Capacity Building and Training for Peace Operations and Conflict Resolution in East Africa

Dr. Adams Oloo

Conflicts in Africa bear certain unique characteristics predominantly embedded in their root causes, intensity, duration (often too long), escalation and their propensity to spill over to neighboring states. Although the recent creation of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) led to concerted efforts by African states to search for peace on the continent, the commitment of African people to mitigate their own conflicts is not a recent endeavour: the continent has been grappling with the issue since the beginning of the post-colonial period, yet positive results have persistently remained elusive. Capacity-building and training in conflict resolution can make an important contribution to the management of conflict in East Africa.

Introduction

Conflicts in Africa bear certain unique characteristics predominantly embedded in their root causes, intensity, duration (often too long), escalation and their propensity to spill over to neighboring states. Although the recent creation of the AU PSC led to concerted efforts by African states to search for peace on the continent, the commitment of African people to mitigate their own conflicts is not a recent endeavour: the continent has been grappling with the issue since the bagging of the post-colonial period, yet positive results have persistently remained elusive.

African peacekeeping is caught between the intransigence of the international world and the need for Africans to become self-sufficient. A preoccupation with state-centered approaches to peacekeeping on a continent where the state is often the source of insecurity has been problematic. Capacity-building and training in conflict resolution can, thus, make an important contribution to the management of conflict in East Africa.

One of the most significant post-Cold War trends is the recognition of the need for regional security complexes to take collective responsibility to solve their security problems. This demands that regions accept co-responsibility and share the burden to police themselves. It also implies that there has been a dilution of the central role that many had hoped the United Nations would play in this regard. For Africa, this has meant a new dawn to provide African solutions to African problems. A number of trends have been discernible as a result of this quest. These include the steady decline of UN peacekeepers on

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Dr. Adams Oloo is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi
the African continent; an increase in robust, multilateral military interventions by willing African coalitions, with the blessing of the UN Security Council (UNSC); the growth of bilateral military interventions, under the auspices of sub-regional organisations, but without Security Council approval; increased civilian participation and the provision of humanitarian assistance; and the continued collaboration on African peacekeeping capacity-building programmes.4 In the last decade, peacekeeping in Africa has grown dramatically, with the continent hosting more operations and peacekeeping than any other region.

East Africa, this case study, is often used to specifically refer to the area now comprising the countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Seychelles, Somalia and Sudan. In East Africa there are five important regional actors involved in peace and conflict management: the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The demand for peace operations in this region has expanded with the entry of the Somali and the Sudanese crisis into the fray, and all these organisations respond simultaneously to these crises.

This paper seeks to highlight the nature of conflicts that exist in Eastern Africa; the framework under which these conflicts have are being addressed; the capacity-building and the training modules in place that are geared towards enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of these organisations; as well as the necessary measures that can be undertaken to strengthen these organisations and make them relevant actors in the maintenance of peace, and also mediums of conflict resolution in Eastern Africa.

Collective Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa

Collective security arrangements, while they vary in form and scope, typically oblige states to act in certain ways with respect to other states.5 A ‘common security approach’ emphasises that states in a given regional formation share common security concerns, often of a multidimensional nature, and together can address their security needs more effectively than alone or in opposition to each other.6

In Africa, the AU is the central organ around which collective security structure functions, with sub-regional organisations acting as both its pillars and implementation agencies for the continental security policy. At its first session, the assembly of the AU established a PSC as a standing decision-making organ, including “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” PSC is composed of: a Panel of the Wise, which is a body that advises the Council on issues relating to the maintenance and promotion of peace; a continent Early Warning System, to facility anticipation and prevention of conflicts; an African Standby Forces (ASF), a body of multidisciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid deployment; and a Special Fund to provide the financial resources for activities.7 ASF components that have already been created and/or are in the process of being developed in Africa include Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); Western Africa Standby Brigade (WASBRIG); Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SASBRIG); Northern Africa Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); and Central Africa Standby Brigade (CASBRIG). The establishment of regional brigades consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment anywhere in Africa at appropriate notice.8 This structural interdependence not only contrasts starkly with the OAU’s often uneasy relationship with the continent’s regional organisations, but also helps to focus the plethora of African security initiatives onto one common objective. Moreover, it allows the AU to profit from the regional organisations’ comparative advantage in military and security matters, their experience with peace operations and – in the case of western, eastern and southern Africa – their established frameworks for conflict prevention, management and resolution.9

Conflict Architecture in Eastern Africa

The security of African nations remains subject to a variety of military and non-military risks that are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. While the potential for interstate disputes has not diminished, the last decade has seen the appearance of the complex new risks to peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organised international crime. These crises have had elements that range from interstate, intrastate and/or transnational in nature, and also involve the cross-border movement of refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs), migrants and
widespread human rights abuses. Such intrastate and transnational conflicts are generally fought by sub-state actors or ‘warlords,’ militias, criminal elements and armed civilians, and not by regular armies. As a result, social cohesion and state institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail, and the civilian population flees the conflict region or the country. A crisis response or peace support operation (PSO) will, therefore, generally include political, diplomatic, military and humanitarian efforts to control any conflict and to promote reconciliation, the re-establishment of effective government, and a self-sustainable peace.10

The conflict dynamics in East Africa are complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking regional and international actors. The violent conflicts have tended to expand geographically and the epicenter of the conflicts is shifting from one country to another. The need to strengthen regional security arrangements is thus one of the most pressing priorities in East Africa today. Political instability, civil strife and interstate conflict have been defining features in East Africa. Conflict in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia has spilled over their respective borders, which has in turn increased the insecurity of neighboring states.11

Furthermore, ethnic identities in this region have not been used by elites to harness unity in diversity, but have instead been used instrumentally to consolidate and serve the interests of the dominant at the expense of the less powerful groups. The contemporary destruction of the legitimacy and accountability of many of the states in the region thus results in part from the arbitrariness of their territorial boundaries, originally brought about by colonial partition and then ‘transferred’ to the local elite at independence. In these circumstances, overlapping ethnic identities between states, especially when used in the pursuit of power, often become a source of conflict rather than of unity. In the past two decades, hundreds of thousands of people have fallen victim to violent conflict and the vagaries of the dictators in the region. Many East Africans have, as a result, been alienated from their states respectively and have fled their countries and become refugees in neighbouring countries.12

The states of East Africa are also undermined by acute environmental degradation. An ecological system made viable by cyclical drought has been further damaged by armed conflicts. Pastoralist and hinterland populations have been among the primary victims. Desertification, drought, environmental degradation and a scarcity of resources have displaced large numbers of people, driving them across national borders as migrants or as environmental refugees. Apart from putting pressure on state boundaries, their arrival sometimes creates feelings of insecurity and intolerance in the local population, which now has to compete for scarce resources. This, of course, can engender xenophobia and conflict of various kinds in the population of the receiving countries.13

Within the Eastern Africa region there exists two conflict systems: the Horn of Africa conflict system; and the Great Lakes conflict system. The former comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, while the latter comprises Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire and, by some accounts, Kenya. Because conflict systems are in part spurred by diplomatic and economic realities, they often overlap. The Horn of Africa and Great Lakes conflict systems have a clear overlap, whose sub-set includes Kenya and Uganda.14

Violent conflicts present one of the most urgent challenges in the Eastern African region. The region has witnessed one of the longest armed conflicts in Africa in the Sudan. It has, in recent times, also experienced one of the world’s worst genocides, in Rwanda. Burundi also experienced a civil war for most of the period after 1993, while ethnic and resource related tensions in Kenya have erupted into violence during election years in the 1990s. In this same region, Somalia has experienced a civil war for the last one and a half decades following the collapse of the state, while a full-blown border war was fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In Northern Uganda, an atrocious war has been perpetrated for the last two decades, leading to massive displacement and suffering. In addition, and partly as a result of this state of affairs, illicit weapons have proliferated in the region, aiding the escalation of conflict.15

Internally, Uganda has been plagued by severe violence in the northern and western parts of the country. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been raiding large parts of northern Uganda for the last two decades and is behind cruel atrocities. Although the Ugandan government has granted amnesty to the rebels, suspicions still linger among the LRA leadership.16 In Rwanda and Burundi, the most conflict-prone countries in the Eastern African region, different stages of transition and ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction prevail.

The Eastern African region has also been experiencing another unfolding trend that has threatened peace and security in this part of Africa. There is a new proliferation and availability of small arms. As a result, states that were
considered relatively peaceful, such as Tanzania and Kenya, are now being confronted by increased instances of armed crime. Crime networks have sprung up and are operating organised crime rings, especially around car theft, cattle rustling and armed (bank) robbery. 17

Cattle rustling is also a problem on the border territories of Kenya and Uganda. This situation has further been compounded by incidents in neighbouring countries. For instance, the volatile situation in Ethiopia and Somalia has a great impact on the state of affairs in Kenya, while the conflict in Southern Sudan has had repercussions in Northern Uganda. In Sudan, the conflict is undermining the progress that was achieved in enhancing peace through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 18

Current Framework for Conflict Management and Peace

African countries’ willingness to participate in peace operations has dramatically increased in recent years. Prior to 1988, just 12 had contributed personnel to a UN peacekeeping operations, most only to a single mission. Since 1999, 29 have contributed to a UN peacekeeping operation, most to more than one. This increased willingness is not limited to UN peacekeeping operations. African regional organisations have also become more active. Of the 27 Africa-led peace operations that have been undertaken, 21 have involved regional organisations. All but three of the missions involving African regional organisations have been undertaken since 1990. Five organisation have undertaken one or more such missions, but many more have created new conflict resolution mechanisms, strengthened their secretariats, undertaken training, and sought new funding streams to better prevent or resolve conflict among their members. 19 In East Africa, there are currently multilateral institutions, regional organisations, heads of state initiatives, individual donors, and formal and informal contacts between governments and rebel groups, as well as civil society organisations and religious organisations involved in conflict resolution work, at different levels.

The AU and sub-regional organisations are important elements and partners in any effort to develop and implement a regional political strategy for East Africa. They play an important role in promoting and implementing the regional cooperation on peace, security and economic integration. Among the relevant regional organisations active in the eastern part of Africa include the AU, IGAD, EAC, COMESA and NBI, which have different mandates, structures, membership and ambitions. Their effectiveness and potential also vary widely.

As already pointed out, there are several institutions that address and have mandates that seek to ensure peace in the Eastern Africa states, as well as steer conflict management in the region. Below are some of these activities.

The AU: the AU operationalised its PSC in 2003, as outlined by its Protocol adopted in 2002. Soon after, the AU launched its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi, and deployed its second operation, a ceasefire monitoring force in Darfur, in June 2004. The ambitious AU agenda also includes development of sub-regional brigades to comprise its proposed ASF by 2010. 20

The AU has made significant progress in developing its capacity to engage in conflict mediation and peacemaking in the past few years. Its efforts have attracted substantial support from the international donor community, including through the APF, which is one of the most tangible aspects of the EU’s growing cooperation with the AU. The AU-led African operation in Darfur (AMIS) is particularly challenging for an organisation whose peace and security structures are still in their infancy. The European Union (EU) is committed to strengthening the political authority of the AU and its ability to deliver. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) includes an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), for which the prevention and reduction of intra- and inter-country conflicts are among the key objectives.

Heads of the State Initiative: one of the more important institutions for conflict management in the region is the Heads of States forum. The Heads of State initiative has mediated in conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, and the chairmanship of the Heads of State network circulates between the presidents of the region. 21

IGAD: IGAD comprises Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, and has become a central part of the political and security architecture of the Horn of Africa, and has played a key role in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes. Mostly importantly, IGAD provides a forum for regional dialogue in a sub-region of endemic conflicts. Support for IGAD is, therefore, central to achieving the EU’s objectives in the Horn of Africa.

In the area of conflict prevention it has set up Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), a conflict early warning and early response mechanism; and Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), a standby force for preventive deployment, peace-enforcement and peacemaking.
missions as part of the ASF. Finally, it aims to develop capacity in post-conflict peacebuilding.

Africa Crisis Respond Initiative (ACRI): The need to quickly restore peace and security in the event of armed conflict has resulted in the establishment of joint military formations in all sub-regions to respond to needy situations. ACRI that has received immense US support involves the establishment of military cooperation in each of the five identified sub-regions on the continent to obviate reliance on the less effective extra-continental interventions in conflict situations. This security scheme has advanced further in the establishment of the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and EASBRIG Fund in 2004. According to the Jinja Draft Protocol, the EASBRIG member states undertake to place all armed forces at the disposal of the EASBRIG arrangement for peacekeeping action under a unified command whenever required for the restoration of peace and security. The EASBRIG now has three components: the brigade HQs, to be located in Addis Ababa; the Planting Element, to be based in Nairobi; and Logistic, base to be co-located with the Brigade HQs in Addis Ababa.

EASBRIG: in implementing the AU Commission’s requirements, IGAD convened the Jinja meeting of Experts in February 2004 on the establishment of the EASBRIG. This was followed by a meeting of Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) from the Comoros (which sent a representative), Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, the defence attaché of Tanzania, who attended as an observer, and a representative from Common Market from Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). There were also observers from the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations operations (SHIRBRIG) and Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (RECAMP). It was noted that, once established, EASBRIG would encompass 13 East African countries. Hence, in addition to those mentioned, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Seychelles would also be included.22

Eastern Africa Community (EAC): Although primarily a vehicle for economic integration, EAC – which includes two IGAD countries, Uganda and Kenya – is rapidly developing important mechanisms for cooperation on border controls, policing and efforts to combat trafficking and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) amongst its members. It could offer an effective framework for supporting action on important cross-border and bilateral issues between Uganda and Kenya, the two countries in the Horn that are members of the EAC. Furthermore, the EAC Customs Union, which came into effect at the beginning of 2005, is already having a significant positive impact on inter-regional trade.

EAC has also made progress in the area of peace and security, particularly with the formulation of a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in Defence and the development of a concept paper toward upgrading the MoU into a Protocol. In view of this progress, EAC was advised to harmonise its efforts in a collaborative manner with IGAD and COMESA, towards the establishment of EASBRIG.23

NBI: has emerged as a promising vehicle of regional cooperation on resource sharing. It is focused on cooperation and sharing the benefits of sustainable use of the waters of Nile Basin. COMESA includes all the countries of the Horn of Africa region except Somalia. COMESA is important in promoting trade and investment in the region as well as regional integration, and is also engaged with the EU in the context of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations.

The East African Polite Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO): EAPCCO member countries, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, signed a memorandum to strengthen the regional cooperation to fight border-crossing organised crime, terrorism and narcotics trade.

EAPCCO, a regional police coordination body, has a key role to play in steering the development and implementation of a sub-regional action programme to tackle the proliferation of small arms, specifically the Nairobi Declaration on SALW.

COMESA: COMESA is composed of Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, the Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 4th Summit of the COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, which was held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24 and 25 May 1999, decided that COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs should meet at least once a year to consider modalities for promoting peace and security in the region. It was further decided that they should consider the modalities of promoting peace, security and stability within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and to report to the Authority.24

Under the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Committee on Peace and Security has been formed. It is composed of high-level officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of member states.
The committee shall meet at least once a year to consider modalities of promoting peace and security in the COMESA sub-region, and make recommendations to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

As evident from the above, East Africa has a number of actors that are steering security in the region. It appears, however, that these efforts are not well coordinated at the moment. In addition, information about different activities is not fully known by other actors and, on occasion, it looks unclear under which mandate different initiatives are taken. This might result in different initiatives undermining or infringing negatively on other initiatives. There is thus a need for a more efficient distribution of information about what is taking place at different levels, as this would improve the efficiency on all work geared towards responding to enhanced peace and conflict management in the region. This also includes information on what NGOs and other actors are doing at the local level and upwards in the system. It should also not be ruled out that this multitude of organisations in need of financing might start competing with each other, displaying others as less efficient than themselves. An evaluation of the regional institutions and mechanisms currently in operation in the Horn that are geared towards containing human insecurity is thus necessary and timely, as it will lead to more coordination and complementarity in addressing the subject at hand.

Capacity-building and Trading

Efforts to strengthen regional security institutions in Africa are part of the continuing evaluation of the post-Cold War global security architecture. African countries have made laudable contributions to international peace processes under ad-hoc arrangements, as contributors to UN missions, and through regional and sub-regional organisations. African conflict management efforts such as through mediation and shuttle diplomacy are well-known, but African-led peacekeeping and, more notably, peace enforcement operations, have faced a lot of impediments. Many African militaries lack the requisite training, equipment and logistic capability to effectively undertake and sustain such operations — either alone or as part of multinational missions. While the AU, ECOWAS and sub-regional groups are trying to develop more capacity, such efforts are still nascent.

East Africa peacekeeping troops face the same challenges that other African regional organisation face. These range from lack of logistic support, integral regional approach, general mission support, sufficient and skilled military and civilian personnel, funding, a clear concept of operations, and links to a peace building plan.

Aware that African countries and regional organisations were being overstretched as they assumed these new responsibilities, Western countries, led by France, the UK and the US, undertook various programmes to develop African peacekeeping capacities. The US, UK and France remain the major players supporting African conflicts management, and began to address African sensitivities to the lack of co-ordination in the conduct of these exercises, and the external capacity-building initiatives in general. In the latter part of 1997, the three powers announced the launching of a ‘P3’ initiative, which would co-ordinate the ongoing and future efforts in the realm of peacekeeping training in Africa by the UK, the US and France.

The centerpiece of the French policy is the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme (RECAMP for Réinforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix). The initial UK policy, the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, has been subsumed within a large programme known as the Conflict Prevention Pool, which combines resources from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development. The central US policy in this regard, ACRI has been replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme. Washington also established Operation Focus Relief (OFR), which provided peacekeeping training and equipment to African countries during 2000 and 2001. ORF is viewed as a one-off initiative. Under ACRI, national contingents at the battalion-level received non-lethal peacekeeping training, with an emphasis on the development of basic military skills, protection of refugees, operating effectively with humanitarian organisations, and the observance of human rights. Members of the U.S. Army 3rd Special Forces Group (3rd SFG), based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (which had been training African armies since July 1990), visited each participating state and embarked on a 70-day training cycle (initially 60-days) with a six month follow-up, including Field Training Exercises (FTE) and computer-based simulations. By July 2001, such training had been given to about 8,000 troops, comprising forces from Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Uganda and Senegal.

The organisations involved in peace operations and conflict resolution in East Africa are developing greater capacity to tackle issues of regional
peace and security with help from both governmental and non-governmental organisations. These organisations are also in the process of developing linkages/networks amongst themselves for better collaboration of their various activities.

The AU has increasingly addressed its capacity-building constraints within the framework of the PSC, with the sub-regional organisations as its pillar of operations. The AU made significant progress in the development of a cohesive African peace and security system in 2003. The AU has been able to develop regional ‘standby forces’ in cooperation with the sub-regional organisations on the continent. It is also in the process of developing a continental early warning system (CEWS) to be linked to the regional CEWARNs. The CEWS is tasked with providing the Chairperson of the Commission with information in a timely manner, so that he/she can advise the Council on "potential conflicts and threats to peace and security" and "recommended best courses of action."32

The AU has already deployed two peace operations. In April 2003, the AU launched a mission in Burundi which would grow to over 3,300 peacekeepers, led by South African with troops from Mozambique and Ethiopia. The objective was to uphold the ceasefire agreement, support disarmament of armed forces, assist in establishing stability, coordinate with the UN, and facilitate humanitarian assistance. More observers were supplied by Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. The AU mission in Burundi was established with the understanding that mission leadership would pass to the UN. Indeed, the AU relied heavily on outside support from the UN and Western countries (including the US and the United Kingdom) for logistics and funding. While there was cooperation among these actors it was improvised, and the AU transitioned its mission to the UN in 2004. Building on its success in Burundi, the AU launched its second mission in Darfur in 2004. This mission was much more ambitious, with the aim of monitoring a cease-fire agreement in an area equivalent to the size of Texas, where conflict and a humanitarian crisis continued at a level considered as genocide by the US. Today, that mission has grown to 7,000 personnel, benefiting from willing African nations and major financial, logistical and operational support from the West and other developed states. Even as it has succeeded at many tasks, however, the AU faces fundamental problems.33

The COMESA Programme for Peace and Security is working closely with EAC, IGAD and IOF and with the EU to develop a Conflict Prevention and Management Resolution (CPMR) strategy for the Eastern and Southern African Region. A training workshop for COMESA Parliamentarians on capacity-building in conflict prevention and management skills was held from 5 to 7 September 2002 at Berjaya Mahe Beach Resort in Port Glaud, Seychelles. The training workshop was organised in response to the need for capacity-building in conflict prevention skills among Parliamentarians in the region. The need was identified during consultations with Parliamentarians in the process of developing modalities of addressing issues of peace and security in the COMESA region through conflict prevention.

IGAD has already developed a CEWARN to obtain, analyse and distribute information on potentially violent conflicts; develop scenarios to respond to potential conflicts; and conduct research on ongoing crises.34 The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is responsible for the actual exchange of information, encoding of information and support of the national units, known as CEWERUs (Conflict Early Warning and Response Units). Once fully mature, each IGAD member state will have a CEWERU and an operational steering committee that could include a wide range of stakeholders.35 CEWARU uses a sophisticated methodology and reporting tool originally developed by Virtual Research Associates Inc. (VRA). With funding from Germany and the USs, and the assistance of the Swiss Peace Foundation, who had been using much of this since 1998, the technology was embedded and customised at the CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa.36 The CEWARN system includes alternative news-feed from local information networks or field monitors that log relevant information according to a common set of coding rules. The composite measures of conflict and cooperation used by CEWARN are based upon a unique set of indicators (currently numbering 52) designed specifically for monitoring pastoral conflict in the IGAD region. The result is a set of baseline measures across a range of phenomena, including alliance formation, exchange behaviour, mitigating behaviour and peace initiatives, as well as armed interventions, behavioural aggravators, environmental pressure, and triggering behaviour. These baselines are derived from regular and structured field observations.37

Since June 2003, CEWARN has been monitoring and tracking cross-border pastoral and related conflicts in the two pilot areas of the Karamoja and Somalia Clusters; these pilot areas are now being expanded. CEWARN has an information gathering and analysing tool known as the CEWARN Reporter, used for coding, graphing and analysis of data. The tasks of CEWARN include collecting
In Kenya, a British Peace Support Team (BPST) of seven military staff is working closely with Kenya in the staff College and Peace Support Transport Training Centre to develop Kenyan and East African PSO capacity. A number of prestigious and senior level courses are run each year in addition to numerous other training activities at the operational and tactical levels. Approximately 700 students are trained each year from Eastern Africa and beyond. In addition, the BPST is engaged in developing a Mine Action Centre, which has already trained 120 personnel in humanitarian demining. The African Civil-Military Coordination programme, coordinated from ACCORD, is funded by the Government of Finland. GTZ funds a similar programme at the Kenya Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), and some of this funding has been allocated to support the role of the PSTC in this partnership.

In 2004, the Training of Peace (TFP) at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) initiated consultations with the East African Police Chief Cooperation (EAPCCO) on areas of possible cooperation and collaboration. These consultations resulted in a broad agreement in November 2005 with the Head of the Sub-Regional Bureau (SRB) of the Interpol in Nairobi, Kenya, for the ISS/TFP to support EAPCCO in conducting the Police Officers Course as assistance to enhance the capacity of EAPCCO member Police Services for UN and AU peace support operations. The year 2006 ended with the second of the two Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) UN Police Officers (UNPOC) Trainers courses in Kigali, Rwanda, from 20 November to 2 December 2006. The course, which was organised under the auspices of the SRB of the Interpol Office in Nairobi, was hosted by Rwanda National Police (RNP) at the La Palaisse Hotel, Kigali.

Like all the capacity-building training courses being facilitated by TFP at the ISS, the EAPCCO UNPOC was packaged as a train-the-trainers course, with the aim to build and enhance the capacity of EAPCCO member states’ police services and forces to undertake peace support operations mandated by the UN and/or the AU. Within this framework, the Kigali course was attended by 13 participants drawn from nine EAPCCO member states, namely Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as five participants from the host nation, Rwanda. Incidentally, there was only one female participant on the course, in spite of the fact that member states were requested by the SRB to encourage the participation of female officers, in order to maintain and restore a reasonable gender representation. The participants ranged in rank from the Inspector bracket to Superintendent, and from three years to 25 years’ professional service experience. It is worth noting that the ISS/TFP started its collaborative support to EAPCCO in 2006. The collaboration focuses on capacity-building training in the area of UN and regional peacekeeping operations, for which two training courses were planned for 2006, the first being a High Level Course in Nairobi in March 2006. The UNPOC Trainers’ course is a relevant framework for building capacity within the region, not only for UN and AU peace operations: it is also expected to enhance capacity towards ASF. The UNPOC Trainers will thus enhance the capacity of the police component of EASBRIG, as the establishment of the ASF gradually gains momentum towards 2010, by which time the Force should be operational.

Another initiative is being espoused by USAID’S Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA): the Regional Conflict Management and Governance Team (RCMG). It has been involved in various initiatives aimed at strengthening the capacity for managing conflicts in the Eastern African region. Consequently, the RCMG Team has established a foundation for more effective management of conflict by African organisations. The principal aspects of this work includes capacity-building of intergovernmental, governmental and civil society African organisations and individuals in conflict management; implementation and focusing of conflict activities on the ground using effective approaches in three targeted conflict zones; completion of substantial analytical work leading to new approaches to conflict management; reorientation of regional intergovernmental organisations (IGAD, COMESA and EAC) to work in partnership with civil society and business in addressing regional conflict; and extending information and communications technologies (ICT) to establish
quick response capacities of regional conflict management networks.

Over 20 CPMR organisations have received institutional strengthening from ISGM. These include Africa Peace Forum (APFO), Bahr-al-Gazal Youth Development Agency (BYDA), Forest Action Network (FAN), Resource Conflict Institute (RECONSOLE), and Rwanda Women’s Network (RWN). All five organisations were taken through an Organisational Capacity Assessment (OCA) at the beginning of the grant period that assessed all five at the nascent stage. Most of the courses were targeted at organisations that traditionally do peace work in conflict zones, but it is worth noting that USAID targeted a less traditional audience in 2002 through two regional bodies, IGAD and COMESA. The IGAD Women’s Desk conducted training in Advance Negotiation and Mediation for and COMESA. The IGAD Women’s Desk conducted training in Advance Negotiation and Mediation for Ministers in Charge of Women’s Affairs in IGAD member states. Other members of parliament and government officials were also involved. The workshop resulted in a recommendation from trainees involved to extend the training into all IGAD countries in order to reach more officials. For the first time, COMESA selected targeted Members of Parliament from the region. An outcome of the meeting was a recommendation by the parliamentarians to form a network of MPs from the COMESA region that would work toward conflict prevention and mitigation in the region through sharing of information.

The success over the period, which includes the following, has been documented: first, at the formal governmental level, two regional organisations – IGAD and COMESA – have been realigned to begin taking on the function of intergovernmental platforms for conflict management in the region. Second, IGAD has established CEWARN. Third, much progress has been made in building capacity of African NGOs that work in conflict management. Nine organisations that received institutional strengthening from the Institutional Strengthening and Grant Making Programme (ISGM) not only made the desired progress in institutional strengthening, but also had significant impact on the respective communities served. Progress in FY 2002 continued through ISGM institutional strengthening activities and through training in conflict management by a number of intergovernmental organisations (IGAD and COMESA) and NGOs, such as the African Peace Forum and FORDIA (Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa). Fourth, moreover, that experience has increased recipient organisations’ ability to plan, manage and monitor more ambitious conflict mitigation activities, particularly those involving the identified ‘effective approaches’ in conflict management.

Despite this array of organisations engaged in capacity-building and training operations, African governmental and intergovernmental institutions continue to lag behind in developing and deploying comprehensive peace operation capacities. The few AU- or regional Economic communities (RECs) – led operations conducted to date have indeed been significantly limited in terms of meeting the necessary comprehensive demands. As a natural consequence, the current multidimensional operations set up in Africa – such as UNMIL in Liberia and UNMIS in Sudan - are significantly dependent upon UN or other non-African resources. The AU and the RECs have deployed troops, but they are not self-sustaining and require outside logistical support. They face fundamental gaps in their planning and management capacity to lead peace operations. Their headquarters’ staff total a few dozen professionals; the most skilled are taxed by the requirements of their (often multiple) responsibilities. The AU and RECs are reliant on external sources to finance their operations, since they lack sufficient funding from their member states. Ambitious plans for coordinating peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are still in the early stages of being operationalised. For these African organisations to play a stronger role in peace operations they require baseline capacities: management and planning, financing, logistics, transportation, command and control, skilled and available personnel, and clear leadership. The AU and RECs would also benefit from clearer concepts of operations, mandates, leadership qualifications and doctrine for their missions, as well as from more development of deployable police and personnel.

With new donor support to increase African capacity, however, the African organisations, the UN and donors need a joint strategy to address what is needed. There is need to develop greater institutional and operational capabilities for conflict management. This is challenging, especially at a time when immediate crises may postpone longer-term planning, and as resources are applied to urgent requirements.

**Conclusion**

As enumerated in the Brahimi recommendations to UN peacekeeping operations, the following principles apply to operations led by regional and sub-regional organisations too: First, warfighting is the job of nations and coalitions, not a single nation/organisation. But peacekeepers should be
prepared to deal with armed groups or bandits, and not get pushed around during the conduct of their mission. The sub-regional organisations may need to provide troops with more robust rules of engagement (ROE) and specialised support to implement peace after intrastate conflicts. Second, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be complementary from the beginning. The security provided temporarily by peacekeepers enables peacebuilding to work; peacebuilders help develop the institutions and environment that sustain security and enables peacekeepers to return home. Third, fundamental support is required from member states and within headquarters to underpin peace operations. Their collaboration affects and influences the capacity and success of the organisation’s mission.48 With its focus on peacekeeping, the Panel identified more specific requirements: clarify UN mandates and match capacity with mandates’ directives; improve communication among actors in headquarters, the field and member states; support better planning, logistic and mission leadership; deploy more rapidly and effectively with skilled and available military and civilian personnel (including police); and develop rule of law capacities and better links to longer-term peacebuilding efforts.49 These are the same challenges that East Africa grapples with, and must be addressed if its peacekeeping operations are to remain self-sustaining.

Notes and References

8 Maluki, 2006.
17 Ibid.
27 Berman, 2002.
28 See ACRI Concept and Training Update, 8 November 1997; and ACRI Concept Paper, 16 April 1998.
33 Holt, 2005.
34 IGAD, Draft Supplementary Protocol on Decision-Making for CEWARN.
35 See Article 11(3) of the CEWARN Protocol.
36 Cilliers, 2005.
37 Cilliers, 2005.
38 Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning Conflict Prevention, Kempton Park, South Africa, 17-19 December 2006.
40 www.fco.gov.uk
41 EAPCCO High Level UNPOC Course Nairobi, Kenya, 10-14 April 2006.
42 EAPCCO UNPOC Trainers Course Kigali, Rwanda, 20 November – 2 December 2006.
43 EAPCCO UNPOC Trainers Course Kigali, Rwanda, 20 November – 2 December 2006.
44 USAID and MSI, 2003, Great Horn of Africa Peace Building Project: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region.
46 Holt, 2005.
47 Holt and Shanahan, 2005.
49 UN General Assembly, 2002.