take command of gendarmerie units. The Compagnie Internationale, which was virtually destroyed with the capture of thirty of its number at Kabala, was the only example of a large number of mercenaries operating together long enough to establish any 'esprit'.

Those mercenaries who returned to the Congo in 1964 were a very small percentage of those originally enlisted by Katanga. This is not surprising considering that the first experiences of mercenary soldiering were not found to be conducive to re-enlistment even under different circumstances. Between 1960 and 1963, the mercenaries were exposed to the pressure of an ever-strengthening O.N.U.C. and, towards the end, the inevitable defeat of the Katangese forces caused many to leave hurriedly. Katanga's autonomy was never recognised internationally and the resources available to employ mercenaries, although con-

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(8) Up to 'Rumpunch', relations between O.N.U.C. soldiers and the mercenaries had been cordial. Valahu reports that some O.N.U.C. troops used the mercenaries as contacts with the black market (Valahu, op. cit. pp. 160). Men of the Swedish contingent were often sympathetic to Katanga's cause.
siderable by Congolese standards, could not match those of the U.N. Katanga's secession was an adventure and the first mercenaries appear to have been adventurers rather than true professional soldiers. They were never given an opportunity to train in the type of warfare with which they were faced and the pressure of the O.N.U.C. was such that there was never any security. The O.N.U.C. and the U.N. representatives steadily eroded the military and political strength of Katanga by occupying the centres and deporting all 'undesirables', but it was during this stage that the basic patterns of mercenary deployment emerged and these were to be used again to greater effect.

The tactics employed by the mercenaries in their war with the A.N.C. were very similar to those adopted by the Government forces in 1964-1967. The towns and villages were the basic targets. These were taken by surprise and with overwhelming force. The A.N.C., jeunesse or 'rebel' militia were scattered and the villages were either razed or occupied by garrisons of gendarmerie. Resistance was always slight unless the O.N.U.C. was involved in the battle. The mercenaries were supplied with F.N. rifles, side arms, grenades and often flame-throwers. Heavy firepower proved to be the only real tactic employed so as to combine an economy of weight with the maximum of efficiency. Their uniforms consisted of whatever could be obtained from Belgian or old Force Publique stores and the paratrooper camouflage jacket was preferred. Captured weapons, especially revolvers and knives were added indiscriminately while beards and personal headgear completed the bizarre picture painted by Davister.

The 'Compagnie Internationale' was employed as a shock-unit in assaults on major centres, such as that of Kabalo in April, 1961, and the A.N.C. had no answer to their strength, to which must be added the fire-power of Avikat, which had complete freedom of the sky until the U.N. action of December, 1962 to January, 1963.

For all their earlier successes, the mercenaries lost interest in the Katangese cause after the O.N.U.C.'s 'Morthor' operation in December, 1961, and, at the end of the next year, simply faded away before the advance of U.N. troops. It became apparent, after Hammarskjöld's death, that the U.N. would tolerate neither a secessionist state in Katanga nor a mercenary army there. By the end of three years in the Congo, the U.N. had spent $279.4 million in maintaining the O.N.U.C., most of it on the force in Katanga. While U.N. enthusiasm for the O.N.U.C.

(9) Personal interview with participant.
(11) Belgian regular soldiers were given Government permission to fly for Avikat in February, 1961. (Gerard-Libois, J. op cit. p. 189). Australian and South African pilots were also used.
waned after mid-1963, intense pressure existed to end the seces-
sion and the U.N. would, presumably, have provided a force,
however large, to crush the mercenary-led army had ‘Grand-
slam’ failed.

It would appear then that the decision to employ mercenaries
in Katanga was the wrong one for Katanga. Limited Belgian
military assistance to a black Katangese army in 1960 might well
have been sufficient to establish the state. The presence of
mercenaries so aroused international suspicions of ‘neo colonial-
ism’, however, that Katanga had to be humbled. They did, how-
ever, demonstrate that white troops could be decisive in a civil
war in a country like the Congo.


The leaders of the revolution in 1964 did not take impulsive
action in the hope of carving out a portion of the Congo for
themselves. Their revolution was essentially nationalist. They
resented bitterly their loss of power amid the destruction of the
Congo’s political base by the establishment of, firstly, Colonel
Mobutu’s non-political ‘College of Commissioners’ Government
and, later, the non-parliamentary régimes of Adoula and Tshom-
be. They resented the subservience of successive Congolese
Governments to the non-African intervention of Belgians and,
latterly the United States. Most of all, they reacted to the
murder of Lumumba and the power of the ‘Binza’ group
which became the decisive caucus in the Congolese Parliament.

Their revolution was planned from the outside. Mulele,
Gbenye, Soumialot and the others left the Congo to seek outside
support for their Lumumbist movement, a movement which had
lost ground in the Congo itself and which they wished to restore.
The C.N.L. was formed in Brazzaville in October, 1963, and
it planned a series of operations to bring down the Adoula
Government. When an attack on Mobutu’s life failed in Novem-
ber, 1963, they began to plot civil war. They began from the
grassroots and soon rallied enough support in Kwilu to begin
active operations.

The Gbenye section of the C.N.L. moved to Burundi whence
it launched its military attacks in mid-1964. They made a cult of
Lumumba and won widespread support. They attacked all relics
of the colonial era, killed thousands of educated people and
imprisoned all missionaries and diplomatic staff. They establish-
ed a youth wing, the ‘jeunesse’, and inspired their warriors,
through the power of witchcraft and magic, with immortality.

(13) See above, Chapter 3.
(15) So named after a suburb on a group of hills outside Leopoldville. This loose
group consisted of Mobutu, Nendaka (the security police chief), Foreign
Minister Bomboko and two minor ministers who supported Adoula and were
all implicated in Lumumba’s murder.
(16) Young—op. cit. p. 345.
They established a revolutionary régime based on three main centres: traditionally separatist Stanleyville; Kindu, the key to the Congo River from the east and headquarters for the rebel front which was to advance to Leopoldville; Fizi, on Lake Tanganyika which was to reduce the Bukavu pocket of Government resistance.

The military successes of this movement outstripped the organisation. The impact on the population proved too euphoric initially to guarantee a lasting effect and the reconquest and pacification of the towns, at least, proved an easy task for the A.N.C. Only isolated groups were able to hold out against the A.N.C. onslaught but these behaved in a manner which proved a credit to the teachings of Mao or Guevara. Thus the revolution of the C.N.L., while making dramatic territorial gains and ‘converting millions of people to its cause, in fact had not progressed beyond ‘stage 3’, the guerrilla warfare stage, of revolution. The mass movement had no organisational or military underpinning. The rebel mistake was not to consolidate when the A.N.C. was demoralised, because, while the Adoula Government was shaky, it was still in effective power. The next Congolese leader, Tshombe, knew only too well how to deal with insurgents. When the reconquest was gathering strength, the rebels exhibited themselves openly without retiring quietly to the background and reorganising and consolidating their political organisation and base areas. All Mao’s teaching was carried out except for the underlying tenet: the ‘political goal.’(17) When Chinese and Cuban advisers gave support to the C.N.L. it was too late. Countries such as Uganda, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania and the U.A.R. gave support but not to the extent that their fingers were burned when the revolution failed.

The mercenaries employed by the Congolese Government in 1964 and 1965 enjoyed a status, both in the Congo and outside, far higher than any which existed during Katanga’s secession. They were armed by the U.S.A. and Belgium, given military rank in the A.N.C. hierarchy and priority for weapons and other military equipment. Congolese military offices were established in Johannesburg and Brussels for their recruitment. They became the military elite.

The tactics employed by the Belgian Staff, who planned the whole military effort from 1964 onwards, were divided into two equally important sections: the actual ‘reconquest’ and the ‘pacification’. The mercenaries were assigned the first responsibility and they acquitted themselves well.

In 1964, discipline was hard and 5 Commando, at least, conducted itself along the lines that could be expected from an established European or American army unit. Esprit de corps was high and the reconquest was attacked with great energy.

The secondary role of the military operation, the ‘pacification’, was the responsibility of the A.N.C. (which contained some units of Katangese ex-gendarmes who were officered by mercenaries), and these units did not fare so well. Failure by them in any sector meant that the armoured spearhead, the mercenaries, was again called in to restore order. This brought the mercenaries into closer contact with the population at an administrative level and often meant that the mercenary units remained stationary for periods of time.

In this activity the mercenaries, acting as autonomous units, showed serious limitations. They reacted badly to sedentary occupation duties and this was when disputes and indiscipline occurred.

6 Commando was broken up into small squads to operate with the Congolese and Katangese units and, although it became well integrated with the A.N.C., it benefited less from its own military experience. Being French-speaking, they received better treatment from the Belgian High Command but did not give as good value in return. They were less prepared to commit themselves to battle as they often lacked the strength to win outright. In their duties as stiffening for A.N.C. troops, however, they did the best they could. The A.N.C. soldiers were not dedicated fighters and often needed inspired leadership. This the men of 6 Commando gave to the A.N.C. up to the end of 1965. The presence of 5 Commando always gave them a standard to emulate, if somewhat bitterly.

The first comparison which should be drawn is that of the military background of the ‘Katangese’ mercenaries and of 5 and 6 Commandos. Many of the men in the first detachment of mercenaries employed by Katanga were either officers and N.C.O.’s of the Force Publique or volunteers from the Belgian army. They were familiar with the Congo and served to establish the new ‘state’. These men were later replaced by adventurers from France, Rhodesia and other countries and a completely new outlook developed. Military discipline deteriorated and there was little that the Katangese régime could do to establish authority. Little or no attempt was made to weed out physically or mentally unsuitable men. Of interest is the fact that the former members of the Force Publique were often the most brutal in their methods.

From 1964 onwards, the mercenaries were organised along more standard military lines. Although the mercenaries of this period had little or no military experience prior to their coming to the Congo, they were trained and prepared for their duties as soon as they arrived. Kamina was reopened as a training centre and a camp at Leopoldville made over to the mercenary units. Training in weapons was given and, as from 1961-1963, the variety was kept to a minimum. The Nato F.N. rifle was standard
equipment and light machine guns were fitted to most transport vehicles. Medium and light mortars and bazookas were also used but their use was confined to experts, usually N.C.O.'s. Belgium supplied all of the weapons used and America most of the vehicles. Belgian experts were on hand for training and there was some contact with the American military mission. The men of 5 Commando were also prepared physically for combat and were expected to keep fit. The recruiting offices in Johannesburg and in Belgium were selective in their choice and further screening was employed once recruits reached Kamina.

A direct comparison between the two Commandos shows that, if conventional military action was required, as it was at times in the reconquest of the Congo, then English-speaking mercenaries reacted more favourably to the demand for disciplined drive. French-speaking mercenaries, in this case with the language advantage, integrated much better with indigenous troops than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.

From the end of 1965, the Congo mercenary declined both in status and utility. The back of the revolution had been broken and the 'mopping up' was hard, tedious work. When 5 Commando was disbanded in 1967 there was little fighting left to be done and what there was could easily be handled by the retrained Congolese Army. The routine of normal army duties did not appeal to the remaining mercenaries and this is one of the main reasons for their susceptibility to mutiny. The glamour had gone and they were becoming redundant.

The mercenary mutiny of 1967 in Kisangani (Stanleyville) and Bukavu did prove one point which could have been forgotten. The white mercenary soldier was still more effective than the army of the Congo and, one must presume, more effective than in the armies of many new states without a military history and long-established military experience.

The A.N.C. reinforced from outside with airpower and modern arms, was still incapable of defeating a force many times smaller than itself. This points to an extended utility for white mercenaries in a continent like Africa.

Rural, uneducated and tribal communities are easily dominated by military power and more easily still by soldiers who share none of their loyalties, superstitions or prejudices. The political consequences of employing mercenaries, however, may debar their use in any situation short of an emergency.

In Africa, in particular, mercenary troops are seen, at least publicly and politically, as symbols of neo-colonialism and the penalty for their use could be isolation by other African States. From a pragmatic standpoint, however, there is much to be gained from their employment provided that a strict rein is kept on their activities and they are not exposed to influences which may detract from their strategic value. By the latter is meant
political bargaining within the country of employment.

The importance of the 1960's

The decolonisation of most of Africa since World War II has created a power vacuum which is still unfilled. Various forces acted to keep the old colonial countries from continued political domination of their former colonies, but since the independence of the Congo in 1960, interest groups other than national governments have tried to exert their own power on the continent.

When the colonial administrators of Britain, France and Belgium left the newly independent states they took with them the qualified and experienced cadres of the colonial armies, if these existed at all. Europe was preoccupied with her own economic expansion and the dangers of the Cold War. Post-war strategy had developed along nuclear lines rather than along those of the internal security that had formerly been needed in the colonies.

As colonisation declined and the European states became more involved in their domestic spheres, a third force emerged which maintained pressure on the colonial powers to continue their withdrawal: the United Nations. Thus, once decolonisation began, it was forced to continue.

The rising pressure at the United Nations was one of the factors which convinced Belgium that the Congo must be freed. At the same time, she and other large investors such as Britain were reluctant to relinquish their economic stake in the country and so the secession of Katanga was attempted to act as a cover for this. International pressure forced the Belgian government to withdraw its troops and the alternative of employing mercenary troops was attempted. The U.N. intervened directly in the Congo to protect the unity of a new state against the colonialist interests and the political opportunism of Tshombe but the Katanga secession demonstrated the effectiveness of white soldiering in Africa and, although the mercenaries of Katanga were defeated, the use of this type of soldier began to increase.

The Yemeni Royalists became buyers, and then, less than two years after their expulsion from Katanga, mercenaries were employed by the Congo Government. Some of the original mercenaries were re-employed and a definite organisation began to be established. All leaders of the new Congolese Force had been employed by Tshombe while he was in Katanga and these men began to share Tshombe's aspirations in the Congo due to their prolonged association with both the man and the area.\(^{18}\)

Had Tshombe continued to enjoy power in the Congo, the mercenaries might well have faded into obscurity but the Mobu-

\(^{18}\) Denard, Hoare, Puren, Schramme, Wicks and Meuller all assumed senior rank in 1964.
tu coup in November, 1965 focused interest on whether their loyalties would remain with Tshombe or with the Government which paid them. It appeared initially that the mercenaries were not unduly unhappy over the change in government but, as African criticism of their employment continued and it became apparent that they were to be replaced, the mercenaries began to show more interest in the restoration of Tshombe.

A large network for recruitment and administration had been established to cope with the steady stream of men who came from Europe and Southern Africa. The Congolese government retained nominal control over this system but in effect the mercenary army ran and maintained itself. Through its leaders, this army became linked with the political future of the Congo.

Tshombe's abduction in 1967 predated by only a few days a well co-ordinated plan to restore him to the Congo. The then current insecurity of 6 Commando was used by Denard to foment the mutiny and, at the same time, two other mercenary attacks were planned for the re-establishment of an autonomous Katanga.

A small group of mercenaries and former gendarmes from Katanga entered Katanga from Angola. Tshombe was in prison in Algeria and so an attempt was made by a second small group to free ex-Katangese Interior Minister Munongo from his island jail on the Congo River. The same organisation that planned these raids had also made provision to supply the mercenaries of 6 Commando by air from Angola.

The whole scheme proved abortive but a great deal of planning had gone into it and large resources were used. During Tshombe's exile, he lived in Spain and maintained his links with those governments and businesses which had interests in the Congo. In this way the intrigue was kept alive. Angola was still used as a base for operations and the pattern of activity seems to implicate Portugal as Tshombe's main backer. Portugal had aided Tshombe in 1960 and, since that date, had witnessed growing discontent and rebellion in her African colonies. The Congo Government, despite its partial reliance on the Angolan rail link, gave support to the Angolan rebels.

Tshombe maintained contact with his mercenaries throughout his exile but, since the attempted restoration failed, the whole organisation appears to have redirected its activities to other parts of Africa. There is one distinction. The British and South African mercenaries do not appear to be involved with this scheme any longer.

Angola is used as the transit camp and logistic base for French mercenaries who are fighting for Biafra and the Portu-
guese Island of Sao Tome is used as an assembly point. There are strong indications that this is the same organisation that recruited mercenaries for the Congo, although no formal proof is available. Bars in Paris and Brussels which were used for illegal recruitment for the Congo are again centres of information on the needs of Biafra. Lisbon is the point where mercenaries leave Europe and the transit camp seems to receive official sanction. The main personalities involved, Denard and Faulques, are those who were the leaders of the French-speaking units in the Congo.

A major split in the mercenary ranks seems to have occurred since the 1967 Congo mutiny and this is mainly along linguistic lines. Peters is now working for the Federal Government of Nigeria and South African, British and Egyptian pilots and soldiers are now engaged in fighting other mercenaries in the Biafran Army. That these men were recently comrades in arms and are now opposed and making violent statements in public about their attitudes towards each other seems surprising. There appears, however, to be an understanding between mercenaries of both sides that mercenaries will not be harmed if possible and the federal pilots will not engage the Biafran airforce. This suggests a repetition of the situation of the Renaissance period when agreement between mercenary forces made a mockery of warfare.

The demand for mercenaries in Africa and the Middle East has seen the recruitment and organisation take on a commercial look. In Pretoria, an organisation called 'Mercenaire International' has been started by Neville Warrington. His plans are to create a complete military unit, comprising soldiers, pilots and naval officers, of up to 1,000 men, which could be used in countries which do not have efficient forces of their own and, presumably, by any revolutionary movement. Warrington appears to be supplying Biafra and Yemen and the pay which is being offered shows that the mercenary market is strong.

France, Portugal, Belgium and South Africa are the main suppliers of mercenaries and, of the four, Belgium and France can have little to gain politically. France might wish to sow

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(23) Newscheck—2-1-68—Recruits are 'hidden' in jail in Lisbon while they await transport to Angola.
(24) Major Wicks, an old associate of Hoare, joined the Biafran side. In January, 1968, Wicks was arrested in Togo whilst smuggling Nigerian banknotes. After several months he was released after Togo had received no 'reward' from the Nigerian Government for seizing the notes. Hoare seems inactive but friendly towards the Federal government, as are other British mercenary officers.
(25) The Times, 9, 1/68.
(26) Ibid.
(28) Newscheck—2-2-68.
(29) Salaries in Biafra rise as high as R2,400 per month for a pilot. Ibid. (At the time of writing, Warrington appeared to be involved, but for most of 1968 he seems to have been inactive).
dissention in the powerful states of the Congo and Nigeria to protect her African Community and it would appear that business interests may have unofficial sanction to protect their Biafran interests.\(^{(30)}\)

Portugal is in real danger of losing Portuguese Guinea and, should this happen, Angola and Mozambique would not seem so invincible to African states. If West Africa can be kept divided, then Portuguese Guinea will not be the main priority of African politics. South Africa's interests too are to protect the Portuguese possessions. In Nigeria, however, South African mercenaries have been fighting with the Federal army, and this could contribute to South Africa's new drive to win some approval in African states by helping a recognised government. In August 1967, the Chief of the South African Security Police, General van den Bergh, made such a distinction when he said that passports would not be issued to mercenaries who wanted to fight the Mobutu government. The situation was "slightly different in the Katanga days", when South African mercenaries were fighting to uphold an existing government.\(^{(31)}\)

This is at variance with earlier Government statements, themselves often at variance with one another. In April, 1961, the Minister of External Affairs, Eric Louw, said in Parliament that the Government had done its best to prevent men from going to the Congo, though if people with valid passports supplied good reason for going to Rhodesia, for example, they could not be prevented. Louw based his defence on this loophole rather than any argument that Katanga had a legitimate government.\(^{(32)}\)

By 1964, when Katanga's former leader, Tshombe, was Congolese Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd did talk in terms of 'legitimate government'. "When Katanga had a recognised government, South Africa also gave it supplies. It also allowed the recruitment of mercenaries. Now the Central Government, as a legitimate government was recruiting and the position was again legal."\(^{(33)}\) Dr. Verwoerd's statement is unsatisfactory in that Katanga had not an internationally recognised government. And van den Bergh's assertion that passports would not be issued to mercenaries to fight against Mobutu's government is not altogether watertight for the reasons Louw gave. Moreover, many of the mercenaries travelled in special aircraft direct from Johannesburg without passports or visas, presumably with official consent. Still, General van den Bergh's statement probably indicates "current policy", that the South African Government would "not be a party to the overthrow of any government anywhere."\(^{(34)}\)

\(^{(30)}\) Newscheck, 1/9/67.
\(^{(31)}\) Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 27/8/77.
\(^{(33)}\) Speech to the Cape National Party Congress—Port Elizabeth—26th August, 1964.
\(^{(34)}\) Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 27/8/67.
In doing this, the strength of White Africa is also apparent to Black Africa. White troops have demonstrated their superiority over African armies since 1960. This has caused frustration to the efforts of African states to establish their equality in the community of nations. For the future, there has been some speculation as to South Africa's military relations with friendly governments in neighbouring states. "If disorder and prolonged violence were to occur in these states, would the Republic feel obliged to follow up its economic help with military support for the governments in power?"(35) Another writer suggests that South Africa can offer friendly African leaders not only economic advantages but also "potential military support for them personally if any local ex-corporals try to start a coup d'etat. To this might be added threats that leaders of black African states which harbour 'freedom fighter camps against South Africa might find aided local coups d'etat mounted against them ... "(36) In international politics such action is not abnormal, as American practice indicates. Foreign policy statements by South African cabinet ministers at least show how aware they are of the vacuum in the southern half of the continent since Britain's withdrawal.(37) One of the factors that might inhibit the South African government from going so far as to take open military action would be the danger of appearing to internationalise trouble in the sub-continent. So it could be more astute a means to use mercenaries, despite the moralising outcries that their presence sometimes provokes.

Some countries outside Africa may also soon become dependent on mercenary troops. Britain is in the process of withdrawing from the Far East and all bases east of Suez. Singapore is already worried about the vacuum this will leave in the military situation and the very existence of the feudal states in the Persian Gulf is consequent on British military presence and their rulers are already thinking of a substitute. Moreover the loss of American lives and the fundamental stalemate in the Vietnam war may increase the degree of isolationism which is appearing again in the United States, and future American governments seem likely to be less willing to act as the world's policeman.

Thus the mercenary may well become an acceptable ingredient of national armies once again until nations who have no armies of their own can provide adequately for their own protection from local resources.

(36) Norman Macrae, Deputy Editor of the Economist, in a special supplement to the Economist, 29 6-68, p. xlvi.
(37) Two typical examples as this work was being prepared for publication were speeches by Foreign Minister Muller and the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, M. C. van Rensburg. The Star, 16/8/68.
Appendix

SELECTED RESOLUTIONS ON THE CONGO ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 14th 1960 (S/4387):

The Security Council,
Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,
Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/4382),
1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;
2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

This resolution was adopted by eight votes (Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland, Tunisia, U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.) to nil, with three abstentions (China, France and the United Kingdom).

2. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 22nd, 1960 (S/4405):

The Security Council,
Having considered the first report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387 of July 14th, 1960 (document S/4389),
Appreciating the work of the Secretary-General and the support so readily and so speedily given to him by all Member States invited by him to give assistance,
Noting that as stated by the Secretary-General the arrival of the troops of the United Nations force in Leopoldville has already had a salutary effect,
Recognising that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts,
Considering that the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Recognising that the Security Council recommended the admission of the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations as a unit.

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of July 14th, 1960, on the withdrawal of their troops and authorises the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect;
2. Requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
3. Commends the Secretary-General for the prompt action he has taken to carry out resolution S/4387 of the Security Council and his first report;
4. Invites the specialised agencies of the United Nations to render to the Secretary-General such assistance as he may require;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

This resolution was adopted unanimously.

3. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON AUGUST 9th, 1960 (S/5526):

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution of July 22nd, 1960, (S/4405) inter alia, calling upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of July 14th (S/4387) on the withdrawal of their troops and authorising the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect.
Having noted the second report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the aforesaid two resolutions and his statement before the Council.
Having considered the statements made by the representatives of Belgium and the Republic of the Congo to this Council at this meeting.
Noting with satisfaction the progress made by the United Nations in carrying out the Security Council resolutions in respect of the territory of the Republic of the Congo other than the Province of Katanga.
Noting however that the United Nations had been prevented
from implementing the aforesaid resolution in the Province of Katanga although it was ready, and in fact attempted to do so. Recognising that the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Province of Katanga will be a positive contribution to and essential for the proper implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

1. Confirms the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of July 14th and July 22nd, 1960, and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby;

2. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council’s resolutions;

3. Declares that the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution;

4. Reaffirms that the United Nations force in the Congo, will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise;

5. Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to implement this resolution and to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

This resolution was adopted by nine votes to nil, with two abstentions (France and Italy).

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE FOURTH EMERGENCY SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 20th 1960 (A/RES/1474/REV. 1. (ES-IV:)

The General Assembly,
Having considered the situation in the Republic of the Congo.
Taking into account the unsatisfactory economic and political conditions that continue in the Republic of the Congo.
Considering that, with a view to preserving the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, to protecting and advancing the welfare of its people, and to safeguarding international peace, it is essential for the United Nations to continue to assist the Central Government of the Congo.

1. Fully supports the resolutions of July 14th and 22nd, and
of August 9th of the Security Council;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security;

3. Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation;

4. Appeals to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government for purpose of rendering the fullest possible assistance to achieve the objective mentioned in the preamble;

5. Requests:
   (a) All States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Republic of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
   (b) All Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

6. Without Prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, calls upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other material of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of July 14th and 22nd and of August 9th, 1960, of the Security Council.

This resolution was adopted by seventy votes to nil, with eleven abstentions (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Ukraine, Union of South Africa and the U.S.S.R.). Bolivia was absent.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON
FEBRUARY 21st, 1961:

A

The Security Council,
Having considered the situation in the Congo.
Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the killing of the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito.
Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security.
Noting the report of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (S/4691) dated February 12th, 1961, bringing to light the development of a serious civil war situation and preparations therefore,
1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort;
2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisors not under United Nations command, and mercenaries;
3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them;
4. Decides that an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished;
5. Reaffirms the Security Council resolutions of July 14th, July 22nd and August 9th, 1960, and the General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of September 20th, 1960, and reminds all states of their obligations under these resolutions.

B

The Security Council,
Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously imperil peace and order, and the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace and security.
Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in the Congo.
Recognising the imperative necessity of the restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance with the fundamental law of the country, so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely elected parliament.

Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, including the formation of any Government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security;

1. Urges the convening of the parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures in that connection;
2. Urges that the Congolese armed units and personnel should be recognised and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo;
3. Calls upon all States to extend their full co-operation and assistance and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the implementation of this resolution.

This resolution (S/4722) was adopted by nine votes to nil, with two abstentions (France and U.S.S.R.).

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON NOVEMBER 24th, 1961 (S/5002):

The Security Council,
Recalling the resolutions S/4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S/4741.
Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (EX-IV), 1592 (XV), 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV), and 1601 (XV).
Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo, (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely:
(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
(b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;
(c) To prevent the occurrences of civil war in the Congo;
(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and
(e) To render technical assistance.
Welcoming the restoration of the national Parliament of the Congo in accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent formation of a Central Government on August 2nd, 1961.
Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically seces-
sionist activities and armed action now being carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a sovereign nation,
Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel,
Recognising the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,
Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the interests of world peace and international co-operation, and stability and progress of Africa as a whole.

1. Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries;
2. Further deprecates the armed action against United Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities;
3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom;
4. Authorises the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign advisors not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in Paragraph A.2 of the Security Council resolution of February 21st, 1961.
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities;
6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations;
7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly to activities against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities against the United Nations forces and personnel;
8. Declares that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi fondamentale and
Security Council decisions and specifically demands that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;

9. Declares full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist that Government in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national integrity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions;

10. Urges all Member States to lend their support, according to their national procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations;

11. Requests all Member States to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter.

This resolution was adopted by nine votes to nil, with two abstentions (France, United Kingdom).

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 14th OCTOBER, 1966:

The Security Council,
Having heard the statements of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the representative of Portugal,
Taking note of the statement of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that Angola under Portuguese administration is used as a base of operation for foreign mercenaries for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Taking note further of the statement of the representative of Portugal that there are no mercenaries in Angola, nor camps, nor war material meant to disturb the peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Being deeply concerned over developments in the area,
Recalling the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly,

1. Urges the Government of Portugal in view of its own statement, not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

2. Calls upon all States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation resolution.

This resolution was adopted unanimously.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 10th JULY, 1967 (S/RES/239(1967):

The Security Council,
Having taken cognizance of the message of the Congolese Government contained in document S/8031,
Having discussed the serious developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Concerned by the threat posed by foreign interference to the independence and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
1. Reaffirms in particular paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution 226 (1966) of 14th October 1966;
2. Condemns any State which persists in permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries, and the provision of facilities to them, with the objective of overthrowing the Governments of States Members of the United Nations;
3. Calls upon Governments to ensure that their territory and other territories under their control, as well as their nationals, are not used for the planning of subversion, and the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
4. Decides that the Security Council shall remain seized of the question;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution.
This resolution was adopted unanimously.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 15th NOVEMBER, 1967 (S/RES/241 (1967):

The Security Council,
Concerned by the serious situation created in the Democratic Republic of the Congo following the armed attacks committed against that country by foreign forces of mercenaries,
Concerned that Portugal allowed those mercenaries to use the territory of Angola under its administration as a base for their armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Taking into consideration the support and assistance that those mercenaries have continued to receive from some foreign sources with regard to recruitment and training, as well as transport and supply of arms,
Concerned at the threat which the organisation of such forces poses to the territorial integrity and independence of States,
Reaffirming resolutions 226 of 14 October 1966 and 239 of 11 July 1967,
1. Condemns any act of interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
2. Condemns in particular, the failure of Portugal, in violation of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, to prevent the mercenaries from using the territory of Angola under its administration as a base of operations for armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. Calls upon Portugal to put an end immediately, in conformity with the above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council, to the provision to the mercenaries of any assistance whatsoever;

4. Calls upon all countries receiving mercenaries who have participated in the armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take appropriate measures to prevent them from renewing their activities against any State;

5. Calls upon all Member States to co-operate with the Security Council in the implementation of this resolution;

6. Decides that the Security Council should remain seized of the question and requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution.

This resolution was adopted unanimously.


Congo 1961: 1962. " " " "
Congo 1962. 1963. " " " "
Congo 1963. 1964. " " " "
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